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Abstract 
 
This is my thesis that I explored the dynamic process and peculiarities of Korean welfare 
politics during the Kim Dae-Jung government of 1998-2003, which was the first 
administration to come to power through a peaceful turnover of political power. To this end, 
the research focused on the policymaking processes of National Health Insurance and 
National Pension reforms during that period. The thesis analysed these welfare reforms from 
a more rigorous theoretical framework in order to uncover the key characteristics of welfare 
politics in Korea. In particular, the key role played by stake-challengers including civil 
organisations in such policymaking process was addressed in detail because these Non-
Governmental organisations emerged as an influential player against the established 
stakeholders representing vested economic and political interests.  In contrast to the 
situation in many western democracies, the influence of political parties in the reform process 
was minimal and those parties did not play any significant part in the debates and conflicts 
surrounding the welfare reforms during the Kim Dae-Jung era. Interestingly, though, the 
National Assembly itself through democratic development did eventually emerge as a new 
player in this arena. This thesis also paid due regard to the role played by international 
agencies within the space of Korean welfare politics. It was noteworthyfact that stake-
challengers coalition led by civil organisations was able to overcome stakeholder coalition’s 
interests and objections to win the battle for health insuranceintegration and public pension 
reforms in spite of limitations. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
1.1 Research Background: The New Politics of Welfare Reform in 
Korea 
 
The Law of Reform vs. the Law of History 
Reform is one of the most contested political issues in society. While there has been huge 
variation in the nature of reform, there has been one feature common to all reforms 
throughout history: reform is a controversial issue. There is prescient epigram on the nature 
of reform written by Niccolo Machiavelli in 1513: 
 
“There is nothing more difficult to manage, more dubious to accomplish, nor more doubtful 
of success…than to initiate a new order to things. The reformer has enemies in all those who 
profit from the old order and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit from the 
new order”.(Fuchs, 2009, p.208) 
 
In practice, many politicians call for reform and many people and organisations support 
reform. However, rhetoric and reality are rarely the same. Once reform begins to be 
implemented, people tend to align themselves in accordance with their particular interests. 
The unorganised masses who desire reform are sometimes inactive and silent, while the 
minority with vested interests, such as elites and large companies, utilise the mass media to 
tarnish or emphasise the problems of reform and thereby reconfigure the goals of the reform 
in their own interests. The history of reform around the world has proved this ‘law of reform’ 
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and has demonstrated that the reality is rarely the same as the rhetoric. For example, the 
politics of health care reform in the United States, at least before the passage of Health Care 
Reform Act in 2010, demonstrates the pervasiveness of this ‘law of reform’ (Kim, Y. S. and 
Cho, H.J,2010;Fuchs, 2009). 
However, I think that there is another law, which is the ‘law of history’. The principal point is 
that, as human history testified, human societies develop through reform of various kinds. 
Although the present-day meaning of reform has become increasingly blurred, it essentially 
implies improvement. In everyday language and in literature, reform implies progress or 
development. The concept of reform in the South Korea (hereafter Korea) political context 
has meant progress, improvement, or development and has sometimes been synonymous with 
the radicalism of the Left. In the social policy context in Korea, reform has meant an 
expansion of the welfare state, the introduction of new welfare programmes, and an increase 
in benefits or broader eligibility for them. In the past, the meaning of reform had been the 
same in the West. 
By the early 1990s, however, welfare reform meant the opposite(Norris, F and Thompson, L, 
1995). From that time forth, welfare reform meant cuts, decreasing benefits, and limiting 
eligibility in the advanced welfare states that had suffered financial crisis. The term reform no 
longer denoted improvement, progress, and development. While reform has different 
meaning in different countries, generally speaking, it is used to mean ‘improvement’ occurs 
in developing countries with rudimentary welfare states. 
 
The Politics of Welfare Reform  
No matter what the meaning of reform is, one thing that all reform has in common is that 
changes accompany it. The reform of government policies in particular has an influence on 
many people, and it inevitably has positive and negative aspects. In short, reform produces 
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politics. Welfare reform is a particularly sensitive issue because it is related to people’s 
quality of life. Accordingly, since the politics of welfare reform is more controversial, more 
complex, and more confrontational than ordinary politics, welfare reform leads to greater 
levels of political debate and confrontation. Consequently, prior to any investigation of a 
reform, we need to have a comprehensive understanding of the type of reform that is under 
investigation. In addition, therefore, prior to a full investigation of welfare reform politics, we 
need to briefly introduce the concept of welfare politics and explore its application to Korean 
social policy.  
Welfare politics is so broad and ambiguous a concept that is difficult to define it. For the 
purposes of this thesis, however, I will follow the definition of welfare politics given by Shin, 
K. Y (2002), which focuses on the political dynamics in the process of the formation of 
welfare policy. According to Shin, welfare politics refers to power dynamics among social 
groups regarding welfare policy at various developmental stages of welfare policies. 
Following on from his explanation, therefore, the groups involved in welfare politics range 
from the state, capital, interest groups, international organisations, civil society organisations, 
and trade unions, etc. The key to understanding welfare reform and its politics is ultimately 
the identification and comprehension of the political process within it.  
 
The Politics of Social Policy in Korea 
Welfare politics in Korea was very simple for several decades. During the period of rapid 
economic growth from the 1960s to the late 1980s, all important social policy decision 
making was dominated by the president and was in practice administered by a small number 
of bureaucrats with an exclusive interest in economic growth. At that time, all social policies 
were essentially instruments for economic growth and political legitimacy. The Korean 
governments before the democratisation struggle in 1987 lacked legitimacy because they 
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were military regimes with no electoral mandate to rule. The politics of welfare was 
characterised by 'the politics of legitimation' in that the military regime utilised welfare policy 
to strengthen its political support(Kwon,H. J,1999a). 
However, since 1987 the nature of Korean politics has changed from the politics of 
legitimation to that of democratization(Kwon, H. J, 1999a). Along with administrative 
officials, who previously dominated policy making, interest groups who privately pursue 
profits and civil movement groups who pursue the public interest began to exert their 
influence on policy decision making. Changes brought about by democratisation led to an 
increase in the influence of hitherto excluded organisations such as trade unions and civic 
groups in policy decision making. Under the authoritarian regimes, interest groups were able 
only to ask for their private interests in policy decision making, usually by means of a ‘back-
scratching relationship’ with civil servants or politicians. The transition to democracy 
transformed in part the policy-making process, making it more transparent and better 
reflecting public opinion. The emergence of welfare politics in Korea signified a seismic 
change in the dynamics of welfare policy decision making.  
 
The Welfare Politics of Democratisation 
The transition to democracychanged, in part, the policy-making process and the role of the 
government in this process. The transition to democracy brought about the development of 
civil society and increased governmental accountability considerably. The welfare policies 
previously implemented by the authoritarian governments had merely served their aims of 
economic development and securing political legitimacy. According to Shin, K. Y(2002), 
during the transition to democracy after the pro-democratic resistance movement of 1987, the 
process of policy making, which had been led mainly by those in power, faced major changes 
due to the development of civil society and the organisation of interest groups. The one-sided 
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policy-making system led by the bureaucracy gave way to a more equal and complex one that 
became the focus of public opinion and social pressure. Previous governments, which had 
dominated policy making, became the target of criticism, and collective attempts to effect 
policy changes emerged (Shin, K. Y, 2002). However, democracy itself did not necessarily 
lead to the development of welfare or welfare politics (Flora and Alber, 1981). Although the 
potential for the development of welfare politics in Korea was unlocked by democratisation, 
the actual trigger for its development was the 1997 economic crisis. In addition, it should be 
noted that the discourse on welfare politics in the Korean context was in complete contrast to 
that on welfare politics in Europe. Debate about welfare politics in Western society was 
centred on welfare reform as part of a wider neoliberal economic agenda (Pierson, 1994; 
Weir, 1998), whereas the emergence of welfare politics in Korea was the inevitable result of 
the economic crisis decisively and democratisation of the process of policy decision making 
in part.  
 
The Paradox of the Economic Crisis 
The critical juncture in the Korean context was the 1997 economic crisis. If the first 
opportunity for a shift in Korean welfare politics was provided by democratisation, the 
economic crisis was the decisive factor in the reformulation of Korea’s welfare politics. This 
is one of the key arguments of this thesis. I term it the new politics of welfare reform in 
Korea. Therefore, we should now briefly examine the economic crisis in Korea in 1997 and 
its relationship with the development of welfare politics.  
As mentioned earlier, it is widely accepted that welfare reform in Korea represents the 
general development of welfare programmes and the expansion of state welfare. Since the 
start of the twenty-first century, however, the meaning of welfare reform in Korea has 
become more complex and has begun to focus on more specific welfare programmes such as 
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pension provision, health insurance, and public assistance, like the West. The most important 
thing, however, is not the meaning of welfare reform itself, but the changes in the political 
and economic dynamics brought about by welfare reform. The reason why these changes are 
so important is that they are very closely interrelated with the course of development of the 
Korean welfare state. Since policy produces politics (Pierson, 1994), welfare reform in Korea 
has also produced new welfare politics, and as mentioned above, the crucial factor in the 
history of social policy development in Korea was the economic crisis of 1997. Since 
economic crisis is a major factor in initiating social policy reform (Castles, 2001; Timonen, 
2003; Lee, J.H, 2007), the Korean economic crisis had an enormous impact on both politics 
and the economy in Korea. Korea’s rate of unemployment and level of inequality rapidly 
increased, and the Korean government was forced to request a bailout package from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, unlike in the West, where there was a 
retrenchment in welfare spending after economic crisis, Korea’s economic crisis gave rise to 
welfare reform. As part of the bailout package, the IMF stipulated that the Korean 
government implement welfare reform, including the expansion of state welfare, because the 
limitations of the developmental welfare state had become apparent.  
 
Emergence of New Welfare Politics 
The economic crisis brought out a new welfare discourse and paradigm. Above all, it forced 
welfare issues to become part of official debate. In the past, Korean governments had claimed 
to have established a welfare society or even a welfare state, but this had been mere political 
rhetoric. In actuality, most previous governments did not specifically recognise or develop 
welfare policies. Moreover, before the economic crisis, successive Korean governments had 
deemed welfare provisions for workers and citizens unimportant. The mass unemployment 
and increased level of poverty caused by the economic crisis, however, drew attention to the 
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need for and importance of state welfare and highlighted the ineffectiveness of traditional 
government policies. Accordingly, as part of the crisis management programme, the need for 
a new welfare policy and the expansion of state welfare came to the fore. Therefore, the new 
government that had come to power in the wake of the economic crisis extended and 
strengthened welfare benefits and coverage via a range of social insurance programmes. In 
the next section, I will briefly outline details of these developments. 
In order to manage the social crisis caused by the economic crisis, a new welfare system was 
introduced and the existing welfare system was strengthened. For example, the Employment 
Insurance Program (EIP) was extended to all workplaces in 1998, although it was not strictly 
enforced. The National Basic Livelihood Security System (NBLS) was introduced in 2000 
based on the idea of social rights, replacing the stringently means-tested public assistance 
programme. In the same year, all separate health funds under the National Health Insurance 
(NHI) were integrated, paving the way for a financially and administratively integrated 
programme (Kwon, 2002, 2005b). These welfare reforms opened the way for a new welfare 
politics, one that would be swept along by the winds of welfare reform policies and would be 
varied, colourful, and dynamic. New welfare reform policies created new welfare politics. 
This new welfare politics has had a continuous and strong impact on the course of 
development of the welfare state in Korea. Accordingly, in this dissertation, I will explore the 
structure and peculiarities of welfare politics in Korea and the strategies and interactions of 
political actors within it. In so doing, it is my intention that this will provide a better 
understanding of and new insights into the Korean welfare state.  
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1. 2. The Scope of the research  
 
As stated above, this dissertation attempts to study the new politics of welfare reform after 
the economic crisis in Korea. Specifically, I will investigate the political dynamics of welfare 
reforms in Korea, which are contingent upon the political institutions, political actors’ 
strategies, and the relationship between them. 
In order to do this, however, I will not deal with the entire picture of welfare politics in Korea. 
The chief reason for this is that there have been several excellent earlier studies undertaken, 
perhaps the most notable of which is Kwon, H. J (1997, 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2001, 2002, 
2003, 2005a, 2005b)’s work. However, these studies have mainly focused on welfare politics 
before democratisation in Korea. My focus in this research will be limited to the period from 
1997 to 2003, which coincides with the Kim Dae-jung administration in Korea. The reasons 
forthe selection of this period are that the economic crisis, which fundamentally changed 
Korean society as a whole, occurred during that time, unprecedented welfare reform focusing 
on state welfare was implemented, and transfer of power from an authoritarian regime to a 
democratic regime took place. In short and comparatively speaking, a more progressive and 
pro-welfare government came to power. These socio-economic changes produced a new and 
unique politics of welfare reform. In conclusion, my research examines welfare politics in 
Korea during the distinctive period under the Kim Dae-jung government after the economic 
crisis in 1997. 
In order to achieve my research aims, I will explore welfare policy reforms during this period 
via my theoretical framework of welfare politics. In particular, I have chosen to focus my 
analysis on pension and health insurance reforms during the Kim-Dae-Jung government in 
order to understand the variety of policymaking and political processes associated with 
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welfare reform. Through this exploration, I will uncover the nature and characteristics of 
Korean welfare politics, its dynamics, and reveal its limitations as well.  
 
Focus on pension and health insurance reforms  
As mentioned above, this research will mainly focus on pension and health insurance reforms. 
Why have these two policy areas been chosen? Above all, these policy areas are key pillars of 
a nation’s welfare system. According to the ILO’s method of estimated social expenditure, 
most European countries in the 1970s and 1980s spent more than 80% of their social 
expenditure on pension and health care plans (Kim, Y.M, 1998, 2001b). So, by reflecting on 
Europe’s case, it can be noted that most of the conflicts between interest groups were caused 
by pension and health insurance policies. In other words, the conflict structure of these two 
policy areas reflects the overall structure of conflict within a welfare system. The same can be 
applied to Korea. Regarding national health insurance, the system is a universal social 
insurance system for health care with and is the largest in terms of population coverage and 
budget, which amounted to almost 20 billion pounds in 2010. The national pension fund 
amounts to over 150 billion pounds. Social conflicts took on same aspect. The most 
controversial and intense social conflicts were caused by the health insurance and national 
pension programmes during the Kim Dae-jung administration (Kim, Y.M, 2001b). In practice, 
the Kim Dae-jung government expanded pension programme coverage to the self-employed 
and those with short-term contracts in 1999 despite widespread organised resistance. By the 
following year, the management organisations of various NHI health funds were integrated 
into one single organisation. In the process of policy making for these reforms, civil 
movement organisations played a significant role in integrating and strengthening these 
programmes. 
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One of the main concerns of this study is to understand how the interactions between political 
variables have affected the development of these two welfare policies in Korea. In identifying 
the forces that have influenced pension and health insurance reforms in Korea from a welfare 
politics perspective, it will be possible to determine the array of variables that could play a 
prominent role in the rapid expansion of social welfare in Korea. In order to do so, I will 
employ a detailed analysis of reforms and the policy-making process in Korean pension and 
health insurance policies.  
 
1.3 Aim of the research and the research questions  
 
This research will aim to explain the peculiarities and dynamics of Korean welfare politics 
since the 1997 economic crisis. Simultaneously, through this study, the driving forces of and 
the interactions among political and social actors in the policy-making process of welfare 
reforms, especially pension and health insurance reforms, will be uncovered. Specifically, 
through analysis of the policy-making process, I will look at the following issues:  
 
1.Where and how are welfare reforms initiated, brought to the attention of government, 
propelled forward to the point of policy decision-making or blocked and quietly buried? 
2.With a particular focus on pension and health insurance, how and to what extent do 
political and social actors influence the policy-making process of welfare reforms? 
3.What are the key peculiarities of welfare politics in Korea since the economic crisis? In 
what way do they differ from Korea’s welfare politics before the economic crisis? 
 
In addition to these three main questions, there are also several related questions that this 
research will examine:  
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(1) What are the underlying general processes of such changes and welfare reforms?  
(2) What are the most influential and important driving forces behind these reforms? Since 
social policy development can be understood in the context of power relations in society, it is 
necessary to examine the broader power structure and actors that permits or constrains the 
welfare reforms.  
(3) How do we explain the political dynamics of welfare reform with regard to the decision-
making process for social policies in Korea?  What cleavages appeared, and how were they 
`structuralised' in regard to welfare politics in South Korea? In Korea, economic bureaucrats 
have customarily held considerable influence in the decision-making processes of 
government. I will explore how they have affected social welfare policy development and to 
what extent they have had the power of veto in the process of social policy decision making. 
This is also a very important issue in terms of welfare politics. What is the relationship 
between welfare development and the political system? What were the core factors that 
influenced welfare politics at the distinctive conjuncture of democratic transition and 
financial crisis?  
(4) The most important issue is the inquiry into ‘how welfare politics manifested themselves 
in the decision-making process of the pension and health insurance welfare reforms’ 
 
1.4 The Organisation of this Research 
 
The thesis consists of eight chaptersincluding this Chapter 1, introduction. Chapter2provides 
an overview of the new politics of the productive welfare reforms after the economic crisis. 
In this chapter, I will show the new players in Korean welfare politics.Chapters 3 and 4 
focuson theoretical issues. Chapter 3 reviews the literature on competing theories of welfare 
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politics in Western and Korean contexts. The literature on Western theories will provide 
important insights and a rich theoretical grounding for this research. In this chapter, I will 
also review how Korean scholars have applied these Western theories and have constructed 
their own approaches.In Chapter 4, I present a theoretical framework for analysing the 
political dynamics within the policy-making process of pension and health insurance reforms. 
My framework is based on power-centred action theories. In this chapter, I will present a new 
framework for analysing the policy-making process of pension and health insurance reforms 
and especially the political dynamics within this process. Economic and social bureaucrats, 
state political leaders, international economic actors such as the IMF and the World Bank, 
and labour unions and civic movement groups’ respective roles and interplay will be 
discussed.  
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 contain the case studies. Chapter 5 will cover the welfare politics of 
health insurance reform in Korea, including an overview of health policy politics before the 
economic recession. Chapter 6 will deal with the welfare politics of pension reforms during 
the Kim Dae-jung government after the economic crisis, including an overview of the public 
pension system in Korea and the politics of pension policy creation and reform before the 
economic crisis. The lastchapters are the concluding stage.  
In Chapter 7, I will analyse the new pattern of Korean welfare politics, puttingit into 
perspective. In this chapter, the common political patterns among political-social actors in the 
policy-making process of both pension and health insurance reforms will be identified, and 
the new politics of welfare reform in Korea will be illustrated.Chapter 8 draws together the 
conclusions of this research. In particular, it will present the theoretical and empirical 
implications of the political dynamics in the pension and health insurance reforms in Korea.  
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1.5From Journalist to Social Scientist 
 
Moving my role from a reporter who was heavily involved in this era of change to a  
detached social scientist was a major challenge for me. In this section, I touch on the 
differences between the role of a researcher and that of a journalist including an assessment 
of how the roles vary, the distinct demands of academic research and how I had to adapt my 
approach in order toproduce a social science thesis. At first glance, the work of a journalist 
and a researcher would seem to havesome over-arching similarities of approach.  Both, for 
example, endeavor to find facts and report them as accurately as possible. In my research I 
used methods which I also used routinely in my work as a journalist such as interviewing, 
recording the information and analyzing relevant existing data and information. However, 
there are some clear and significant differences in the roles of the journalist and the 
researcher. For the journalist the key issue is obtaining and delivering a `lively’ story as fast 
as possible. There is never enough time for methodical background reading, systematic 
review of evidence or space to consider alternative interpretations in depth. Instead the 
journalist has to settle for a more impressionistic evaluation in which the contemporary 
details of a story are relayed in as clear and as accurate a way as possible which can appear  
somewhat superficial to the professional social scientist.  In moving to the role of a detached 
scholar, I had a new experience.  I now had the opportunity to undertake a more reflective 
review of issues.I was able to collect and sift information in a systematic way having time to 
consider, analyse and comment on the information I discovered.  This conversion of roles 
was far from straightforward not least because I remained as an active journalist during the 
time I was studying for my PhD thesis as a part-time student. I had to work hard to control 
my journalistic instincts so that they did not spill over into my academic enquiry. However, 
in the process of researching my topic I recognized that conducting research is not only about 
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producing`stories’ but also requires new interpretations and analysis and the need for a clear 
research frameowork to produce more reliable findings. Nevertheless, it remains the case that 
both the reputable journalist and the scientific researcher share a common desire to pursue the  
truth and to present their findings in an impartial a way as is possible. 
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Chapter 2 
 
‘Productive welfare’ Reforms after the Economic Crisis (1998-
2003) 
 
Introduction 
The economic crisis in 1997 severely shook Korean society. During the 1960-1990s, Korea 
achieved a remarkable and rapid economic growth that is sometimes called `the miracle of 
the Han River’ (the Han is a major river in Korea, flowing through Seoul). As a result, the 
Kim Young-sam government joined the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) in 1996. However, within one year, the economic situation had changed, and 
Korea suffered a foreign-exchange crisis in 1997.Korea’s international competitiveness 
evaporatedand many companies found themselves on the brink of bankruptcy. Consequently, 
many companies dismissed their employees, the city parks and major train stations became 
full of homeless people, and day-to-day living became difficult for many people. Generally, 
most countries adopt fiscal constraints and cuts in welfare spending in response to economic 
crisis, as evidenced by the UK’s cost-cutting measures of 2010-2011. What makes the 
Korean case particularly interesting was that Korea reacted to its economic crisis very 
differently from the customary Western response to economic crises (which tends to follow a 
pattern of welfare spending retrenchment and the simple expansion of safety nets for the most 
vulnerable). Instead Korea achieved a range of remarkable welfare reforms and significantly 
expanded its state welfare. Like her economic growth during the 1970s and 1980s, Korea’s 
welfare state developments were extraordinarily rapid after the economic crisis. The then 
president, Kim Dae-jung, who had been elected to office in the midst of the economic crisis 
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and had become the first opposition party leader to assume the presidency in almost 50 years, 
called his new approach to welfare ‘productive welfare’. In practice, the Kim Dae-jung 
government’s social policies were hugely different from those of the previous government. 
Although the fiscal conditions were very difficult owing to the economic crisis, the 
government managed to expand the coverage of pensions, integrate national insurance, 
introduce unemployment insurance, and enact the National Basic Livelihood Security Act, 
among other welfare improvements.  
This chapter aims to provide a general understanding of social policy developments under the 
Kim Dae-jung government. Specifically, I will explore what sort of welfare reforms were 
made, which factors influenced the reforms, which actors were the main actors in promoting 
welfare reforms, and the interactions among the actors in welfare politics. This chapter will 
serve to outline the welfare reforms under the Kim government as a prelude to examining in 
detail the policy making and welfare politics of pension and health insurance reforms during 
this period in Chapters 5 and 6. In order to do so, I will first detail what happened in 1997 in 
Korea in terms of the social policy arena. Next, I will review the actors’ actions and their 
political activities and analyse the nature of the welfare reforms. 
 
2.1 Economic crisis and the crisis of the developmental welfare state 
2.1.1 The impact of the economic crisis  
 
The word ‘crisis’ is very political term and is sometimes appropriated and misused by 
politicians, the CEOs of companies, and those who have special interests in order to create 
tension and to try to draw attention away from their own difficulties and failings; even during 
periods of economic growth, they sometimes employ the word. However, the economic crisis 
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in 1997 was not a ‘crisis’ in this political sense; rather, it was a dreadful reality and an 
unprecedented event for Korea. It created panic. “In January 1998, right after the beginning 
of the financial crisis one newspaper in Korea succinctly described the dreadful picture of the 
IMF era; ‘On everybody’s lips is the word, layoff. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is 
spelled out as I M Fired” (Shin, K.Y,2002, p.1). As a journalist working for a Korean daily 
newspaper, I too wrote many articles about the situation at that time. This is part of one of my 
articles about the economic crisis. 
 
There are laid-off workers everywhere. The survivors, however, are not safe. During the last 
year of the IMF bailout, Korea has suffered a flood of unemployment ... some of the jobless 
have been forced onto the streets … some of these were once management staff, technical 
experts, and even chief executive officers of small and medium-sized firms...(The Hankyoreh 
Daily Newspaper, 1999) 
 
The collapse of the economy was too sudden, unexpected, and it struck all Koreans by 
complete surprise because almost no country had attracted as much interest in its spectacular 
economic growth as Korea had until that moment. 
 
In a report published in 1993, the World Bank noted that eight countries in East Asia have 
achieved impressive economic growth rates during 1965-1990. In particular, a great deal of 
praise was showered upon South Korea, which had continued to record annual economic 
growth rates of about 9% for 30 years (IBRD 1993). Four years later, the Korean economy 
attracted the attention of the world once again, but for the opposite reason. What used to be 
the showcase of economic success was now meeting with the crisis of total insolvency(Lee, B. 
S, 2007). 
 
What had gone wrong? Although the causes of the economic crisis are still debated, the most 
obvious cause was insolvent companies. At that time, what was becoming increasingly 
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troublesome was the debt-to-equity ratio of many Korean conglomerates, which competed for 
sheer size, often with borrowed money (Oh, 1999) According to Oh, the average debt-to-
equity ratio for the thirty largest Korean chaebols reached 450 per cent in 1996, while the 
average ratio in the United States seldom reached 150 to 200 per cent at that time. Moreover, 
their capital holdings were also amongst the worst in the world. Their tendency to seek short-
term and high interest loans, so-called ‘hot money’, worsened this situation and so many big 
companies collapsed.  
Finally, the then government announced that it would apply for a bailout from the IMF one 
day before the presidential election was due, and on December 3 1997, the Korean 
government and the IMF signed an agreement on a bailout package of $57 billion. However, 
the package was not a simple loan contract. It included a range of demands such as economic 
restructuring and reform, corporate governance and corporate structure reform, and labour 
market reform. These demands were designed to open Korea to global markets. Accordingly, 
“further market opening and financial liberalization had to be more extensively implemented” 
(Woo, 2004) in the name of economic reform by the Kim Dae-jung government, which was 
inaugurated in January 1998. The international financial apparatus, including the IMF and the 
World Bank, also intervened in the economic and social policies of the incoming government 
as well. 
The most decisive impact of the economic crisis was political change. At the onset of the 
economic crisis, candidates were in the midst of campaigning for the presidency” and “the 
country was vulnerable on both economic and political fronts (Kwon, H. J, 2003). 
Fortunately, however, Korean democracy did not descend into turmoil, and instead there was 
an astonishing transfer of power. The opposition leader, Kim Dae-jung, was elected to the 
presidency. This was all the more surprising since during the campaign to the onset of the 
economic crisis, Kim Dae-jung was struggling to mend his broken promise that he would 
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retire from politics after his defeat in the 1993 presidential election, and the governing 
candidate was leading the race (Kwon, H. J, 2003). 
The economic crisis radically changed the approval ratings of the candidates. The election of 
Kim Dae-jung was significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, in the political context, it 
meant that the peaceful power shift form an entrenched ruling camp to an opposition leader 
was accomplished for the first time in fifty years of republican politics in Korea (Oh, 1999). 
Secondly, in the social policy context, it meant that a pro-welfare president was elected for 
the first time and there was considerable state welfare expansion. Thirdly, in the 
policymaking and welfare politics context, his election meant a significant change in policy 
paradigms at the top of the decision-making structure (Kwon, H. J, 2003). Lastly, the 
economic crisis and the ensuing power shift spelt trouble for the long-standing developmental 
welfare state. Inevitably, the combination of the economic crisis and this power shift forced 
the Korean developmental welfare state to undergo radical changes, 
 
2.1.2 The characteristics and the crisis of welfare developmentalism 
 
The Korean welfare system was poorly developed by the authoritarian government, which 
adopted an ‘economic growth-first strategy’. Some scholars including Kwon H.J (1998, 
2005a) have described its inherent characteristics as ‘the developmental welfare state’. 
According to Kwon (2005a), the key characteristic of the developmental welfare state was 
welfare developmentalism. Welfare developmentalism was the principal rationale of social 
policy throughout the East Asian region (Deyo, 1992; Goodman, White and Kwon, 1998; 
Chung, M.K, 2004; Kwon, H.J, 2005a, Lee, H.K, 2009), and its basic premise was that social 
policy was an instrument for economic development (Kwon, H.J, 2005a). In practice, Korean 
social policy had functioned both as an instrument for economic growth and as an effective 
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tool of legitimation for the Korean military regimes for several decades. Under this paradigm, 
social policy did prove to be one of the most effective policy instruments during the period of 
rapid economic growth in Korea (Kwon, H. J, 2002; Goodman and White 1997).  
The Park regime introduced the first modern social welfare programme, the Industrial 
Accident Compensation Insurance scheme, in the early 1960s. Alongside this, a pilot 
programme for health insurance also was introduced. In 1973, the National Pension Scheme 
(NPS) was first considered as a means of accumulating domestic capital but was postponed 
owing to the international oil crisis of that year. In 1977, the National Health Insurance 
system was introduced for workers. These programmes were fundamentally tools for 
economic growth and to promote the stability of Park’s authoritarian regime. During this 
period, Korea’s economic growth was remarkable. The average annual economic growth rate 
from 1962 to 1987 was 8.7 per cent. After the June 1987 democratic struggle, economic 
growth continued, and by 1997 Korea had the world’s 11th largest economy. As a result of 
this continued growth, NHI was extended to the entire population and the NPS was 
implementedin the end of 1980s. The Employment Insurance Programme (EIP) was 
implemented in 1995. “Consequently, until the middle of the 1990s, just before the financial 
crisis began in1997, Korea operated four major social insurance programmes, implying on 
the verge of becoming a modern welfare state” (Chung, M.K, 2004). All these welfare 
developments were initiated and administrated by the Korean government, but government 
did not take responsibility for financing them (Kwon, H.J, 2002). Instead, he government 
shifted welfare responsibility onto companies and families, using their regulatory power to 
force the private sector to provide and finance certain types of social provision and care (Lee, 
J.H, 2007). Kwon has called this role of the State in financing welfare programmes that of a 
regulator (Kwon, H. J, 1998, 2002). Chung, M. K (2004) summarises the characteristics of 
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the Korean developmental welfare regime as follows. As for its ideologies and functions, 
Chung notes five points:  
 
A strong developmental ideology deeply embedded in the welfare system as well as other 
social and political institutions. A conservative ruling coalition between the state and 
business with labour excluded or incorporated. Subordination of social welfare policies to 
industrialization and macro-economic policies. Strong fiscal conservatism; public financing 
skewed to economic investment rather than welfare. Employment-related or industrial 
achievement model, with benefits provided through work (2004, p.161) 
 
Chung also describes the formal structure of the Korean welfare regime. Its key feature was 
that it employed “social insurance programmes as the main form of the welfare, with the 
state’s minimal contribution to funding”. He also describes the nature of the public assistance 
of this regime as “very strict provision” and emphasises the minimal development of social 
services. In sum, the state provided a minimum of direct provision and instead subsidised and 
regulated non-profit service providers, especially those working in the areas of education and 
health. 
Lee, J.H (2007) sets out the characteristics of developmental welfarism as follows: 
 
(1) The state’s role as a regulator and a low social spender in combination with the 
prominent welfare role of the private sector (2) the privately financed social insurance 
principle (3) the link between work and welfare through an enterprise-and employment-
centred system (4) a strong emphasis on human capital investment and self-reliance without 
commitment to socially guaranteed minimum standards of provision(p.21) 
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However, the political and socio-economic negative effects of the developmental welfare 
state were tremendous. In the social policy context, the welfare state was residual and 
selective. In particular, the welfare state protected only a selection of the population, such as 
civil servants, schoolteachers, military men, and regular workers. Kwon, H.J (2002) describes 
the downsides of welfare developmentalism of Korea as follows: 
 
First, redistribution took place in such a way that the lion’s share went to the high income 
earners, reflecting the fact that the wage earners in large-scale business and state sector 
employees were the first groups of people covered by the social policy programmes. Second, 
social policy-making was confined only to small number of top policymakers, leaving most 
citizens without a voice. Third, the welfare state was organized mainly for the wage and 
salary earners and was based on the implicit assumption that unemployment could be kept to 
a minimum (p.26). 
 
Chung conceptualises Kwon’s third argument as the dualism of the Korean welfare 
regime(2004) and adds that the expansion of corporate welfare schemes worsened this 
dualism. He states that large-business labour receives more benefits from both public and 
private welfare programmes, but workers in small and medium-size businesses and the urban 
marginal sector receive less from both sides. He goes on to argue that “this dualism is a 
product of a Korean industrialisation strategy based on large business in the context of East 
Asia since World War II” (2004). This dualism has still not been resolved, although there 
have been some developments since the economic crisis. 
The 1997 economic crisis hit the developmental welfare system hard in every regard. 
Fundamentally, this system did not protect the vulnerable, and the economic crisis had 
created hundreds of thousands of vulnerable unemployed people. Under this system, they had 
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to rely on their savings or private help to survive. For them, the social safety net within the 
welfare system was meaningless because the system was mainly for employed people, 
particularly those working for large businesses. 
 
2.2 The reform of the developmental welfare state and the introduction of 
productive welfare 
2.2.1 The productive welfare of the Kim Dae-jung government 
 
The IMF prescriptions and social safety net 
The impact of the economic crisis on the Korean economy was immense throughout 1998. 
Korea experienced a sudden fall in GDP of 5.8 per cent. Domestic consumption dropped and 
export industries were lifeless. As a result, per capital gross national income fell from 
$10,307 in 1997 to $6,823 in 1998. The all-round effects of the recession on the Korean 
economy are tabulated in Table 2-1. 
Table 2-1 The changes in the Korean economy from 1995 to 1998 (unit; per cent) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 GDP 8.9 6.3 5.0 -5.8 Final consumption expenditure 8.2 7.2 3.2 -8.2 Exports of goods and services 24.6 11.2 21.4 13.3 Imports of goods and services 22.4 14.2 3.2 -22.0 
(Source; NSO (the Statistics Korea), 1999, Shin, D. M, 2000a) 
 
The all-round effects of the recession on the Korean economy are tabulated in Table 2-1. 
Although the recession stemmed from the economic crisis, the IMF demands brought about a 
further temporary deterioration of the economy. The IMF demands were focused on 
economic policy, but social policy was included as well and can be categorised into four 
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areas: ‘the financial sector, corporate governance, labour relations, and social welfare’ 
(Chung, M.K, 2001). The demands included abandoning the unsound financial institutions, 
corporate restructuring, internationalized domestic accounting and auditing activities, 
elimination of government-directed lending and non-intervention in financial activities, 
removal of all government assistance including tax privileges to domestic firms and rapid 
liberalization of the trade regime and the labour market (Lee, H. K, 2009). In light of these 
demands, the newly elected Kim Dae-jung government had to implement economic reform 
and social reform at the same time, faithfully following the IMF prescriptions. The reason 
why social policy was included in the IMF prescriptions was that the prescriptions were 
based on neo-liberalism, and accordingly, the reforms were expected to lead to mass 
unemployment. In practice, these economic prescriptions had a huge influence on the socially 
disadvantaged. The rate of unemployment skyrocketed from around 2.5 per cent in the early 
month of 1997 to 6.3 per cent in February 1999, the jobless total reaching 1 million (Shin, 
D.M, 2000). Perhaps the most noteworthy feature of this period was the collapse of the 
middle class. The long-standing economic growth in Korea had brought about a numerical 
increase in the middle class, but the financial crisis forced the numbers of middle class to fall 
substantially. The social policy elements of the IMF prescriptions were fundamentally geared 
to securing smooth economic reform.  
The IMF package and the notion of productive welfare  
The newly elected Kim Dae-jung government had to simultaneously implement the neo-
liberal economic reforms and establish a social safety net, even before drinking a toast to its 
presidential victory. The welfare reform to be carried out under the Kim Dae-jung 
government was conceptualised as ‘productive welfare’ (or DJ welfarism). The notion of 
productive welfare was reportedly devised by President Kim Dae-jung himself. According to 
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the book of ‘DJ welfarism (2000)’ published by the Presidential Committee for Quality-of-
life under the Office of the President in 2000, productive welfare was defined as follows; 
 
Productive welfare is an ideology as well as a policy that seeks to secure minimum living 
standards for all people, while expanding opportunities for self-support in socio-economic 
activities for the purpose of maintaining human dignity (2000, p.18). 
 
The Presidential Committee for Quality-of-life explained the three components of the concept 
of productive welfare as follows: 
 
1) Distribution through an equitable market system 2) redistribution of wealth by the 
government 3) social investment for self-support. 
 
In the same vein, the Presidential Committee on Policy Planning at that time advocated three 
key principles: 
 
1) guaranteeing a minimum standard of living for those without the ability to 
work  
2) supporting self-reliance and self-support by virtue of the centrality of work 
and human capital development  
3) a more efficient and democratic management of welfare institutions by 
increasing the involvement of local authorities, the private sector and the 
community in policy design and implementation (1999). 
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Lee, H.K (2004) identifies the three notions that lay behind productive welfare. She argues 
that “the notion of productive welfare incorporates the ideas of, first, the basic human right to 
decent minimum standard of life, second, the right to work and participate, and third, welfare 
pluralism, with emphasis on the importance of social welfare as a human capital investment” 
(p.293). Lee, H. K (2004) interprets it to mean a welfare mix of ‘the components of 
Beveridge’s notion of national minimum, Nordic countries’ social democratic corporatism, 
and the neo-liberal principles of welfare-to-work and private public partnership’. Shin, 
K.Y(2003b) argues that “productive welfare was an outcome of complex economic, political 
and institutional dynamics” (p.12). He defines it as “welfare-to-work, which is similar to 
workfare, which has been intensively developed in the United States and later in Britain” 
(ibid.). Whatever the precise motivation for and interpretation of productive welfare may be, 
the Kim Dae-jung government implemented an audacious welfare reform package that 
covered many kinds of social welfare programmes.  
 
2.2.2 The implementation of productive welfare reform  
 
Unemployment countermeasures 
In practice, then, what happened in the social policy context under the Kim Dae-jung 
government from the economic crisis in 1997? The most urgent issue was the problem of 
joblessness because the economic crisis and the subsequent IMF economic reform package 
triggered an unemployment explosion.  
As can be seen in Illustration 2-1, the rate of unemployment was 2.4% in 1990, and it 
remained fairly consistent until 1997. By 1999, however, it stood at 6.3%, according to the 
ministry of Labour.According to Kwon, H. J (2001), the unemployment had three important 
characteristics. 
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Illustration 2-1: Unemployment Trends in Korea (unit; per cent) 
 
(Source : the Minstry of Labour White Paper, 2000)  
 
First, the unemployment rate among young people was very high.The number 
ofunemployedpeople aged between 15/34 was about 781,000 (53.9% of all the unemployed). 
Second, no employment sectors were safe from job losses. Third, there was a change in the 
labour market structure. In other words, a bigger proportion of the older employees left their 
jobs while more young people tended to stick to their work instead of exploring various 
possibilities (Kwon, H. J, 2001). 
The Kim Dae-jung government rushed in countermeasures to tackle the problem. Various 
measures were introduced, including temporary job creation through a large-scale public 
works project, job sharing, vocational training, and income support for the unemployed. Most 
importantly, the government expanded unemployment benefit coverage under the 
Employment Insurance Programme from businesses with 30 employees to those with ten, 
then with five, and finally in October 1998 to all employees except temporary and part-time 
workers. Unemployment benefit is one of the three components of the Employment Insurance 
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Programme (EIP). The other components are job-training grants and job security grants, as 
shown in Table 2-2. 
 
Table 2-2 The structure of the EIP (Kwon,H.J, 2001) 
Components Sub-programme Grants for 
Unemployment benefits Unemployment benefits Incentives for job seekers Incentives for early job-takers Incentives for training, etc. 
Job training Incentives for employers Incentives for employees In-house training Paid leave for training, etc. Training for the unemployed Incentives for training, etc. 
Job security  Restructuring programme  Incentives for employing unemployed, women, and the elderly Subvention to the retirement funds for construction workers  
Temporary closure/reduction of working hours/redeployment of workers, retraining, etc. Employment of the long-term unemployed Maternity leave Employing the elderly, etc. 
(Source: Ministry of Labour, Labour White Paper, 1998) 
 
The EIP is a social insurance programme financed by contributions from employers and 
employees. The government acts as a regulator and subsidises its operational costs. This 
means that benefits are available to those who have paid the required contributions prior to 
the date of unemployment. Eligibility conditions for receipt of the benefits include the 
following: the recipient must be actively seeking work, and there must be ‘justifiable reasons’ 
for their having lost their job. Alongside increasing the coverage extension of unemployment 
benefits, the Kim Dae-jung government also increased the level and duration of 
unemployment benefits and relaxed the insured period for benefits. Government expenditure 
on unemployment reached 2.7% of GDP in 1999. Aside from this, the Kim government made 
efforts to strengthen other measures for tackling unemployment, such as vocational training. 
However, in spite of the coverage expansion, the benefits could not be claimed by many of 
the unemployed and the poor. The EIP was limited only to those who had previously been in 
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full-time employment and was not applicable to the self-employed who had lost their jobs, 
temporary or part-time workers, unpaid family workers, or those people who had left their 
jobs voluntarily. These limitations were fundamentally related to the legacies of welfare 
developmentalism, but in spite of these limitations, the Kim Dae-jung government’s 
measures against mass unemployment received attention in other countries.  
 
The reform of public assistance  
The most notable welfare reform under the Kim Dae-jung government after the economic 
crisis was the introduction of the National Basic Livelihood Security (NBLS) system. The 
NBLS became a symbol of President Kim Dae-jung’s welfare policy; indeed, Kim stated in 
an interview with the Hankyoreh daily newspaper in 2007 that his greatest achievement was 
the introduction of the NBLS system. President Kim’s assessment was no exaggeration. 
Many academics regard the enactment of the NBLS as a remarkable development in the 
history of social policy. Moreover, the importance of the NBLS goes far beyond its function 
as a new form of public assistance: it was significant in terms of social policy content, policy 
making in the area of social policy, and welfare politics. In this section, the discussion will be 
confined to the importance of the NBLS’s content in the public assistance context. 
The NBLS system originated from the Livelihood Protection (LP) system, which was enacted 
in 1961 as a type of public assistance for the deserving poor. Public assistance refers to state 
benefits paid out of general tax revenues without contribution conditions (Hwang, 2006). 
When the LP was introduced, much of the Korean population was poverty-stricken. The rate 
of absolute poverty in 1965 was 40.9%. The LP was introduced to meet the needs of these 
people, but its coverage was insufficient and selective, its application was crude, and its goal 
was neither social security nor the guarantee of social rights but the maintenance of public 
order and the management of the labour market, rather than the well-being the poor (Hwang, 
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2006). Accordingly, its structure was based on selectivity and its principle on self-reliance. 
To become a beneficiary of this system, all three of the following conditions had to be met. 
 
First being poor, second, being economically inactive, meaning, aged 65 and over, or under 
18, or handicapped, or pregnant, and the third is having no responsible family members or 
the responsible family member being unable to work(Lee, H.K, 2009, p.11). 
 
These strict conditions meant that less than one per cent of the total population received LP 
benefits before the economic crisis. Moreover, the number of possible recipients was limited 
and determined by the budget allocated to the LP system. 
However, since the economic crisis forced many people from the middle class below the 
poverty line, “it had a significant role in provoking public awareness of the poverty problem 
and the necessity for reform of the existing social safety net” (Jung, 2009). Furthermore, 
throughout the economic crisis, income distribution became more unequal. 
Table 2-3 Income distribution in Korea (per cent) 
 1st-3rd 4th -7th 8th-10th Gini coefficient 
1995 14.7 35.3 49.8 0.284 1996 14.3 35.3 50.4 0.291 1997 14.6 35.8 49.7 0.283 1998 13.2 34.6 52.1 0.316 1999 13.1 34.3 52.6 0.320 
(Source: NSO (2001)) 
 
As shown in Table 2-3, the income share of the 1st-3rd groups, which are the lowest of the 
decile groups (that is, the lowest earners), decreased to 13.1 per cent in 1999 from 14.7 per 
cent in 1995, whereas the 8th-10th groups (the highest earners) increased to 52.6 per cent in 
1999 from 49.8 per cent in 1995. The Gini coefficient column in Table 3-3 demonstrates how 
income inequality increased. 
31 
 
It was under these circumstances that the LP Act was finally abolished and replaced by the 
NBLS system, which was enacted in 1999 and then implemented in October 2000. But what 
are the differences between the two systems? Why is the NBLS Act valued and spoken of so 
highly? In practice, were there significant changes? 
Compared to the LP system, the NBLS system has several obvious improvements, and it is 
widely accepted in the academic world that by the enactment of the NBLS Act, the Korean 
State recognised welfare as a citizen’s social right for the first time. Firstly, the LP system 
was established merely as a means of support, whereas the NBLS system is based on social 
rights. This means that a basic standard of living is to be guaranteed by the government, both 
as the state’s responsibility and as the people’s right. Secondly, the LP’s age restrictions were 
abolished, and people aged 18-65 can be benefit recipients under the NBLS system. In 
addition, housing benefit was established as part of the NBLS system. Under the NBLS 
system, benefit recipients capable of work must seek work and are required to participate in 
the Self-Reliance Assistance (SRA) service. This service is aimed at preventing welfare 
dependency and increasing self-support. Thus, “the SRA services are provided as a welfare-
to-work programme for the Active Labour Market Policy” (Jung, I. Y, 2009). In terms of its 
increased coverage, the practical effects of the introduction of the NBLS can be seen from the 
following passage by Lee, H. K (2004). 
 
The number of public assistance cash beneficiaries increased from 0.37 million in 1997 to 
1.55 million in 2002. The poverty line, the minimum standard of living to be protected by the 
NBLS system, was estimated by the experts and made pubic each year. The budget for the 
NBLS rose from 900 billion Won in 1997 to 3,403 billion Won in 2002. It accounted for about 
half the total budget of the MOHW in 2002 (p. 294). 
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In spite of these considerable improvements over the LP system, the NBLS system still has 
some drawbacks. Although the age restrictions of the LP system were abolished, other 
entitlement criteria for the new benefits are based upon the older system. The most 
problematic issue is the family-support criteria. These criteria include the applicant’s family’s 
income and assets, which have to be below a level set by the government. Because of this, 
many poor people below the poverty line are not entitled to benefits under the system.  
In sum, despite the considerable improvements made to the public assistance programme, the 
NBLS system has not escaped the policy legacies of developmental welfarism. Lee, J. H 
(2007) states that the NBLS provides “minimal income support and a strong emphasis on 
self-reliance without socially guaranteed minimum standards of provision” (p.106), while 
Chung, M. K (2000, 2004) argues that in Korean society, policymakers and social elites tend 
to favour the developmentalist position, that social welfare programmes should not 
undermine the institutional base for economic growth.  
 
The reform of health insurance and pensions  
The health insurance and pension system have also undergone major changes since the 
economic crisis. In this section, I will only briefly summarise the Kim Dae-jung 
government’s reforms and their results. The reason for this is that I examine in detail the 
content, the policy-making process, and the political-social interactions of the reforms to 
these two key welfare systems in Chapters 5 and 6. 
The first challenge for the government and pro-welfare reformists was to integrate the many 
separate health societies into a single administrative organisation that would operate health 
insurance and manage its funds, something that had been a long-standing demand of civil 
organisations before the economic crisis. National Health Insurance (NHI) was introduced in 
1977 and began to cover the entire population from 1988. During the early stages, the 
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management of NHI was administed separately by numerous health societies “in terms of 
collecting contributions and paying hospitals for treatment of their members” (Kwon, H.J, 
2002, p.31). This administrative separation meant that the NHI funds were dispersed among 
the various health societies. According to Lee, H. K (2004), these numbered 420 in total, all 
with different contribution rates and independently managed funds for different workplaces 
and geographical areas. The problems with this diffuse system of management went beyond 
systemic insecurity and instability. In particular, the regional health funds for the self-
employed suffered fiscal problems that created further inequalities in the system. Finally, the 
Kim government effected the integration of NHI, and the separate health societies were 
merged into a single administrative and financial system.  
The Kim Dae-jung government also reformed the National Pension Scheme (NPS) in 
response to the crisis. However, the reform strategy taken was different from that usually 
adopted by the West in times of economic hardship. Rather than employing a policy of 
retrenchment, Kim’s government expanded pension coverage to the urban self-employed, to 
firms with fewer than five employees, and to temporary workers and daily workers in 1999. 
As a result, “9 million individuals were added to make the 16 million universal coverage of 
the pension system a reality by 2001” (Lee, H. K, 2004, p.295).  
Regarding pension reform during the Kim Dae-jung Administration, Kwon, H. J(2002) 
summarises the developments as follows: 
 
The Kim Dae-jung government made three important policy decisions for reforming the 
programme. First, the level of pensions would be lowered so that expenditure in the future 
would be smaller. Second, the programme was to cover self-employees, farmers and urban 
informal sector workers, who were previously excluded. Lastly, a steering committee was set 
up to consult the ministers of Finance and Economy and Health and Social Welfare on 
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investment decisions. This committee included policy experts, as well as officials from the 
government. The new rules were implemented from December 1998.(P.40) 
 
The interesting point is that despite the pressure from the IMF and the World Bank for the 
introductionof a partially privatised pension system, the government maintained a 
redistributive form and a single fund system based on the principle of social solidarity. 
However, although there were significant developments, there were still serious problems 
with the new pension system, such as its financial sustainability and fund management issues. 
Besides these reforms, medical and pharmaceutical practices were separated, and free 
primary school education was implemented. In addition, the Industrial Accident 
Compensation Insurance scheme was expanded to all companies.  
 
Debates and reinterpretation of the welfare reforms  
The welfare reforms of the Kim Dae-jung government led to major debates among academics 
on the nature of welfare reform and the welfare regime under this government. In fact, this 
was the first time that academic debate on the nature of a Korean government’s welfare 
reforms had taken place (Nam, C. S, 2002a). The key issues were how best to understand the 
nature of the Kim government’s welfare reforms and how to evaluate their performance. 
These questions were closely related to the issue of what constitutes the nature of the Korean 
welfare state.  
The debates on the post-economic crisis welfare reform can be broadly divided into three 
categories. These debates are essentially based on Gosta Esping-Andersen's (1990) typology 
of three welfare regimes. The first argument is that the reform was neo-liberal in nature. Cho, 
Y. H (2000) argues that it was explicitly so, while Chung, M. K (2000) contends that the 
reform was essentially neo-liberal in approach, but it was informed by the institutional 
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legacies of the developmental state. However, Kim, Y. M (2001) argues that there was an 
expansion of state welfare and a reinforcement of the state’s role in welfare provision within 
a wider neo-liberal economic framework, which suggests that the reform was hybrid in nature. 
Similarly, Kim, Y. M (2001b) insists that the reform was a hybrid of liberal and conservative 
welfare regimes. However Nam, C.S(2000) claims that although the intentions behind the 
reform may not have been so, its result was a conservative welfare regime. These debates 
have raised fresh arguments about the Korean welfare regime’s likely future direction. Here, 
like in the debates on its nature, scholars see different prospects for the Korean welfare 
regime: the emergence of a conservative welfare regime (Cho, Y.H, 2000, 2002), the 
continuation of a developmental regime (Chung, M.K. 2002), and the development of a 
hybrid form combining liberal and conservative regimes (Kim, Y.M. 2001b, 2002). 
The main debates were later developed and expanded upon through two books edited by Kim, 
Y. M (2002) and Chung, M.K (2004), respectively. The core idea of the debates concerned 
the fundamental nature of the Korean welfare regime. Although scholars have each presented 
very different arguments, they have a common ground in one sense: the Kim Dae-jung 
government’s creation of the basic foundations for the Korean welfare state has had a 
considerable influence both on its course of development and Korean welfare politics. More 
interestingly, most scholars at that time did not regard the Korean welfare state or its future 
prospects positively (Nam, C.S, 2002a, 2009; Kim, Y.M, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c; Cho, Y.H, 
2000, 2001). However, I contend that despite the Korean welfare regime’s many 
shortcomings compared to advanced welfare states, the possibilities for and the potential of 
the Korean welfare regime is considerable. The most important factor is that since the 
inception of welfare reform, the numbers of people supporting the establishment of a 
universal and comprehensive welfare state have continuously increased and continue to do so, 
as you can see Table 2-4. The pressure ‘from below’ in terms of welfare politics in particular 
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is inexorable and the creation of a new and comprehensive Korean welfare state seems almost 
inevitable. This pressure ‘from below’ can be confirmed through the exploration of welfare 
politics during the period of welfare reform under the Kim Dae-jung government after the 
economic crisis. 
 
Changes in the labour market after the economic crisis  
As Table 2-4 shows, the welfare policy performance of the Kim Dae-jung government was 
very different from that of previous governments.  
Table 2-4 Welfare performance before and after the economic crisis 
 Social expenditure (adjusted GDP, %) The MOHW budget (adjusted government budget, %) 
National pension participants (unit; millions) 
Employment insurance participants (unit; millions) 
Gini coefficient 
1996 5.29 4.03 742.6 433.1 0.291 
1997 6.46 4.22 735.6 428.0 0.283 
1998 10.86 4.12 658.0 526.8 0.316 
1999 9.77 4.97 1074.9 605.4 0.320 
(Source: figures from the KIHSA, MOHW, NPS, etc.) 
 
There was an expansion of social insurance, the enactment of the NBLS system, an increase 
in social expenditure adjusted for gross domestic product (GDP), and a considerable increase 
in the budget of the MOHW. Although poverty and income inequality were rising (as shown 
by the GINI cokefficient), neither was due to welfare reform (Nam, C.S. 2002). Rather, the 
economic crisis and the neo-liberal globalisation measures implemented by the previous 
government lay at the heart of problem, although it must be noted that the neo-liberal 
economic reforms implemented in the wake of the economic crisis also had a considerable 
impact in this regard. Indeed, many scholars, including Nam, C. S (2002b), Lee, H. K (2004), 
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and Shin, K. Y (2003) have pointed to the impact that neo-liberal economic reform had on 
income distribution.  
According to Nam,C.S (2002b), the most influential factor was the changes in the 
composition of the labour market. The percentage of irregular workers rapidly reached over 
50% of the entire workforce after the economic crisis, and the proportion of irregular workers 
reached 58.4% in 2000 (Kim, Y. S, 2001). These changes in the labour market would later 
have a considerable influence on the nature of the Korean welfare regime and Korean welfare 
politics. 
 
2. 3Changes in the policy-making process  
 
2. 3. 1 The understanding of the policy-making process 
 
The changes in social policy in Korea after the economic crisis were not limited to welfare 
reforms. More significantly, there were changes in the policy-making process itself. As was 
shown in Chapter 1, the policy-making power under the authoritarian governments was 
concentrated in the autocratic president and the bureaucracy. By and large, policy making 
occurred within a closed structure, and it was primarily democratisation that opened up this 
policy-making system in terms of the social policy arena. Eventually, the economic crisis 
brought about significant changes to the policy-making power structure and its process.  
The social policy-making process in Korea since the economic crisis has been explored by a 
number of scholars, and these studies have yielded important insights. The bulk of the 
research has focused on individual policies such as pensions, health insurance, the separation 
of medical and pharmaceutical practices, and so on. In particular, the policy-making process 
of the NBLS system has been the subject of intense study. The reason, perhaps, is that the 
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NBLS system policy-making process was the most dramatic and interesting. In this sense, the 
most notable research was Ahn, B. Y’s (2000) work. He examined how democratisation and 
civil society had influenced the policy-making process throughout the enactment and 
implementation of the NBLS system. He discovered four key characteristics of the NBLS 
policy-making process. 
 
1)Civil society’s role in the reform process of social policy has increased and major changes 
in the existing policy-making process have occurred. 2) However, decision-making remains 
president-centred. 3) Bureaucratic politics remain prominent 4) The economic bureaucrats 
with neo-liberal attitudes intervened in the detailed enactment of reforms and attempted to 
influence decision makers on social policy (Ahn, B, Y, 2000, p.45; from Korean, author’s 
translation). 
 
In reality, the enactment of the NBLS system arose from a welfare reform movement by civil 
organisations, but the final design was the product of a compromise between civil 
organisations and the conservative bureaucracy. After Ahn’s study, a number of younger 
scholars re-examined this process, and they came to much the same conclusions.  
 
2.3. 2 Three interpretations of Korean welfare politics in terms of policy-making process 
 
However, comprehensive research on the policy-making process and welfare politics is still 
rare, and few studies have examined the major policies systematically. In light of this, there 
are three important researchers who have extensively investigated the nature of Korean 
welfare politics. The first notable study was conducted By Kwon, H.J (2002). Kwon 
examined “the reform policies on income maintenance programmes for the unemployed and 
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the poor and in the public health care system, including the reform of National Health 
Insurance and the policy for redefining the work of health care professionals” (p.1). He 
reveals the significant role played by “the advocacy coalition of the welfare-idealistswho 
were the driving force of such reformswith the strategic edge to produce the policy outputs 
they wanted” (p.20). Kwon’s research provided younger scholars with a keen insight into the 
politics of welfare reform in Korea. In conclusion, he argued that: 
 
after the long period when the economic pragmatists exercised a strong influence in policy 
making, the advocacy coalition of the welfare idealists was able to grab the effective point of 
decision amid the economic crisis of 1997-1998, which had altered the course of political 
competition and to a great extent changed socioeconomic conditions in Korea(2003, p.71). 
 
The second significant body of research in terms of the policy-making process and welfare 
politics in Korea since the economic crisis is Shin,K. Y’s studies. In 2001, Shin published the 
article, ‘The Economic Crisis in Korea and Welfare Reform’. In this article, he revealed three 
distinctive features of the social policy-making process in Korea. The first feature that he 
emphasised was that “social classes did not play a significant role in shaping state policy” 
and that “labour unions and peasant organizations did not have political leverage to exert 
their influence through institutional politics” (2003, p.63). Secondly, “political parties did not 
properly function as a policy maker. Political parties in Korea have been dependenton 
regional antagonism since the 1970s, and they have not been interested in social policy 
making for mobilizing voters” (ibid). Thirdly, he noted that “underdevelopment of party 
politics has contributed to the development of the political activity of social movement 
organizations” (p.64). 
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Shin emphasised the importance of two actors in particular – the IMF and the Kim Dae-Jung 
government – but the most decisive actor affecting economic and social policy in Korea was 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). According to Shin, in accordance with the demands 
of the IMF and the World Bank, the Kim Dae-jung government implemented an expansion of 
the social safety net. Moreover, he argued that “as the Kim government used the social policy 
to legitimize the neo-liberal economic reform, it wanted theinvolvement of various social 
groups that might influence public opinion”. Shin’s understanding is somewhat different from 
that of Kwon and other scholars, and he is acutely critical of the Kim government’s role in 
the reform process. In his analysis, Shin focuses on the attitude and actions of bureaucrats. He 
insists that they have a neo-liberal anti-welfare ideology, and while civil organisations and 
policy experts increased their influence on state policy, bureaucrats retained power in shaping 
social as well as economic policy.  
The third important body of work is Kim, Y. S’s research. She has endeavoured to 
conceptualise welfare politics in Korea and reveal the particularities of it more theoretically. 
She argues that democratisation marked the turning point in Korean welfare politics and 
presents the four following characteristics of Korean welfare politics: 
 
First, Korea’s welfare issues stayed in the “realm of non-decision” (Bachrach and Baratz, 
1979)… Second, the welfare consciousness of Korean seems to be alienated from their 
objective socio-economic status… Third, interest articulation in Korean welfare politics 
shows a tendency of extreme pluralism … The last characteristic of Korean welfare politics is 
a critical role played by in sic civic movement groups (2007, pp.213-216). 
 
Her research into ‘the institutions of interest representation’ has revealed a new aspect of 
welfare politics:‘the flawed interest representation has resulted from the political party 
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system that was alienated from civil society and also from the paralyzed social dialogue’. Her 
research has made an important contribution to the study of welfare politics in Korea because 
she has tried to discover how political institutions such as the electoral system and the 
structure of social pacts between the government, the labour movement, and management 
have affected welfare politics. 
 
2.3.3 The politics of the Tripartite Commission 
 
Continuing in this vein, we therefore need to pay attention to the Tripartite Commission (TC) 
because it was the first social pact in modern Korean history. The TC, which had first been 
proposed by trade unions on 3 December 1997, was established from the beginning as a 
presidential advisory body for tackling the economic crisis. The members of the TC 
comprised the heads of the KCTU (the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions) and the 
FKTU (the Federation of Korean Trade Unions) as labour leaders, the heads of the KEF (the 
Korea Employers Federation) and the FKI (the Federation of Korean Industries) as 
representatives of business organisations, the MOFE (the Ministry of Finance and Economy) 
and MOL (the Ministry of Labour) ministers, and finally four political representatives, one 
each from the ruling party and the three opposition parties. The TC was, as it were, a four-
way consultative body composed of labour, management, government, and political parties. 
Initially, the body was merely a consultative body without any legal basis, but the second-
round commission was launched by presidential decree in 1998(Lee,J.H, 2007), formalising 
the association. Before the economic crisis, this type of arrangement was unimaginable. After 
many difficulties, the TC finally reached a historic agreement, the ‘Tripartite Accord for 
Overcoming the Economic Crisis’. However, the accord forced the working class to accept 
harsher conditions in order to tackle the economic situation. 
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The gist of the social pact is labour’s approval of increasing labour market flexibility, 
especially the introduction of lay-offs for ‘urgent managerial reasons’ and a worker dispatch 
system, in return for the promotion of basic labour rights, the reform of corporate (chaebol) 
governance, and the enhancement of social security systems (Lee, J. H, 2007, p.120). 
 
For the new government, the TC was viewed as an instrument for the smooth implementation 
of the neo-liberal economic and labour market reforms called for by the IMF. For business 
and labour circles, however, the TC was seen as more problematic due to their competing 
interests. Talks on measures to tackle unemployment and on economic structural reform 
initially reached a deadlock, but an agreement was eventually reached, albeit one that 
favoured business interests. This agreement provided the business circle with greater powers 
to fire employees freely, which added to the uncertainty and misery of working people. In the 
end, two federations repeated joint and withdrawal continuously of this committee. 
Nevertheless, in the policy-making process or welfare politics context, the TC is meaningful 
because labour unions, management, and the government all participated together in the 
national public policy decision-making process.  
The key arguments on welfare politics presented thus far appear to have different views on, 
and assessments of, the Kim Dae-jung government’s welfare reforms, but nevertheless, they 
all have one argument in common: although the Kim government achieved meaningful 
welfare reform in response to the economic crisis, it did not escape the legacies of 
developmental welfarism or fundamentally alter the established course of welfare 
development in Korea. I agree with the arguments on the contents of the welfare reform. 
However, as regards the welfare politics and policy-making process context, I come to a 
different conclusion to the scholars discussed in this chapter. I contend that a new politics of 
welfare reform emerged, and the economic crisis was the critical juncture for welfare politics 
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in Korea. I will attempt to sustain my argument in Chapters 5~7 with the aid of previous 
research and my theoretical framework.  
 
2.4 Concluding remarks 
 
When analysing social policy, the most important task is to examine under what conditions 
new social policy emerges and to discover how the accumulation of social policies affects 
welfare regimes. Economic crisis is a key factor in the initiation of welfare reform, and this 
has certainly been the case in Korea and also in other countries (Castles, 2001; Timonen, 
2003; Kwon, H.J, 2003a; Lee, J.H, 2007). Korea’s economic crisis brought about a 
completely different topography in both her economic and socio-political context. The 
economy was collapsed and Korea had to receive a bailout from the IMF and the World Bank. 
The economic crisis ultimately led to a power shift and triggered social crisis.  
The newly elected Kim Dae-jung government faced demands from both external and internal 
forces for economic and social reform. The external forces were the IMF and the World Bank, 
and the internal forces were civil organisations, interest groups, the labour movement, and so 
on. Notably, these forces’ interests sometimes converged and at other times diverged, making 
the policy-making process more complicated and pluralistic. With this change in the policy-
making process, a new politics of welfare reform emerged. 
The signs of the emergence of a new welfare politics were explored by some scholars. In this 
sense, some researchers have explored the NBLS and the Tripartite Commission, while other 
researchers have conducted in-depth studies of individual policies. This in itself, however, is 
insufficient if we are to develop a comprehensive understanding of the policy-making process 
and welfare politics in Korea. I contend that by examining the reform process of the major 
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policies such as pension and health insurance programmes, a clearer appreciation of these 
political processes will be possible. This will be undertaken in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
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Chapter 3  Research on Welfare Politics in Korea   Introduction  
The relationship between politics and policy has been a frequent subject of debate in the 
academic field of Western social policy. The relationship between welfare development and 
welfare politics has also often been debated in social scientific research on the welfare state. 
These discussions originally stem from the political nature of social policy itself. Social 
policy historically emerged in the mid-19th century in response to conflicts of interests and 
confrontations between social groups, and as Pierson (1994) claims, policy has produced 
politics.To be more precise, the birth of social policy was the beginning of welfare politics. 
Many scholars have tried to discover the decisive factors, key driving forces, and core 
variables for the development of social policy or welfare states. They have also tried to 
elucidate the political dynamics of the social policy-making process and the political system’s 
influence on changes in social policy. During the 1980s and 1990s, the origin and 
determinants of the welfare state became an intensively researched subject in the social 
policy academic world. Many excellent studies emerged in the UK, Europe and USA. 
In the same vein, research on the welfare development in Korea has also increased, focusing 
primarily on policy changes and the characteristics of the welfare regime. In reality, Korea’s 
welfare regime has experienced significant changes throughout democratisation and 
particularly since the economic crisis. Alongside these changes, new forms of welfare politics 
have emerged: for example, “class politics seems to have become increasingly complex while 
interest cleavages along other-than-class lines have increased in importance” (Ahn & Kim, 
2003, p.260). To investigate the changing nature of welfare politics in Korea, the different 
theoretical approaches that have been developed in both domestic and foreign studies of 
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social policy and welfare state development need to be analysed. In general, many of these 
studies can be classified as having adopted a functional approach, a class-based approach, or 
a new institutionalism approach. However, another, more general, classification can be made. 
The criterion on which this general classification is based is the cause of the policy change. In 
this sense, the following question emerges: why and how did the countries adopt such social 
policies or such welfare development?  
Welfare politics is ultimately the politics of welfare development or the welfare state. 
Accordingly, the theoretical literature on welfare politics, by and large, has been concerned 
with the logic of social policy development. Generally, studies falling within this category 
have posed and have endeavoured to answer the following fundamental questions:  
 (1) By whom, why, and how are such welfare policies formed and changed? 
(2) Which factors or actors have had the most influence on the social policy-making 
process? 
(3) What impact did welfare politics have upon the welfare state, and what form did it take 
as a result?  
 
In this chapter, I will review a number of approaches that explore the development of social 
policies in terms of welfare politics.  
 
3.1 Competing theories; the politics of welfare development   
3.1.1 The state-centred approach 
 
The state and welfare are inextricably linked. The state has been both the most influential 
actor in and regulator of welfare development. Accordingly, the emergence and development 
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of a theoretical state-centred approach is unsurprising, an approach that originally stems from 
the idea that “the state in capitalist democracies is neither a neutral referee nor a capitalist 
state”(Shin, D. M, 2003, p33) and “the state should be understood as an autonomous entity 
with its own interests and goals and with its own capacities to achieve them through a variety 
of policy instruments” (Shin,D. M, 2003, p.33). Scholars advocating this approach include 
Theda Skocpol and her colleagues (Skocpol, 1984; Skocpol and Finegold, 1982; Skocpol and 
Ikenbery, 1983; Skocpol and Weir, 1985). Statist theorists commonly argue that “causal 
factors in the formation and development of social policies are state structure and state 
managers within that structure” (Chung, M.K, 1992, p.18), an argument based on Skocpol’s 
proposition that the state is autonomous. In this regard, Skocpol has argued that “state 
executives and their followers will be found maneuvering to extract resources and build 
administrative and coercive organizations precisely at this intersection between international 
conditions and pressures, on the one hand, and class-structured economics and politically 
organized interests, on the other hand” (1979, p.32).  
This state-centred approach regards welfare states as developing “primarily through the 
innovative role of state managers and experts, who are nevertheless constrained by state 
structures” (Chung, M.K, 1992, p.19). Heclo (1974) explained this approach in his book 
Modern Social Policies in Britain and Sweden in the following way: social policies are 
formed not by social pressures, but by senior officials and by experts on social problems. 
Skocpol and her colleagues also emphasise the state’s autonomy to develop social policies 
and its capacity to achieve goals through a variety of policy instruments (Skocpol, 1985; 
Orloff, 2003). Of course, most researchers recognise that the state’s autonomy and capacity 
are not universal or absolute characteristics and vary in accordance with a range of internal 
and external structural conditions.  
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In summary, the state-centred approach emphasises two points: first, the state is a very 
significant factor in welfare development and welfare politics; second, state actors such as the 
political leaders and bureaucrats play vital roles as decision makers in the policy-making 
process. In practice, political leaders, state elites and bureaucrats in a number of industrial 
countries, including Korea, played crucial roles in presiding over national economic 
development and social policies. For several decades, they controlled both the business sector 
and social organisations such as trade unions and interest groups in order to promote an 
‘economic growth-first’ policy. In the social policy context, state actors initiated, designed, 
managed, changed, and even reformed key social insurance and public assistance 
programmes. In this view, the state  
 “is seen as a group of political institutions with a life and structure of its own by adopting the 
Weberian notion of the state” and “as a corporate actor, a monolithic entity with its own will, 
isolated from society” (Chung, M. K,1992, p.20). 
 
The state-centred approach has contributed greatly to a better understanding of the 
development of social policy and welfare politics. According to Chung, M. K (1992), the 
state’s centrality in much of this development has been largely disregarded by pluralistic and 
Marxist approaches, and the state-centred approach has brought the state back into studies of 
the policy-making process, making scholars more aware of “the mediating role of state 
institutions and state elites and the impact of the inter-state system on domestic politics” 
(Chung, 1992, p.20). Notably, as mentioned earlier, this approach explains the ‘economic 
miracle’ in East Asian countries like Korea and Taiwan well. Another of its contributions is 
that it has led researchers to focus on historical changes in the state’s policy-making 
processes.  
Nevertheless, this approach also has some problems as regards its understanding of the role 
of the state in the policy process. Scholars have pointed out three main problems. The first is 
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that the state is not separate from society, but this approach makes the assumption that the 
state is a separate and autonomous entity (Mitchell, 1991, p.77). Evans (1995, pp.139-180) 
draws attention to this point as follows: state autonomy must be understood as ‘embedded 
autonomy’ because the state is closely connected with social actors in the policy-making 
process. Furthermore, even in an authoritarian regime, the state does not totally disregard 
society. The second problem is pointed out by Shin, D. M who notes that “public policy is 
hardly determined in a social vacuum and instead it is decided by reflecting upon the nature 
of social coalitions” (2002, p.33). The third problem that critics commonly point to, and one 
closely related to the first, is that “the statist perspective gives too much to the state as a 
shaper of the society with little reference to its relation to society” (Chung, M.K, 1992, p.20). 
These points lead to the conclusion that the state is never insulated from society; that is to say, 
the state’s autonomy is grounded in social, political, and economic conditions and is limited 
by the structural factors of the capitalist system. 
Despite these limitations, the state-centred approach provides a very useful conceptual 
framework for understanding the dynamics of welfare politics, particularly in Korea, where 
the state played the dominant role in society. Above all, this approach is valuable in that it 
provides a means by which to investigate and understand the political strategies of state 
actors in the policy-making process. However, we need to be aware that this approach in 
itself is insufficient because the relationship between the state and society is not static, but 
varies over time in relation to changing situations. 
 
3.1.2 The class-centred approach  
 
The second important, and most debated, approach to welfare development and welfare 
politics is the class-based approach. In this approach, class is regarded as the principal 
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cleavage in society and the driving force for the formation of and changes in both the welfare 
state and welfare politics. According to Ahn, B. Y (2000), the emphasis on class cleavages in 
the study of the welfare state is very closely related to the concept of social citizenship 
advanced by T. H. Marshall. Marshall stated that “citizenship is a status bestowed on those 
who are full members of a community.  
“All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the 
status is endowed”(Marshall, 1963, p.87). However, it is clear that these rights do not come 
about automatically or naturally. As Giddens (1984) points out, citizenship rights have come 
only through the process of social struggle, and so class conflicts have been the medium 
through which citizenship rights have been expanded. By the same token, scholars who 
advocate a class-centred approach have emphasised the role that class conflict has played in 
bringing about both the expansion of social citizenship and the development of social policy. 
The theoreticians of power resources theory can be regarded as leading proponents of the 
class-centred approach (Baldwin, 1992; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 1983 and 1989). 
They have paid particular attention to working-class power and pro-welfare political parties 
such as social democratic parties. Specifically, power resources theory argues that the power 
that the working class secures through the alliance of trade union organisations and leftist 
parties tends to lead to a social democratic welfare state, or at least more egalitarian outcomes 
(Korpi, 1983; Stephens, 1979), and that “the level of inequality in a society and the 
accompanying degree of redistribution by the state are functions of the organizational 
resources of the working class” (Kellermann, 2005, p.3). Power resources theory has 
provided influential accounts of the welfare state and the welfare politics that surround it. It is 
generally accepted that this theory provides a good explanation of the formation and 
development of social democratic welfare states, especially those that conform to the Nordic 
model.  
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However, some scholars who stress the role of class power have emphasised the need to 
focus attention beyond the working class and its alliances and onto the dynamic interactions 
among other social classes such as the capitalist classes, landed aristocracy, the professional 
middle class, farmers, the petite bourgeoisie, and the salaried middle class (Chung, M. K, 
1992). For example, Esping-Andersen (1990, 1996,1999) demonstrated that the early class 
alliances of workers and peasants in Sweden proved to be an important factor in its social 
democratic system of governance, but the rise of middle class and professional groups more 
recently has had a profound effect in reducing the influence of social democratic parties in 
Sweden. Baldwin (1992) has argued that farmers, the middle class, and the bourgeoisie were 
actually more instrumental in the creation of solidaristic social policies in Scandinavian 
welfare states than the working class. By contrast, Mishra (1984, 1990) has stressed that the 
political power of the working class is a key factor in explaining the successful defence of the 
established welfare state against crisis.In light of Baldwin’s, Mishra’s, and Esping-
Andersen’s arguments, it seems clear that we need to consider the way in which class-based 
coalitions or alliances are formed during the policy-making process so as to safeguard their 
own interests within the capital-labour dynamics of capitalist societies. In practice, these class 
coalitions have been witnessed throughout the history of Western welfare states. On the one 
hand, pro-welfare alliances such as those between federated labour movements and pro-
welfare political parties have played and continued to play an important role in the 
establishment and reform of social policy; on the other hand, different class-based alliances 
also seek to bring about changes in social policy. In this sense, this-class based approach 
demonstrates that “for a more accurate explanation of the development of the welfare state 
we should consider complex interactions among social classes and their coalitional relations” 
(Chung, M.K, 1992, p.15). 
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However, as industrial society increasingly gives way to post-industrial society, traditional 
class cleavages are rapidly weakening and working class power is diminishing, trends that 
undermine the usefulness of a class-centred approach to the study of welfare politics. 
Moreover, although this approach can provide some insight into the Korean experience of 
social reform and political change, it is fully not applicable to Korea and many other 
developing countries, particularly those that, like Korea, experienced a significant period of 
military rule.  
 
3.1.3 The historical institutional approach 
 
The third important welfare development approach that cannot be overlooked in terms of 
welfare politics is the historical institutionalism approach. This approach was initially an 
offshoot of new institutionalism approaches but has recently become an established part of 
them. There are a variety of different strains of new institutionalism: normative, rational 
choice, historical, empirical, international, sociological, network, constructivist and feminist 
institutionalism. For the purposes of this chapter, it is not necessary to examine or elucidate 
all of these various forms; instead, the essential features of new institutionalism need only be 
outlined.  
According to Lowndes (2010), they are as follows: 
 (1) from a focus on organizations to a focus on rules 
(2) from a formal to an informal conception of institutions  
(3) from a static to a dynamic conception of institutions  
(4) from submerged values to a value-critical stance  
(5) from a holistic to a differentiated conception of institutions 
(6) from independence to embeddedness. 
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(From Theory and Methods in Political Science (Marsh and Stoker, 2010)) 
Given that the different forms of new institutionalism share these common characteristics, my 
decision to focus specifically on historical institutionalism is because it provides a better 
understanding of the relationship between the state and society “by focusing on the 
institutions that shape political strategies among contending groups in the process of politics 
and policy-making” (Shin, D. M, 2003, p.39).  
Thelen and Steinmo contend that: 
 
historical institutionalists have constructed important analytical bridges: between state-
centred and society-centred analyses by looking at the institutional arrangements that 
structure relations between state and society, and between grand theories that highlight 
broad cross-national regularities and level variables that illuminate sources of variation on a 
common theme(1992, p.10) 
 
Thelen and Steinmo (1992) also emphasise that historical institutionalists work with a 
definition of institutions that includes both formal organisations and informal rules and 
procedures that structure conduct. Accordingly, this approach looks at “how the institutions 
mediate the interests of respective actors within the large-scale and historically evolving 
organizational structures of state and society” (Ikenberry, 1988, p.243). That is to say, the 
core concern of this approach is “how institutions affect the behavior of individuals”, since 
“institutions have an effect on political outcomes through the actions of individuals” (Shin, D. 
M, 2003, p.38). Therefore, historical institutionalism is interested in political outcomes in 
particular.According to Shin, D. M (2003), this approach emerged during the 1980s in 
response to pluralism and neo-Marxism. He emphasises that historical institutionalism 
“initially looked more closely at the state as a complex of institutions capable of structuring 
the character and outcome of group conflicts” (Shin, D. M, 2003, p.37).  
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Historical institutionalism’s other most important characteristic is that it pays attention to the 
interaction and dynamics between the state and society. In this perspective, the state and 
society do not exist independently of each other and, in particular, the state is not a planner 
disconnected from society and sitting at the head of the policy-making process. As a result, 
this approach is interested in both the state and societal institutions that shape how political 
actors define their interests and how they respond to each other (Steinmo, Thelen and 
Longstreth, 1992).  
Although historical institutionalism has been seen as having advantages for understanding 
policy formation and the policy-making process, it has been to subject to criticism. For 
example, rational choice theorists have argued that this approach is atheoretical, is little more 
than storytelling, and is overly concerned with historical narratives (Hwang, 2002). Other 
critics have argued that it is too political and that it neglects socio-economic structural factors. 
Scholars such as Pontusson (1995) recommend, therefore, that historical institutionalism 
needs to augment its framework with discussion of structural factors such as economic and 
societal variables.  
In addition to the three approaches mentioned above, there are other approaches related to the 
policy-making process and welfare politics. However, I will not review these other 
approaches in this chapter. The reason for this is not because these approaches are regarded 
as less important than the three approaches covered above, but because they are less relevant 
to the Korean welfare development context. Thus far, then, I have reviewed three key general 
approaches to welfare politics.  
In the next section, I will briefly discuss the strengths and limitations of these approaches, 
and I will then consider how these approaches are applicable to the Korean case.  
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3.2 Theoretical discussions and theoretical applications to Korea 
 
3.2.1 Theoretical discussions; state, class, institutions, and welfare politics 
 
All the approaches to welfare development and welfare politics mentioned above have their 
own explanatory strengths and corresponding weaknesses. The theoretical focus of each 
approach will now be looked at in turn in order to address these strengths and weaknesses. 
 
State 
In highlighting the role of the state in welfare development and welfare politics, the state-
centred approach addresses the fact that the state has in practice often played a significant 
role in economic, social, and political development. Since the welfare state was originally a 
product of state politics, and social policy programmes were initially developed in order to 
meet the state’s political needs, the development of the welfare state was primarily 
determined through key interventions by power elites within the state system (Orloff, 2003; 
Hwang, 2002). Therefore, when it comes to the welfare state and welfare politics, we must 
investigate the strategies of powerful actors such as political leaders and high-ranking 
bureaucrats. However, this approach also demonstrates a weakness in that it remains largely 
ignorant of the role played by social forces (Almond, 1988). In democratic societies, social 
forces such as the trade union movement, interest groups, and social movements were often 
more important and were sometimes the driving force of welfare reform. Thus, in democratic 
politics, non-state forces cannot be ignored. In this regard, Hwang argues the following: 
 Another weakness of statism is that the approach has a limited ability to generalize how 
welfare states develop, since statism or the Skocpolian approach stresses a specific historical 
analysis above and against general theory(2002,p.25) 
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For example, for the East Asian countries achieved enormous economic growth under 
undemocratic governments, those governments also initiated, designed, and developed social 
policy programmes under autocratic regimes. However, after democratisation,governments 
could no longer monopolise social policy decision making. In other words, although the state 
remained an important factor in the social policy-making process, it could no longer control 
everythings exclusively. 
 
Class 
Class also is a significant factor in politics. It has been regarded as a basis for social and 
political organisation. In other words, it is a source of social identity in capitalist societies. 
The class-based approach argues that the most significant factor in the development of social 
policy and the welfare state is class alliance, particularly the alliance of working class power 
and pro-welfare political parties such as social democratic parties. Accordingly, in this 
approach, the development of the welfare state is regarded as representative of the victory of 
working-class power over capitalist organisations and related groups. For example, George 
and Wilding (1994) argue that the welfare state is the outcome of a long process of struggle 
between the working class and its alliances and the capitalists and their alliances. However, 
this approach fails to explain “the continuous expansion of the welfare state and the emphasis 
given to the disadvantaged in society” (Hwang, 2002, p.21). In addition, this approach does 
not fully capture or account for the complexity of post-modern society, in which the interests 
of stakeholders have become more diverse, a “diversification of interests around distribution, 
whichin turn, directs theoretical attention to other-than-class issues” (Ahn, 2000, p.16). In 
other words, the importance of ‘other-than-class’ cleavages in post-modern society has grown, 
while the significance of class has declined. It should be noted that Turner (1981) has pointed 
to the increased importance of social movements over traditional class politics, and Ahn, S. 
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H,maintains that collective action is “increasingly organized on an other-than-class basis” 
(Ahn, S.H, 2000, p.17). In reality, the meaning of class is now weakening and is being 
superseded by other concepts such as ‘citizen’, the middle class, and the ‘masses’. Finally, as 
has been seen in the previous chapters, this approach is not universally applicable to the 
circumstances of Korean welfare development and politics.  
 
Institutions 
In the simplest sense, ‘institutions’ refer to rules. Steinmo states that “institutions define the 
rules of the political game, and as such, they define who can play and how they can play” 
(2001, p.2). Kim Yeong-soon also insists that “institutions are important because they are 
foundations of all political behaviour. Interests and preference of social actors are shaped 
only institutional contexts” (2007, p.211). 
The historical institutional approach, as we have seen, “represents an attempt to illuminate 
how political struggles are mediated by the institutional setting in which they take place” 
(Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth1992, p.2). This approach has had greatest influence in the 
fields of comparative politics and comparative political economy, and it is generally most 
interested in the formal and informal rules, procedures, and organisations that constitute 
‘institutions’ (Hall and Taylor, 1998). The crucial feature of this approach is that: 
 
institutions constrain and refract politics but they are never the sole cause of outcomes. 
Institutional analyses do not deny the broad political forces that animate various theories of 
politics; class structure in Marxism, group dynamics in pluralism, Instead, they point to the 
ways that institutions structure these battles and is so doing, influence their 
outcomes(Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth, 1992, p.3) 
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This approach has become influential within social policy academic debate in recent years. 
However as mentioned earlier, it has also faced criticism. Shin, D. M (2002) summarises this 
criticism as follows:  
 
“First, according to the rational choice theorists, historical institutionalism suffers from a 
lack of universally applicable concepts based on deductive theory….second,.....it is common 
place for historical institutionalism to assign analytical primacy to the political or 
intermediate level, and so socio-economic institutions or structural variables in capitalist 
society are dismissed or at best treated as given thing”(p.39). 
 Shin’s criticisms point to the institutional approach being too politically focused and non-
theoretical; it becomes, in effect, storytelling or the relating of historical narratives. If this is 
the case, then, we need to consider the limitations of this historical institutionalism approach.  
In sum, although the state-centred, class-centred, and historical institutionalism approaches 
are very useful repectively as tools in the study of welfare politics, each approach has its own 
limits and shortcomings.  
 
3.2.2 Theoretical applications to the Korean case 
 
In this section, I will explore how Korean scholars have applied Western approaches, 
including the three approaches outlined above, to welfare development and welfare politics in 
Korea. However, there have been few studies conducted on the nature of welfare politics in 
Korea, and those that have been undertaken have produced generally similar findings. 
However, there have been some noteworthy studies from a welfare politics perspective.  
The first noteworthy work is a socio-political analysis by Seong (1991). In this study, he 
reveals the relationship between the Korean political structural shift and changes in social 
policy by employing socio-political models. Specifically, he analyses social policies from the 
59 
 
First Republic(1948~1960) to the Sixth Republic (1988~present), exploring the functional 
relations between forms of political structure (authoritarian versus democracy), ruling 
alliance and resistance alliance, the influence of power and its interactional relations, and the 
ruling alliance’s strategic choices. His research provided a greater understanding of the 
political nature of Korean social policies under the authoritarian regimes at a time when few 
studies had been undertaken in this field.  
The second noteworthy work is Chung, M. K(1992)’s research. His research is largely based 
on a state-centred approach, but he has attempted to extend the concept of the state. Chung 
argues that: 
 “… to reconceptualize the state, which could be useful in understanding the nature of the 
state as well as a structural analysis of public policy……it is useful to visualize the state as 
an entity analytically separable from society, but also to bear in mind that the state in a 
abstract sense refers to structural relations” (1992, p.57) 
 
In particular, his work focuses on the correlation between state autonomy and state capacity 
and the patterns of social policy making. His empirical findings showed that: 
 
“the organizational structure of the Korean state shaped the form and content of social 
security programmes. This imbalance between economic and social policy apparatus in terms 
of organizational power and capacity, and the lack of a coherent social planning body 
contributed partially to the asymmetrical and limited development of the Korean social 
security system” (1992, pp.37-38).  
 
Kwon’s work has made a significant contribution to the realm of social policy research by 
widening the horizons for the interpretation of social policy in Korea and Eastern countries 
(Hwang, 2002). Above all, he and his academic colleagues established that social policy was 
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an instrument for economic development during the period of rapid economic growth in 
Korea (Kown, H. J, 1999a, 1999b; Goodman and White, 1998). These studies mentioned 
above first and foremost emphasise the importance of political variables in welfare 
development and so demonstrate the nature of welfare politics under Korea’s authoritarian 
regimes. Later, Kwon also attempted to discover “the politics of social policy after the 
economic crisis of 1997-1998, focusing on the advocacy coalitions” and concluded that 
“welfare reform is contingent upon the political institutions and political actors’ ability within 
them to form an effective advocacy coalition to pursue their policy agenda” (2003, p.80). 
Besides Kwon’s work, other important research has been conducted. A relatively recent and 
popular approach in terms of welfare politics is the study of the politics of policy making. 
This approach focuses on the process of policy making by examining welfare programmes. A 
variety of studies have been conducted by Korean scholars, some of which have focused on 
the role of the executive branches (Oh, C.S, 1987; Chun, N.J, 1981), while others have 
focused on the role of the National Assembly (Song, 1992) and the dynamics between 
political actors in the process of policy formulation (Choi, 1998) Other scholars such as 
Lee,H.K (1999) and Shin,D. M (2000) have been more interested in the linkages between 
social policy and economic policy. 
Although interest in class or a class-centred approach has reduced in recent years, Shin, K. Y 
(2003a, 2003b, 2004) has continuously focused on class. In particular, he has studied the 
labour movement and capitalist power. Shin’s extraordinary work on class has shown that 
class remains an important factor in welfare politics. Shin has also been keen to reveal both 
the discourse on welfare and the political terrain of welfare politics in terms of the 
development of progressive politics. Likewise, Hwang (2002) focuses on the “dynamics 
between early intentions of those promoting ideas of welfare and the actual behavior” (2002, 
p.47). Woo (2004) studied the politics of Korean social policy by focusing on the ‘balance-
61 
 
of-class-power and the state-centred theories which are better developed to show the diverse 
patterns of welfare state development. Kim, Y. S (2007) focused on political parties and 
social dialogue systems and analysed how the interest representation structure and welfare 
politics affected the Korean welfare state by using the concept of ‘institutions of interest 
representatives’. As a result of her research, she argues that: 
 “Korean welfare politics has displayed the power of institutions at a high level, for the 
flawed institutions of interest representation relegate social issues, including welfare issues, 
to the realm of non-decision” (p.186). 
 
Another notable approach in terms of welfare politics is analysis of the policy-making 
process by examining individual policies such as health insurance, pension provision, and 
public assistance. Various scholars have performed their own research within this area.  
Some have focused on actors such as members of the National Assembly, bureaucrats, 
government branches, and interest groups, whereas others have focused in particular on social 
movements, the labour movement, and the dynamics between actors. Their common interest 
lies in the roles of actors and their activities in the welfare policy decision-making process. 
The variety of research on the politics of policy decision making has contributed to a better 
understanding of the political aspects of welfare policy reform and welfare politics. Some of 
these studies were originally informed by and based on the historical institutionalism 
approach.  
 
3.3 Concluding remarks  
 
On the whole, the research on welfare politics and welfare development in Korea has been 
dominated by the state-centred approach and the historical institutionalism approach. The 
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latter in particular has become more popular in recent years. These trends are closely related 
to Korea’s unique political and economic conditions, such as the developmental state, the 
powerful and sometimes autocratic presidential system, the relative weakness of the labour 
movement, the growth-first policy climate, and so on. For example, “the president has been 
the most powerful and important figure in Korean politics, and ministers and policy experts 
have not played a significant role, unlike in other countries” (Kwon, 1999, p.17). Therefore, 
these unique conditions led Korean scholars to focus primarily on the role of the state, even 
though they did not explicitly adopt a state-centred approach. 
Simultaneously, when it comes to exploring or analysing the detailed policy-making process, 
many scholars have tended to focus on the historical institutional approach and have made 
institutions and critical junctures the focus of their analysis. The class-centred approach has 
been largely disregarded because “class conflicts have not been a decisive factor in Korean 
politics in general and in social policy making in particular in the way that the class-based 
approach assumes” (Kwon, 1999, p.15).  
However, even though two of these approaches appear to be highly applicable to the Korean 
case, a more comprehensive framework for understanding welfare politics in Korea is 
necessary. In the next chapter, I will lay the theoretical and methodological foundations for a 
new framework. 
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Chapter 4 
The Theoretical Framework and Research Methodology 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will present the theoretical framework adopted for this research and report 
on how I designed the field research. The framework is designed to help understand welfare 
politics in Korea since the economic crisis during the Kim Dae-jung government. For doing 
this, I will first discuss some of the points to be considered in connection with the main 
subjects and also how some of the theoretical approaches to Korean politics will be addressed 
and debated in relation to this thesis. I will then describe my theoretical framework in more 
detail. I will also set out the research methodology, explaining why I have adopted the 
‘historically-oriented interpretive’ approach and how it works for this research. Lastly, I will 
detail how I gathered, analysed, and presented the data.  
 
4.1 The key concepts for a theoretical framework on welfare politics 
 
In this section of the chapter 4, the key concepts and issues related to the main subject of this 
thesis, welfare politics in Korea, will be presented. These concepts underpin the theoretical 
framework of this research. 
 
4.1.1 The policy-making process, socio-economic structure, and political variables 
 
According to Heywood, “politics is the activity through which people make, preserve and 
amend the general rules under which they live” (2002, p.4). In other words, politics is 
essentially the study of human beings’ actions. These actions are closely related to a range of 
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factors, including power and the distribution of resources. The arena of politics, therefore, is 
set through “a plan of action adopted by an individual, group, business or government, in a 
general sense” (Heywood, 2002, p. 400). Welfare politics is a form of politics that concerns 
the dynamics of power among social groups in regard to welfare policy. In order to better 
understand a country’s politics and welfare politics, we need to identify the decision makers 
within the policy-making process because this reveals the nature and characteristics of its 
politics in terms of power relations.  
As a subject for academic study, exploration of the policy-making process is most evidently a 
part of political studies or political science (Hill, 1997a, 1997b, 2002). The reason that many 
scholars study the policy-making process is that it shows ‘how power is acquired and used’ 
and ‘who gets what, when, how’ (Lasswell, 1936). The policy-making process both illustrates 
and affects how policy is made (Dror, 1968, p.160) and it has characteristics of a biological 
system. Like a creature has a life, so policy has a life: it is born; it grows; it disappears. The 
most significant part of the policy-making process is the decision-making point because it 
reveals the dynamics of key political and social actors. Accordingly, interest in the study of 
the policy-making process has increased over the last few decades in both the West and 
Korea. 
It is generally accepted that public policy making in particular “is a very complex and 
dynamic process whose various components make different contributions to it. It decides 
major guidelines for action directed at the future, mainly by governmental organs” (Dror, 
1968, 1983, p.12). According to Dror (1968, 1983), policy making has the following twelve 
main characteristics:  
 
It is (1) very complex, (2) dynamic process with (3) various components (such as political 
institutions) that (4) make different contributions. It is (5) a species of decision-making that 
65 
 
produces (6) major guidelines (strategy) (7) for action (8) directed at the future, (9) mainly 
by governmental organs. It (10) formally aims at achieving (11) what is in the public interest 
and (12) by the best possible means (adapted from Dror, 1983, pp.12-16).  
 
Among these twelve characteristics, we should particularly bear points (2), (3), and (5) in our 
mind because “policymaking is a process, that is, a continuous activity taking place within a 
structure… It is a dynamic process, which changes with time” (Dror, 1983, p.12) and that 
“the substructures most involved in public policymaking constitute the political institutions or 
political system of society” (Dror, 1983, p.12-13). Dror ultimately demonstrates the 
implications of decision making in the social policy context. Following Dror’s line of 
reasoning, we need to consider a variety of extraneous variables that include very broad and 
macro-level political-socio-economic factors. In fact, social policy is also influenced by a 
number of policy environment variables. 
Recently, the role of politics in the social policy context has become increasingly emphasised. 
While political factors are certainly very important in terms of policy and the policy-making 
process, social structural variables should not be overlooked. For example, the initial attempt 
to explain social policy development in the West was through the logic of industrialism. 
However, as previously noted, this is not entirely suitable to the Korean case, but such logic 
cannot be ignored entirely because the demand for social policy has inevitably increased with 
the development of industrialisation in Korea. Globalisation is another important external 
factor. After the 1997 Korean economic crisis, the importance of globalisation as a factor 
increased, and the influence of international organisations such as the IMF and the World 
Bank grew. For instance, the IMF demanded social policy reforms, and the Korean 
government had no choice but to accept the IMF demands. Furthermore, globalisation has 
affected social policy and welfare state development in other ways; for example, job 
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insecurity has increased, and state autonomy has decreased. This socio-economic 
environment necessarily generates social demands by the working class or interest groups. 
Depending on the strength of these demands, certain policies become political issues. 
However, there are obvious limits to this structural approach’s ability to explain welfare 
development and reforms in terms of welfare politics. Most significantly, this approach does 
not explain well the political dynamics of the policy-making process or the dynamics of the 
policy itself because this approach does not reveal actors’ interactions and their dynamics. 
The entire policy-making process is a political process; at all times, it is certain that politics 
plays a crucial role in the formation of social policy. The political process and political 
objectives are embedded within the pension and healthcare policy reform processes in both 
the West and Korea. Many scholars (Kwon, 1999; Chung, 2002; Shin, 2003; Hwang, 
2002)emphasise that the key aim of social policyand welfare policy in particular, is not the 
fulfilment of a humanitarian principle or effecting a better life for citizens, but the 
maintenance of social stability, social order, and social control. This view highlights the fact 
that the social policy-making process is imbued with political intentions. Though there may 
be strong demands for the development of particular social policies from elements in society, 
these demands can be repressed, distorted, or expanded by political variables. This 
perspective, which stresses the political variables in the policy-making process, makes it 
possible to explain the dynamics of the policy-making process. If one accentuates only the 
socio-economic variables, then the policy-making process becomes one of unilinear 
`causation' - a socio-economic variables-centred perspective. What, then, are the political 
variables? They are varied and include the following: the nature of a political regime; the 
degree of competition between political parties; electoral politics; the government’s attitude 
to welfare; and how, and the extent to which, veto points play a part in the policy-making 
process.  
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In the Korean case, the policy-making process has been strongly influenced by Korea’s 
political structure and power relations, including the presidential system, the action strategies 
of actors, and the interaction of the actors’ actions. Most notably, the presidential system has 
meant that the president has exercised great political power over the decision-making process. 
Furthermore, welfare issues were not key issues for political parties and were not a 
significant factor in the electoral process. I will discuss this in greater detail later. However, 
during the post-economic crisis period of reform political factors became increasingly 
important and influential. Accordingly, the politics of welfare reform during this period and 
in Korea’s subsequent modern democratic society is highly dynamic and complex. In sum, in 
order to better understand the dynamics of welfare politics in Korea since the economic crisis, 
we need to explore and analyse the policy-making process while taking into consideration 
Korea’s ‘socio-economic structure.’ 
 
4.1.2 The decision-making point, policy legacies, policy actors, and policy feedback 
 
The process of social policy formation is not a linear continuum (Hwang, 2002). A number of 
variables and actors are at work in this process, and as a result, decisions are made, and 
policy is formed, changed, and reformed. Many scholars have described, applied, and 
developed their own approaches in order to understand this policy-making process 
theoretically or practically (Kwon, H. J, 1999; Chung, M. K, 1992; Hwang, 2002; Lee, J. H, 
2007). According to Shin, D. M, “policy formation can be said to be a dynamic and 
sequential process that is driven not only by changes in the international political economy 
but also by domestic socio-economic circumstances”(2003, p.40).In other words, policy 
change and reform are influenced and shaped by internal and external variables. 
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Figure 4-1. A systematic process of policy formation and reform  
 
 
 
Decision-making point 
(From: Hill, 2005, Hudson and Lowe, 2004) 
 
As seen in Figure 4-1, the policy-making process is very dynamic and takes the form of a 
cycle. It can be divided into several phases. The first phase is the emergence and perception 
of a problem, which leads to demands for public action. The second phase is agenda setting. 
In this phase, the emerging problems are selected and filtered, and there is likely to be a 
visible public response to the problems. The thirdphase is the formation and adoption of a 
policy. In this phase, suitable solutions to the problem are identified, an appropriate 
programme is selected, and, above all, a decision-making point for policy implementationis 
reached. The fourth phase is policy implementation, during which the selected solutions are 
applied through the action of administrative implementation agents. The fifth and final phase 
is policy feedback. In this phase, the effects of the policy are determined, and the extent of its 
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impacts, effectiveness, efficiency and relevance to the original problem are evaluated 
(Knoepfel, Larrue, Varone and Hill, 2007). 
The decision-making point is a crucial step among these phases because at this point it 
becomes clear which actors hold veto points in the policy-making process, who impedes the 
ability of executive government to make decisions, and how the rules of the game are applied. 
Generally, the rules of the game are formed by political and legal rules such as constitutional 
and electoral rules, and .however, according to Hwang (2002), “welfare reform or social 
progress cannot only be explained by the decision made by decision-makers but also by 
conditions on which it may depend” (p.43). This means that decision making is conditioned 
by its past. Historical institutionalists have described these pre-existing conditions as ‘policy 
legacies’ (Weir and Skocpol, 1985), which include both domestic and international 
conditions. In practice, therefore, the policy-making process is not static and straightforward, 
but rather changeable and highly complex. Many variables and factors are intertwined within 
this process, and policy actors are one of these factors. These actors take a variety of forms 
and assume various roles, such as “political-administrative authorities that develop and 
implement policy, end beneficiaries, target groups, interest groups”, and an “epistemic 
community as a network of professionals” (Knoepfel, Larrue, Varoone and Hill, 2007, p.56). 
Depending on their interests, they ally and clash with each other. From time and to time, 
interest groups and advocacy coalitions are formed.  
Figure 4-1 illustrates that policy outcomes and feedback constitute part of the policy-making 
cycle. Policy outcomes refer to the effects of a policy, which having been determined by a 
process of evaluation will necessarily lead to revisions in subsequent identification of 
problems and policy formation. Shin, D. M (2003) states that “policies, once enacted, 
restructure subsequent political processes” (p.46). Pierson (1993, p.599) alsoargues that 
“policies provide both incentives and resources that may facilitate or inhibit the formation or 
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expansion of particular groups”. In other words, social policies and reforms can be regarded 
as both the starting point and the end point of analysis. Furthermore, Gough’s emphasis that 
economic policy and social policy are actually two sides of the same coin must be borne in 
mind (1996). Therefore, when it comes to analysing policies, we must not disregard the 
importance of policy legacies, actors, and feedback.  
 
4.1.3 Critical juncture, institutions of interest representation, and political-social 
coalitions 
 
Economic crisis as a critical juncture 
It is widely accepted that economic crisis is a major factor in initiating social policy reform 
(Castles, 2001; Timonen, 2003). As regards this thesis, this is a key point, since an 
appreciation of the influence that Korea’s economic crisis had on welfare development is 
crucial if we are to understand the politics of welfare reform in Korea. Since the economic 
crisis in Korea, the contents of welfare reforms and, above all, its topography have changed 
significantly. I will discuss this in more detail later, but in brief, the participants in the Korean 
welfare policy-making process have become very diverse. For decades, the welfare policy-
making system was effectively closed to all but the president and government officials, who 
had a monopoly over it. Since the economic crisis, these actors still exert a strong influence 
on the decision-making process, but a variety of new participants has emerged, and they have 
actively expressed their own interests. These new participants’ interests have very often been 
antagonistic on key welfare reform policies, and they have frequently clashed on key issues. 
This situation has necessarily led to the formation of political coalitions among stakeholders 
and their organisations. These developments will be described in detail in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
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These post-economic crisis phenomena are entirely unprecedented in Korean politics. Social 
policy, and welfare policy in particular, in Korea was traditionally ‘non-conflictual’, in sharp 
contrast to Korea’s Western counterparts, where social policy initially resulted from 
fundamental conflicts between different social groups. Therefore, in order to understand 
Korea’s new ‘conflictual’ welfare landscape and its changed welfare politics environment, a 
new and unique approach is required. Of course, the driving force of the policy climate 
change was the economic crisis in Korea, but alongside this, the new government, with its 
more democratic and pro-welfare public stance, led to the emergence of a new social policy 
environment. Almost all welfare policies implemented by the new government, including the 
unification of health insurance and the expansion of the public pension scheme, caused 
intense social conflicts among political parties, civil organisations groups, labour and 
capitalists, doctors and pharmacists, and so on. In brief, there was an unprecedented shift in 
Korea’s politico-societal structure and policy environment after the economic crisis. As 
Pierson (1994) famously argues, ‘policies produce politics’, and Korea’s welfare policy 
reforms produced new politics. The economic crisis itself marked the “critical juncture” – or 
the period of significant change (Collier and Collier,1991). I will employ the concept of 
‘critical juncture’ to analyse the specific policy-making processes of health insurance and 
pension reform in Chapter 5 through to Chapter 7. 
 
Institutions of interest representation and political-social coalitions 
Unlike the West, welfare issues in Korea were marginalised for several decades and 
economic growth was always the overriding concern. This approach to economic and social 
concerns began in the early stages of the first military regime and has continued to inform 
almost every aspect of Korean society. As a result, I contend that this growth-first principle 
has been ‘a gene-like factor’ inherent in the thinking of South Koreans because they 
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experienced directly this growth-oriented policy and its results within their daily lives. 
Generally speaking, political parties in democratic countries represent the welfare issues of 
people, but Korea’s welfare issues remained largely beyond the concern of political parties 
and major political actors (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). Accordingly, socio-economic issues 
such as welfare or quality of life were never a priority within Korean politics. 
According to Kim Y. S (2007) “welfare was not a question that distinctly and meaningfully 
revealed the different positions of political parties in policy competition, either in electoral or 
in everyday politics” (p. 214).She also notes that “it is quite a surprise that welfare has not 
been a priority political agenda in the debates between the ruling party and the opposition, 
considering that welfare is a ‘real issue’ … that affects people’s everyday lives and now 
generates serious conflicts among supporters of different policies” (ibid.). Even though 
income inequalities increased and the gap between rich and poor widened, these factors did 
not trigger the promotion of welfare interests or welfare consciousness. Accordingly, 
institutions of interest representation in Korean welfare politics did not exist for several 
decades. 
However, after the democratic struggle of June 1987, the terrain of welfare politics began to 
change somewhat. Above all, trade unions and civil organisations became aware of issues 
related to improving their members’ quality of life, such as health and pension policies. 
Various interest groups such as doctors and pharmacists also began to voice their own 
interests. As a result, institutions of interest representation began to emerge in Korean welfare 
politics, and during the process of welfare reform after the 1997 economic crisis, they began 
to mushroom. These social actors sometimes coalesced and pulled together, and sometimes 
they voiced distinctly separate and contrasting concerns. Depending on their interests and 
support, civil groups, interest groups, social policy academics, and even parties united and 
formed political coalitions. The most notable point, however, is that it was not political 
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parties, trade unions, or capitalists that took the initiative during the period of welfare reform, 
but civil organisations. It is therefore impossible to understand the framework of welfare 
politics in Korea without taking into account these unique characteristics. 
 
4.2 Theoretical framework: the new politics of welfare reform 
 
The theorisation of welfare politics is an ambitious challenge for researchers in social science, 
especially if the theory is to be universally applicable. The most significant reason is that too 
many factors intervene in and influence the politics of welfare. Nevertheless, we need to try 
to build a universally applicable theory. In this section of this chapter, I will present a new 
tentative framework for investigating welfare politics in Korea. This framework originally 
stems from my dissatisfaction with previous approaches on welfare politics. In order to set 
the stage for this new framework, we first need to revisit the approaches to social policy 
change and the nature of welfare politics in Korea reviewed in Chapter 3. Therefore, the key 
approaches to exploring the connections between politics and policy will be re-examined. 
 
4.2.1 Beyond institutions and path dependency 
 
In recent years, many studies on the changes in the Korean welfare state and welfare politics 
have focused particularly on institutions (Kwon, H. J, 1997; Hwang, 2002; Shin, D. M, 2003; 
Lee, J. H, 2007), and the institutional approach has played the leading role in analysing and 
discovering the nature of welfare politics in Korea. 
The most noted scholar to adopt this theoretical position is Kwon, H. J. In his highly regarded 
book, The Welfare State in Korea, he depicted the welfare politics in Korea before 
democratisation in 1987 as ‘the politics of legitimation’ and argued that to explore the 
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mechanism of how politics shapes social policy, we need to examine two dimensions of 
politics (1999). The first dimension involves identifying the main political actors, such as 
political parties, trade unions, and business organisations. These actors also include the civil 
organisations that play a role in shaping welfare politics. These include professional 
organisations such as doctors, female activists, and other interest groups. In particular, Kwon 
emphasised the role of policy experts in the development of social policy in Korea.  
Kwon’s approach was notable in that it marked a paradigmatic shift in the study of Korean 
welfare politics and overcame the limitations of the state-centred and class-centred 
approaches. According to Kwon, H. J (1999), studies adopting the class-based approach have 
successfully identified the main political actors and assessed the power resources that 
political actors can mobilize to further their interests. However, policy outcomes do not 
automatically reflect the balance of power between political actors. Accordingly, Kwon 
inferred that the institutional configuration might block certain political actors but provide a 
strategic edge to others. This is very keen insight. From this conclusion, Kwon argued that 
the second dimension of politics that needs to be examined is the institutional configuration 
of politics. Kwon also states that a better understanding of the institutional configuration 
enables us to recognise “where policy making takes place beneath the formal structures of 
political institutions” (the effective points of decision making) and “how political actors adapt 
their political strategies (1999, p.15). Following the logic of this institutional approach, Kwon 
analysed welfare politics in Korea and defined the nature of welfare politic in Korea as the 
politics of legitimation (before democratisation in 1987) and the politics of democratisation 
(since democratisation in 1987). However, while Kwon’s research has contributed to a better 
understanding of the characteristics of welfare politics in Korea, it is limited to Korean 
welfare politics before the economic crisis (1960-1992).  
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According to Kim, Y. S (2007), the institutional approach, and historical institutionalism in 
particular, produced “ample research results when applied to the welfare state studies in the 
1990s”(p.211), and that the same results also were obtained from studies conducted in the 
early 2000s in Korea. From the perspective of historical institutionalism, she analysed “the 
origins of the peculiarities of welfare politics in Korea since 1987” and “the effects of those 
peculiarities on the development of welfare issues” (2007, p.210). Through this analysis, Kim, 
Y.S argues that the political parties do not represent socio-economic cleavages in civil society 
properly andsocial dialogue is paralyzed, adding that these flawed institutions hindered the 
development of a comprehensive welfare state and created a ‘hollow welfare state’. Kim’s 
contribution is important because she analysed how the interest representation structure and 
welfare politics affected the Korean welfare state by focusing on political parties and the 
system of social dialogue(Kim, Y. S, 2007). 
Other scholars to have employed this institutional approach in terms of welfare politics in 
Korea include Hwang(2002, 2006), Lee, J. H (2007), Shin, D. M (2002), Yang, J. J (2000a) 
etc, with each having forwarded their own arguments. Although these studies have enriched 
my understanding of the nature of Korean welfare politics, I am not completely satisfied with 
the theoretical approach they have taken or their findings for several reasons.  
Firstly, interest in welfare politics has not been as high as other aspects of research on welfare 
among Korean academics. In particular, research by political scientists has been limited, and 
publications on welfare politics in Korea remain scarce. Secondly, my dissatisfaction with 
these studies is more fundamental than their relative scarcity and stems from their 
institutions-biased explanations. I contend that although the institutional approach has “a 
strategic advantage over the class-based approach in the Korean case” (Kwon, H. J, 1999, p. 
15), it should be noted that the institutional approach has been said to lack universally 
applicable concepts (Shin, D.M, 2003; Lee, J. H, 2007). In particular, rational choice theorists 
76 
 
have criticised this institutional approach as non-theoretical storytelling, the mere relating of 
historical narratives, because it simply recounts the chronological history of developments in 
welfare politics. Most importantly, institutional approaches have largely overlooked both 
human beings’ independent actions outside institutional constructs and their interactions.  
Thirdly, the institutional approach places considerable emphasis on the concept of ‘path 
dependency’. The concept of path dependency holds that a path-dependent change is “one 
that is tied to previous decisions and existing institutions” (Wilsford, 1994, p. 251). This 
concept has been applied to examinations of health and pension policy reform in the West, 
notably in Germany, France, the UK, and in particular in the United States. According to this 
approach, actors are constrained by existing institutions and structures that channel them 
along established policy paths (Wilsford, 1994). Accordingly, in any system, big (non-
incremental) change is unlikely (Wilsford, 1994).  
However, in reality, abrupt or widespread major policy change occurs. Why is this? The 
institutionalism approach insists that “actors’ actions are either heavily constrained or fully 
determined by institutions” (Rico and Costa-i-Font, 2003, p.2). However, organisations are 
simultaneously institutions and autonomous collective actors, and Rico and Costa-i-Font 
(2004) therefore criticise this approach for “being unable to explain institutional change” 
(p.2). Another criticism is that this institutional approach necessarily leads to a historical 
determinism.  
As noted in Chapter 1, however, there is a law of history: human beings’ actions shape 
history. Over the course of history, what ostensibly appears to be the dependent path is 
actually being shaped by human action. Finally, my fundamental dissatisfaction with these 
studies is that they do not make a comprehensive attempt to focus on welfare politics itself or 
frame it within the wider Korean political, economic, and social context. 
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4.2.2 Revisiting power resources action 
 
My perspective on policy change 
Although institutions are highly significant factors in the process of policy change, the creator 
of history is the social actor and his or her actions. It must be pointed out here that my 
emphasis is not on actors themselves but their concrete and purposeful actions. This 
perspective is based on the proposition that in reality history is made, reformed, and 
eventually changed by actors’ actions and interactions. Any current system is the result of 
actors’ actions and interactions. While institutions mediate these actions, they can never 
completely determine political actions and policy choices in terms of policy making or 
decision making.  
In this vein, while new institutional configurations are the initial spur for reform, final 
decisions are ultimately the actions of actors. This point is central to understanding the 
history of mankind. As the famous historian Arnold Toynbee (1954) declared, a civilisation 
grows as the result of its successful responses to challenges. In doing so, he argued for view 
of history not as some sort of predetermined destiny, but the result of progress by a creative 
minority. Accordingly, internal and external variables – such as institutions, policy legacies, 
and external circumstances – are core considerations when attempting to understand 
historical policy changes, but our efforts to better understand them should not stop there. We 
must be aware of social and political actors’ actions, their creative strategies, and the complex 
interactions between institutional configurations and actors’ strategic manoeuvring. 
 
Changes in welfare politics in Korea 
The welfare politics environment in Korea has changed as a result of the process of 
democratisation and the economic crisis in 1997 in particular. After the democratic struggle 
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in 1987, new actors emerged and the nature of welfare politics changed. Kwon has defined 
these changes as the ‘politics of democratisation’. The economic crisis was the other 
significant juncture. There were changes in the politico-societal structure and policy 
environment after the economic crisis. The economic crisis, triggered by a foreign exchange 
crisis in late-1997, became a structural crisis for Korea.  
With the increasing number of business failures resulting in mass unemployment, a social 
crisis was created. This social crisis made governmental welfare intervention inevitable, and a 
new welfare politics emerged under the Kim Dae Jung administration. Due to the earlier 
political democratisation, social policies were publicly scrutinised, and as a result, welfare 
policy became an arena for the conflicting interests of competing social groups. Previous 
welfare policies, which had been implemented and overseen by bureaucrats and politicians, 
were no longer immune from scrutiny and criticism, and these new social groups exerted 
pressures and demanded speciifuc things to them. In other words, welfare became a sphere 
for public discussion.  
The most noteworthy point of the new Korean welfare politics after the economic crisis was 
that welfare reform was accomplished with the active involvement of social movements. The 
best example is the enactment of the NBLS law, which established a new form of social 
assistance in August 1999 and was implemented in October 2000. In 1999, social assistance 
in South Korea, which had followed an English Poor Law tradition for around forty years, 
was finally reformed, and a new social assistance law that protected fundamental human 
rights was enacted. It is regarded as a breakthrough law that marked a significant advance for 
Korean social welfare (Jung, I. Y, 2009). The crucial driving force for the enactment of the 
National Basic Livelihood Security Act was the collective action of social organisations, 
especially NGOs, which were able to exert sustained pressure within the new political 
environment. For the first time in Korean history, pro-welfare civil organisations exerted 
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significant influence on the policy-making process, from the formation of policy alternatives 
to the final enactment of social policy (Lee, J. H, 2007).  
Even though the new institutional approach has been a powerful tool for describing Korean 
welfare politics over the years, it nevertheless has explanatory limitations in accounting for 
these changes in welfare politics in Korea. The most obvious limitation is that it cannot 
explain the remarkable and dynamic nature of the changes in welfare politics in Korea, and in 
particular, the strategies, collective action, and solidarity of civil organisations.  
 
Revisiting power resources action 
Therefore, when it comes to understanding welfare politics in Korea since democratisation 
and the economic crisis, it is essential that the notable role played by civil organisations is not 
overlooked. It should also be stressed that after 1997, unlike in the pre-economic crisis period, 
welfare policy was not formulated through a top-down process, but rather resulted from these 
civil organisations’ pressure from below. This peculiarity of Korea’s post-economic crisis 
welfare politics is clearly different from the Western experience, and thus in order to 
formulate a more comprehensive theoretical approach that is applicable to the Korean case, 
we need to put collective action and political processes at the centre of the theoretical 
framework. For this, we need to incorporate a theoretical perspective that has a more 
complete understanding of social and political actors’ actions and interactions. Fortunately 
for the purposes of this thesis, there has been an increasing emphasis on political collective 
actions and interactions as “the main direct determinant of policy” among some researchers 
over the last few years (Rico, 2004, p.16).  
In this regard, Rico’s (2004) power-centred action theories are very useful. Rico endeavours 
to “elaborate a simplified model of the political determinants of policy change, which 
overcomes the current dominant emphasis on institutions (and history) by placing actors’ 
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power resources (and politics) back at the centre of the stage” (Rico, 2004, p.2) and “stresses 
the causal role of actors and politics over institutions and history” (ibid.).  
According to Rico, there are numerous social theories on the determinants of policy change, 
and welfare politics is closely related to the political determinants of policy change. Rico 
categorised these determinants in terms of their four main causes: context, actors, institutions, 
and action (Rico, 2003; Rico and Costa-i-Font, 2005, p.4). This categorisation is outlined in 
more detail in Table 4-1 below.  
 
Table 4-1: Theories of policy change 
Determinants of policy change Context Actor Institution Action Theories related to the determinants of policy change 
Convergence theories. Structural theories. Cultural theories  
Neo-Marxist theories. State-centred theories. Political Interest group theory. Public opinion theory. Participation theory 
Path dependence theory. New institutionalism theory 
Political resources theory. Collective action theory. Game theory. Coalition theory. Social movements theory 
(Source: tabulated from Rico’s (2004) classification) 
 
Rico (2004) sets out to “build a synthetic explanation of welfare state change which can 
prove equally useful to account for the expansion phase up to 1970 as well as for the phase of 
resilience, retrenchment and re-structuring which started thereafter” (2004, p.2). For this, she 
proposes a theoretical framework based on power-centred action theory to explore the politics 
of state welfare expansion across the most innovate countries of Europe and North America.  
According to Rico (2003, 2004), the intense competition among social and political forces is 
analogous to a football match. “As football, welfare politics can be best thought of as a 
league among several competing teams, made of a number of interconnected games which 
are played in different arenas; each of them focused on two rival blocks supported by 
powerful team organisations; surrounded by an audience and a wider socio-economic context; 
and which compete for victory within the framework of a given set of rules of the game” 
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(2004, p.4). The main collective actors in the game are the two teams, and the main 
institutions are the rules of the game as approved by the International Federation of Football 
Associations and its national equivalents. Many physical and social factors also affect a 
football game – the weather, the pitch conditions, and the crowd – but “within football, the 
main directly relevant actions are the interactions between and among teams during the match” 
(Rico, 2004, p.4). Besides these established actors, new actors may affect the teams and the 
league, such as other football clubs, football federations, judges, and the mass media. 
Now let us apply the football metaphor to various theories of policy change. According to 
Rico, context theories might insist that the result of the game will depend on conjunctural 
factors, such as the weather, home advantage, the clubs’ infrastructures, and their financial 
resources. Actor-centred theory will focus on outstanding players, whereas “institutions-
centred theories believe that the rules of the game condition the relative chances of teams” 
(Rico, 2004, p.5). As a result, the context, actor, and institutional theories mentioned above 
would not need to watch the football match at all, since they could seemingly predict the 
outcome beforehand with their knowledge of the context of the match, such as the teams’ 
resources and the rules of the game. By contrast, “action theory depends on the specific 
strategies chosen and on the way they are executed” (ibid.). In reality, the result of the game 
is not directly determined by resources and institutions; rather, it is directly dependent on on-
field strategies and the interactions of players. In the same way, although power resources 
and institutions are important in terms of being driving forces of policy change, the most 
important variables are the key players’ strategic actions and the interactions among them. 
This emphasis on strategies and interactions is not limited to Rico’s work. Since the mid-
1990s, many theories that attempt to explain the relationship between politics and policy have 
emphasised political action. Within this trend, power-centred action theory’s first 
contribution is that, unlike actor-centred institutionalism, it regards key actors not as 
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individuals, but as collective actors, and it emphasises that preference and strategy does not 
derive from an individual’s rational choice but emerges within a society that is divided by 
socio-economic interests (Kim, Y. S, 2010). The theory’s other contribution is its emphasis 
on the mobilisation of public support as a key element of actors’ strategies. 
According to Rico, political parties, interest groups, and state actors play the same role in 
politics as clubs in football. The public is also considered a key political actor. The public 
directly participates in democratic politics through various channels, the most significant of 
which are “voting, which directly determines which political groups get access to formal 
institutional power, and tax-paying, which determines the financial resources in the hands of 
state authorities”(Rico, 2004,p.23). Accordingly, politicians are advised to be aware and stay 
abreast of the preferences and political actions of the public. In fact, politicians do pay a great 
a deal of attention to these matters, since if they do not represent the public’s interests, the 
public is liable to take to the streets in protest as a form of direct political participation. These 
social protest actions, although a relatively unorganised form of political mobilisation, have 
played an important role throughout the history of public policy. The genesis of numerous 
policy changes across Europe and North America is to be found in popular protest, 
sometimes expressed through voting swings against state policies. As an example, according 
to Jenkins and Brents (1989), the formulation and passage of the Social Security Act of the 
United States in the 1930s was shaped by sustained social protest, which interacted with and 
competed against the rival capitalist bloc. They argue that “political mobilization of the 
unemployed led to electoral and coalitional realignments which provided opportunities for 
new organized stake challengers such as a progressive liberal party and state elites, and 
policy experts to gain access to politics as well as influence in policy” (Rico, 2004, p.22). 
These trends in welfare politics have been strongly evident in Korea as well. However, social 
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protest has increasingly given way to formal access to party politics, but it nevertheless 
remains important and continues in Korea and many countries.  
Power-centred theory’s most significant point is its emphasis on strategic coalition or alliance, 
through which competing policies frame the interactions between an anti-reform coalition 
and a pro-reform coalition. The success or failure of reform is determined by the power 
relationship between the stake challengers and the stakeholders (Kim, Y. S, 2010). According 
to Kim, this theoretical perspective leads us to consider the range of actors including the 
working classemphasised by power resource theory. In addition, it enables us to see how the 
interests of civil organisations transform into political actions via political institutions and 
through the linkages that form between societal actors and political actors around interests 
and policy coalitions or alliances. 
 
4.2.3 Politics of the stakeholder and stake challenger coalitions 
 
In this section, I will present my framework for explaining the dynamics of welfare politics in 
Korea since the economic crisis. Based on the arguments presented thus far, my framework 
combines a revised form of Rico’s power-centred action theory with aspects of Kim’s (Kim 
Y.S, 2010) analytical framework for interpreting the politics of health care reform in the USA, 
which also draws on Rico’s power-centred action theory. 
Figure 4-2 depicts the framework for welfare politics in Korea since the economic crisis. It 
was created by combining the important points made by power-centred action theory with the 
considerations presented in the first part of this chapter. The aim of this thesis is to reveal the 
political dynamics of welfare reform in Korea during the period of the Kim Dae-jung 
government with this theoretical framework. This framework reflects the new politics of 
welfare reform in Korea; more theoretically, I would term this framework ‘the politics of 
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stakeholders and stake challengers’. Stakeholders are forces with vested interests that are 
usually opposed to welfare expansion, while stake challengers are forces that are reform-
minded or have direct interests in reform.  
 
Figure 4-2TheFramework of the New Politics of Welfare Reform in Korea 
Political power shift (with institutions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic crisis 
 
Stakeholders and stake challengers may both form coalitions based on the same interests and 
similar political beliefs. Both coalitions contain two different forms of actors: societal actors, 
comprising civil organisations and organised interest groups, and political actors, which 
represent the societal actors’ will and interests within the democratic rules of the game. These 
 
• Stakeholders’ coalition  
Political actors: Conservative 
president, conservative party, 
conservatives in the pro-welfare 
party, conservative economic 
bureaucrats 
Societal actors: conservative civil 
organisations, interest groups, 
conservatives in trade unions, 
business organisations,  
•Stake challengers’ coalition 
Political actors: Reformist 
president, reformists in the pro-
welfare party, reformists in the 
conservative party, reformist 
societal bureaucrats  
Societal actors: progressive civil 
organisations, trade unions, 
progressive religious groups, 
progressive mass media 
 Power/strategy 
 Interaction 
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two actors’ strategies and preferences are influenced by political institutions such as the 
presidency, the unicameral legislature and law-making process, and the electoral system (the 
first-past-the post and single-member constituency system) and changes to the political 
system, such as a political power shift. In addition, socio-economic circumstances have an 
effect on their setting of strategies and preferences.  
Above all, this framework focuses on stakeholders and stake challengers’ strategies and 
interactions because the premise upon which this framework is constructed is that policy 
making is determined by the power relations within the complex interactions between 
stakeholder and stake challengers rather than the relative size of their power resources (Kim, 
Y. S, 2001). Although power resources are an important factor influencing policy making, the 
power relations between the competing actors are a more decisive factor than the power 
resources themselves. These power relations are grounded in both the actors’ relative power 
resources and the interactions and strategic activities between them (Kim,Y.S and Cho, H.J, 
2011). Since the power relations between actors are more dynamic and fluid than the 
established and relatively static power resources of the actors, they are better able to account 
for rapid, bottom-up changes in welfare politics and policy. 
The strengths of this framework are threefold. First, it points to the importance of dynamic 
politics and goes beyond the exaggerated emphasis that has been placed on institutions and 
contexts by focusing on actors’ strategic activities and interactions as the most significant 
variables in policy change (Kim,Y.S and Cho, H.J, 2011). Second, it does not disregard the 
socio-economic and political institutional contexts, unlike the pluralist perspective. Third, 
and most importantly, this framework reveals the stakeholder and stake challenger coalitions 
that emerge around a policy and shows that policy change is the result of their political 
struggles and the interaction of their relative power resources.  
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For Korea, the 1997 economic crisis was the critical conjuncture of policy and political 
change. Politically, it marked a critical point in the ongoing process of democratisation as the 
reformist leader of the opposition party came to power. Institutionally, however, the power of 
the president was still strong. This political legacy of the authoritarian developmental state is 
deeply embedded in the welfare politics of Korea. Power continued to be concentrated in the 
hands of the president and bureaucrats, and they retained the greatest capacity to pursue 
dramatic reforms (Lee, J. H, 2007). The National Assembly did not play a prominent role in 
policy change or policy making in Korea. Although this unicameral legislature had begun to 
increase its influence in policy making and the policy decision-making process after the June 
1987 democratic struggle, the role of individual members of the National Assembly remained 
extremely limited.  
In sum, the groundbreaking welfare reforms under the Kim Dae-jung government since 
economic crisis were a product of the interactions between stakeholder and stake challenger 
coalitions and the result of the stake challenger coalition’s strategic success and victory. The 
framework of the new politics of welfare reform that I have presented is useful in that it 
reveals the struggles between the stakeholder coalition and the stake challenger coalition and 
their dynamic interactions. Above all, the framework can help us to understand how civil 
organisations overcame the stakeholder coalition’s objections and finally won the battle for 
health care and public pension reform. 
The applicability of this framework is not limited to Korean welfare politics during the 
specific period under investigation and can be applied to the welfare politics of other 
countries and other periods of social policy history. The history of social policy itself could 
perhaps be interpreted as a product of the struggles between stakeholders and stake 
challengers.  
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4.3 Research Methodology 
 
In this section of this chapter, I will explain the key research methods employed for the 
research, including the key focus of the data collection, and how I collected, analysed, and 
present the data. For this, the main research questions need to be revisited while bearing in 
mind the analytical framework presented above. This will show how the methodological 
approach that I have adopted will help me to explore these questions. 
 
4.3.1 Revisiting the research questions  
 
The aim of this research is to understand the peculiarities and dynamics of welfare politics in 
Korea since the economic crisis. In order to achieve the aim of this research, I posed the three 
following research questions in Chapter 1. 
 
1. Where and how are welfare reforms initiated, brought to the attention to government, 
propelled forward to the point of decision or blocked and quietly buried? 
 
2. With a particular focus on pension and health insurance, how and to what extent do 
political and social actors influence the policy-making process of welfare reforms?  
 
3. What are the key features of welfare politics in Korea since the economic crisis? In what 
way do they differ from Korea’s welfare politics before the economic crisis?  
 
To answer these questions, I adopted the theoretical framework described above and an 
appropriate research design and methodology. 
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4.3.2 Outline of the research design  
 
The policy-oriented and case study approach 
“Not only is policy research concerned to find answers to policy problems and improve 
policy action, but it is also concerned to identify the right questions to ask in the first place” 
(Clarke, 2001, p.38 in Becker, S, Bryman, A and Ferguson, H, 2012), and research is “a 
systematic investigation to find answers” (Burns, 2000, p.3 in Becker, S, Bryman, A and 
Ferguson, H, 2012) to those research questions. In this regard, the research methodology 
employed for this thesis is policy-oriented research. “The termpolicy-oriented research has 
been used to refer to research designed to inform or understand one or more aspects of the 
public and social policy process, including decision making and policy formulation, 
implementation and evaluation” (Becker, S, Bryman, A and Ferguson, H, p.15)  
In order to fulfil the aims of this thesis, two major social policies were selected for 
investigation: pensions and health insurance. By investigating the policy-making processes of 
these two major social policies, it is hoped that the nature of Korean welfare politics since the 
economic crisis will be revealed. Pension and health insurance policies were selected because, 
as mentioned in Chapter 1, they are central to the Korean welfare system. The pension and 
health care systems account for most of Korea’s social expenditure (Kim, Y.M, 2002). Thus, 
most of the social conflicts between interest groups during the post-economic crisis period 
were caused by pension and health insurance policies. The structure of the conflict between 
the interest groups over these two policies is representative of the overall structure of conflict 
associated with the welfare system. In other words, the politics of pension and health 
insurance illustrates Korean welfare politics itself. Nevertheless, research in terms of the 
welfare politics of these two polities is scarce. These are the reasons that these two policies 
were selected.  
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As for the detailed research design, this research has the characteristics of a case study. The 
Dictionary of Sociology describes a case study as the detailed examination of a single 
example of a class of phenomena. According to Matthews and Ross (2010, p.128), “a case 
study includes either a single case or a small number of cases but each case is explored in 
detail and great depth”. Ragin (1987. p.51) argues that investigators who use case-oriented 
methods limit their investigations to small numbers of carefully selected cases and consider 
combinations or conjunctures of causal conditions. In keeping with these definitions, I have 
therefore focused on the political mechanisms of the policy-making processes in two specific 
cases, namely, the reform processes of Korea’s public pension and health insurance policies 
under the Kim Dae-jung administration in the aftermath of the economic crisis. Through 
investigating the actions of actors involved in the reform processes of these two polices for 
this limited period, I intend to bring to light the characteristics of Korean welfare politics. 
Accordingly, it is necessary to understand the history of these two policies and the dynamic 
process of policy change. Most importantly, the various actors’ positioning, voices, strategies, 
responses, and movements must be explored.  
Owing to the nature of the data that needs to be collected in order to address my research 
questions, a qualitative approach to data collection is highly appropriate. Qualitative 
approaches areprimarily concerned with stories and accounts including subjective 
understandings, feelings, opinions, and beliefs. Qualitative data is typically gathered when an 
interpretivist epistemological approach is taken and when the data collected is the words or 
expressions of the research participants themselves(Matthews and Ross, 2010). There are 
several reasons why a qualitative approach to data collection is most suitable for this study. 
Most importantly, since the core aim of this thesis is to explore the peculiarities and political 
dynamics of Korean welfare politics since the economic crisis through the interactions and 
power relations of stakeholder and stake challenger coalitions, it is important to identify 
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political and social actors’ actions, their strategies, and interactions. For achieving the key 
goals of this research, the decision to adopt a qualitative research approach is natural because 
it is far more appropriate and useful than a quantitative approach for discovering the actions, 
moves, voices and interactions of actors. In the following sections, I will provide a more 
detailed explanation of the precise methodological approach employed for this research. 
 
4.3.3 Historically oriented interpretative policy analysis 
 
In order to produce a more comprehensive research strategy, I adopted a historically oriented 
interpretative policy analysis on the basis of the historical-descriptive research strategy used 
for this research. For this, I conducted unstructured and semi-structured in-depth interviews. 
These interviews can also be considered historically oriented in the sense that they questioned 
people about past events and the interviewees provided their interpretations of these past 
events. There have been a number of major research strategies for bringing history and 
theoretical ideas to bear on one another (Shin, D. M, 2003). Skocpol (1984) categorises these 
strategies into a threefold classification as follows: (1) applying a general model to history; (2) 
using concepts to interpret history; and (3) analysing causal regularities in history. For my 
research, I adopted the second strategy because it is more useful and suitable. Skocpol terms 
this second strategy ‘interpretive historical investigation” (1984, pp.362-386). In conclusion, 
I adopted a historically oriented interpretative policy analysis on the basis of the qualitative 
research strategy used for this study. 
According to Ragin (1987), “the historically oriented interpretative research strategy is a type 
of empirical study in that it attempts to account for specific historical outcomes or processes 
chosen for study because of their significance for current institutional arrangements or for 
social life in general” (p.3). Lee, J.Hstates that “this type of interpretive historical research 
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strategy is grounded on the case-oriented, qualitative tradition as opposed to the variable-
oriented, quantitative tradition” (2007, p.58). 
My main research strategy, therefore, employs historically “interpretative case studies” in 
comparative politics (Lijphart, 1971, p.691). It is hoped that the interpretative case studies 
will bring about a better and more vivid understanding of the political dynamics of actors’ 
actions and interactions in welfare politics. It is also hoped that they will make a considerable 
contribution to the establishment of general propositions, that is to say, they will provide the 
basis for new theory-building for understanding welfare politics in Korea. 
However, as Shin, D.M (2003) has pointed out, an interpretative historical approach also 
involves risks when it is applied to a case study. Researchers might fall into the trap of simply 
recounting historical narratives from the collected data and thus might ultimately approach 
their data in a non-theoretical way. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that there is an 
extensive and careful ‘two-way dialogue’ between the conceptual framework and the data. 
Throughout this thesis, I will frequentlyrevisit my theoretical framework and employ it in 
interpreting and analysing the collected data. My theoretical framework will basically 
function as a guide to analysing the policy-making process. My interpretive case study, 
therefore, will focus its attention on thepolicy-making processes of pension and health reform 
after the economic crisis by using my theoretical frameworkof ‘the new politics approach of 
welfare reform’.  
In so doing, it is hoped that this research can ‘connect the dots’ and produce some significant 
findings about the welfare politics and social policy context of Korea. In addition, it is hoped 
that this research will make a considerable contribution to the “establishment of general 
propositions and thus to theory-building in political science” (Lijphart, 1971, p.691) and lead 
to a better understanding of welfare politics in general.  
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4.3.4 Data characteristics and data collection  
 
For a historically oriented interpretative policy analysis, although several sources of data can 
be used, documentary analysis of primary and secondary sources is the most important. As 
for primary sources, I sourced numerous documents from government, business associations, 
trade unions, magazines, and newspapers. As a journalist, this proved to be a relatively 
simple task. However, since data collection needs to be undertaken in an efficient and 
systematic fashion, and since the target for data collection was a variety of documentary 
sources on health insurance and pension policy, it was necessary for me to understand the 
subject and nature of each specific piece of data and select appropriate terms of reference for 
the data collection.  
 
Data collection on health insurance reform 
The first subject for policy analysis in this research is health insurance policy. The health 
insurance system in Korea has been gradually developed over several decades since its 
introduction in 1963 under the military regime. The process of development and change has 
been affected by various political, social, and economic factors. Moreover, the basic nature of 
health insurance entails political-social conflicts that centre on redistribution, ideology, and 
interests. According to Hacker (1998), although government-sponsored health insurance is a 
central pillar of the modern welfare state, its introduction and coverage extension “has been 
highly controversial everywhere”(Ripley and Franklin, 1976, pp.128-132). For example, 
whenever the introduction or coverage extension of health insurance has been discussed or 
implemented, there have been proponents and opponents and disputes between them. Owing 
to the controversial nature of health insurance policy, I selected the Korean health insurance 
policy-making process for analysis, with a focus on the period since the economic crisis.  
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Table 4-2The key periods of NHI in Korea 
Year Critical juncture Contents Key Actors 1963 Introduction 
(1963-1977) 
The Medical Insurance (hereafter NHI) Act passed. SCNR CSS 
1977 Compulsory NHI programme introduced for companies with more than 500 employees. President Bureaucrats FKI KMA 1979 Expansion 
(1977-1989) 
NHI extended to companies with more than 300 employees, public officials, and private school employees. Medical care institutions came to be compulsorily designated as medical service providers of the NHI programme.  
President Bureaucrats Parties FKI KMA Farmers and fishermen organisations 
1981 Companies with more than 100 employees included in the NHI programme. The first pilot programme for self-employed medical insurance started in three rural areas. 
1988-89 The rural self-employed came to be covered. Employees from companies with 5 workers or more came to be covered in 1988. The self-employed in urban areas came to be covered in 1989.  
1997-2000 Integration 
(1997-2003) 
The NHI Act enacted (1999). All insurers integrated into a single insurer. Contract system for determining medical fees introduced. The separation of prescribing and dispensing of drugs implemented. 
Bureaucrats Parties FKI KMA KPA Trade Unions Civil organisations The insured organisations Policy experts 
2003 The separate health insurance funds between employee and self-employed insurance programmes fully merged. 
(Jo, 2008, p. 67. Key: SCNR: The supreme council for national reconstruction; CSS: The Committee for Social Security; 
FKI: Federation of Korean Industries, which consists of Korea's major conglomerates and associated members; KMA: 
Korean Medical Association; KPA: Korean Pharmaceutical Association). 
 
For this purpose, I investigated and collected official statistics, legislation, presidential annual 
speeches, trade union and business associations’ documents, and reports in magazines and 
newspapers. I then collated this information and categorised it into key periods in accordance 
with the concept of ‘critical juncture’ (Collier and Collier, pp. 27-29).  
During the process of collating and categorising this information, I was particularly indebted 
to Jo’s previous research (2008, p.67). Jo divided the history of National Health Insurance 
(NHI) in Korea into key periods by using the concept of ‘critical juncture’. Table 4-2 follows 
Jo’s categorisation, and I have simply modified Jo’s original work. As can be seen from 
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Table 4-2, it was necessary to collect and examine a great deal of material in order to analyse 
NHI in Korea. Therefore, prior to collecting the materials, I consulted several experienced 
researchers on the best places from which to source the data, the easiest ways in which to 
access it, and so on. In this, Kang Chang-ku, one of the main activists for NHI reform and an 
employee of the National Health Insurance Corporation (NHIC), provided me with a great 
many documents. These are all primary sources on social movements for health reform and 
include some personal memoirs. Shin, Y. J, a professor at Hanyang University and a historian 
of health policy in Korea, also provided many primary source documents and also supplied 
other important documents such as his works about the history of health insurance integration. 
The data collection was first and foremost focused on the policy-making process of NHI 
integration before and after the economic crisis in 1997. 
 
Data collection on public pension reform 
Public pension policy is the second target for policy analysis in this research. Like the health 
insurance system, pensions are one of the most important and controversial social policy 
issues in Korea. The National Pension Scheme (NPS) in Korea goes back nearly 40 years to 
1973, when the military regime enacted the National Welfare Pension (NWP) Act. Although 
the implementation of this Act was postponed, it nevertheless marks the first ‘critical 
juncture’.  
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Table 4-3The key periods of the NPS in Korea 
Year Critical Juncture  
Contents Key Actors 
1973 Formation (1973-1974) The NWP Act passed The President EPB/MOHSA CSS/KDI  
1974  Deferral of the NWP Act’s implementation   
1986 Introduction and incremental expansion (1986-1995) 
 Proclamation of the NP Act amendment   
The President EPB/MOHSA KDI KEF/KCTU 
1988  Implementation of the NP Act  
1992-1995  Extension to firms with more than 5 employees (1992) Extension to farmers and fisherman (1995) The President EPB/MOHSA KDI/KIHSA KEF/KCTU/Farmers organisations 
1997-2000 The era of universal pension and reform (1997-2000) 
The setting up of the ‘NPS Improvement Planning Agency’ (1997) Extension to the urban self-employed(1999)  a new era of universal pensions 
The President MFE/MOHSA KDI/MOHSA Political parties FKI, KEF/Trade Unions/Farmers, NGOs IMF/World Bank (Yang, 2008, p. 105. Key: SCNR: The supreme council for national reconstruction; CSS: The Committee for Social Security; 
FKI: Federation of Korean Industries, which consists of Korea's major conglomerates and associated members; KMA: 
Korean Medical Associations; KPA: Korean Pharmaceutical Association; KEF: Korea Employers Federation; MFE: 
Ministry of Finance and Economy) 
 
The real start of the NPS was when the National Pension (NP) scheme was implemented in 
1988. After this, the coverage of NPS was incrementally extended from 1984-1995. The most 
important period is the time from the setting up of reformist organisations to advise on NPS 
reform in 1997 to the expansion of coverage to the urban self-employed in 1999. This marks 
the third critical juncture in the history of the NPS in Korea. 
In order to examine the policy-making process of the NPS, I again investigated and collected 
official statistics, legislation, presidential annual speeches, trade union and business 
associations’ documents, and reports in magazines and newspapers. As with the data that was 
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collected on health insurance reform, I then collated this information and categorised it into 
the key periods of the NPS in keeping with the concept of ‘critical juncture’, as shown in 
Table 4-2. I was particularly indebted to the previous work of Yang, J. J (2008, p.105). Yang 
divided the history of National Health Insurance (NHI) in Korea by also using the concept of 
‘critical juncture’, and Table 4-3 follows Yang’s categorisation. I have simply modified 
simply Yang’s earlier work. Again, prior to collecting data on NHI, I consulted several 
experienced researchers as to where to find the data, how best to access it, and so on. In 
particular, Kim Yeon-myung, a pension reform activist and professor with great knowledge 
of the National Public Pension, provided many secondary sources such as articles. In addition, 
the NHIC provided some historical primary sources. Data collection was above all focused on 
the policy-making process of NPS reform before and after the 1997economic crisis. 
 
4.3.5 Performing the documentary data collection 
 
Documentary sources are also helpful in identifying the character of each policy. Since the 
range of documentary materials is diverse and includes items such as diaries and memoirs of 
political figures, they are extremely helpful in understanding the debates and positions of 
policy makers. 
The types of documents were categorised by source and were chiefly divided into two distinct 
categories: (1) internal materials and (2) external materials, namely, publications. They were 
then further subdivided according to the data provider: (1) the National Assembly, 
government, and public organisations; (2) political parties, civil organisations, trade unions, 
and business associations; (3) mass media (newspapers and magazines); and (4) individuals 
involved in policy making or the decision-making process. In order to increase the 
97 
 
effectiveness of the data collection, I utilised various methods of data collection depending on 
the type of material.  
My field work for the primary sources was mainly carried out in the National Assembly 
Library in Seoul, which contains many of the minutes of meetings related to my research area 
and many reports on my research subject, that is, pension and health insurance reforms. In 
addition to this, database materials of key newspaper companies such as The Hankyoreh and 
Chosun-ilbo were collected and scrutinised. Most newspaper companies, including my 
newspaper company, The Hankyoreh, have their own libraries and digitised database systems, 
which proved very helpful. Furthermore, since I am a journalist, gaining access to these 
materials was straightforward. I also collected a great deal of material from government and 
public organisations, especially from the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the Ministry of 
Labour, two umbrella business organisations (the Korea Employers Federation (KEF) and the 
Federation of Korean Industries (FKI)), and two umbrella labour organisations (the Korean 
Federation of Trade Unions (KFTU) and the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU)). In 
addition, the field work included carefully gathering material from many internet websites, 
including the Korean government websites, and also a great deal of research in Birmingham 
University library. Secondary sources used were journals and books related to the subject 
area. As for journals, the DBPIA, which is a database of Korean journals and academic 
magazines, proved extremely useful.  
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Table 4-4The types of documents and their collection methods 
   
National Assembly, government and public organisations 
Political parties, civil organisations, trade unions, business associations 
Mass media  Individuals 
Internal resources    
Type    
Meetings’ minutes, report materials  
Meetings’ handouts and minutes, report materials  Internal records, my personal coverage records as a journalist 
Memoranda, ,individual personal records  
 Collection Methods 
Request for acquisition of materials, using the internet, printed copies of materials from library  
Request for acquisition of materials, using the internet, copies of materials from library 
Request for acquisition of materials, using the internet, copies of materials from library 
Request for acquisition of materials 
Publications Type    
 Public statements, reports, materials for public hearings and panel discussions 
Articles and editorials Autobiographies, theses, books and journals 
 Collection methods  
Request for acquisition of materials, using the internet, printed copies of materials from library  
Request for acquisition of materials, using the internet, printed copies of materials from library 
Using the internet, micro films  
 
(Source: adapted from Yang, 2010; Jo, 2010) 
 
In particular, I was indebted to the Social Science Institute of Yonsei University, which has a 
huge quantity of digitised primary and secondary source material. In 2008, I visited this 
Institute and was able to collect these digital sources, which are the work of six scholars, 
YangJae-jin (editor), KimYeong-soon, JoYoung-jae, KwonSoon-mee, WooMyung-sook, and 
JeongHeung-mo. 
The collection methods employed were generally uncomplicated and included requests for 
the acquisition of materials, using the internet (Korean government websites were of 
particular use), obtaining printed copies of materials from libraries, and sometimes buying 
materials. The types of documents collected, their sources, and the method of collection used 
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are set out in Table 4-4 below.Statistics are also very useful and easily accessible. In modern 
societies, statistics are collected and published by a wide range of organisations, including 
governmental organisations. Nevertheless, it is always important to remember that “no 
statistics can be considered to be ‘objective facts’, sincethey all paid for and collected by 
some organization for a specific purpose” (Becker and Bryman, 2004, p.228). 
 
4.3.6 Interviews with policy change participants 
 
Collecting data on pension and health insurance policies, while in some ways relatively 
straightforward, is not without difficulties. Official documents tend to be composed in 
unnuanced and bureaucratic language, and the real intentions and strategies of actors can be 
obscured by the formal language and presentation used in official reports. In addition, some 
of the archived material presented little in the way of interpretative content on the policies 
under consideration. Accordingly, I considered “a basic appreciation of who is speaking, 
when they are speaking, how they are defining the problem, where they are looking for 
solutions in terms of placing the text and evaluating its claims” (Becker and Bryman, 2004, 
p.293).  
 
The semi-structured in-depth interview 
In light of this, I also conducted supplementary interviews with people who have influenced 
policy making. These interviews were conducted either face-to-face, by telephone, via e-mail 
correspondence, or occasionally via msn messenger. Furthermore, if a question arose in the 
course of reading and analysing documents, I would phone and email people related to the 
subject that had arisen. In conducting the interviews, I sometimes employed unstructured 
open-ended interviews (Silverman, 1993) and sometimes semi-structured in-depth interviews. 
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The semi-structured in-depth interview in particular was very helpful because it provided 
enough “freedom for the interviewees to speak freely about the topics related to their interests” 
(Hakim, 2000) and also assisted me “in maintaining sufficient structure to address topics 
relating to the research” (Bailey, 2007). With the interviewees’ permission, most interviews 
were recorded with an I-phone or a digital recorder, and I simultaneously took detailed notes. 
The list of interviewees is tabulated in Table 4-5 with the permission of the interviewees. 
Interviewees1 provided a great deal of valuable information and insights and even supplied 
related documents, memoirs, and articles. At the same time, they also delivered their direct 
experiences, which were invaluable to this research. Most of the interviewees were people 
with intimate knowledge of Korean welfare reforms and welfare politics since the economic 
crisis.However, there are some disadvantages to this approach. 
First, respondents may not always be available for interview. Second, and most importantly, 
one interviewee’s evidence may conflict with that of another, especially in a historically 
oriented study where respondents are asked to recall past events. In such cases, the researcher 
must determine which evidence is most likely to represent what actually took place and 
reconcile the differences between the information that is given and established events. In 
short, the researcher must act as an interpretative mediator between the information that is 
received and that which is ultimately presented as ‘fact’. Accordingly, I employed a kind of 
triangulation process (Yang, J. J, 2008) in which I cross-checked interviewees’ arguments 
against each other and against documentary evidence. In practice, since using the 
combination of the methods mentioned above was the most satisfactory data collection 
strategy available, I took into account four criteria suggested by Scott (1990) in assessing the 
quality of these materials: authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and meaning. 
                                                          
1Additionally, I also interviewed so many current government workers and former government officials who asked to remain 
anonymous. 
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Table 4-5List of key interviewees on welfare reforms and welfare politics 
Interviewees Status Contents Time  
 Kim, Y.I Professor/ a commissioner of the PSC 
Social Movement for NHI integration/welfare reforms 2010. 8.2 2011.1.18 
Kim, Y.M Professor/ a commissioner of the PSPD 
Pension reform/health insurance integration movement/ Social movement for welfare reform 
Occasionally 
 
Kim, S.J Professor/a Senior Presidential Secretary for National Planning  
Welfare reforms under the Kim Dae-jung government after the economic crisis 
2010. 5. 5 2010.8. 2 2010.9.27  
Kim, J.I Ex-Minister of the MOHSA Health insurance/social policy and economic policy 2010. 6.4   
Kang, C.K Trade union member/ a member of the NHIC   
Health insurance reform/integration movement 2008 3. 5 2010. 5. 20 2011. 1. 15  
Shin, Y.J Professor/ a member of the PSC Health insurance reform/integration movement Occasionally via msn messenger  
Lee, S.J ex-National Assembly man/ Executive of the NHIC  
Health insurance reform/ pensions reform/ policy solidarity coalition  
2008.5.10 2010. 11. 5 Occasionally  
Cha, H.B Ex-Minister of the MOHW Pension and health insurance reform, in particular government’s strategy 
2010. 12 5  2011. 3.11  
Song, K.Y A priest of the Anglican church in Korea/ a commissioner of the united civil organisations for NBLS Act enactment  
The enact movement of NBLS Act Occasionally 
 
Lee, T.S Professor/a commissioner of social welfare in the PSPD 
Social policy and Economic policy Occasionally   
 
 Shin,K.Y Professor Welfare politics/ social policy 2008. 6. 7, 2010.5.4 Occasionally   
 
(Key: PSC: Pan-national Solidarity Council for the Medical Insurance Unification and Benefit Expansion; PSPD: People’s 
Solidarity Participatory Democracy; MOHSA, MOHW: Ministry of Health and Welfare; NBLS Act: National Basic 
Livelihood Security Act; NHIC: National Health Insurance Corporation). 
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4.3.7 Data analysis  
 
The process of data analysis for this research involved a continuous conversation with the 
history of welfare development and welfare reforms in Korea. Documents are like the 
footprints of participants, whether positive or negative, in the process of social policy, and 
interviewees are their witnesses. At times, their tracks became unclear, and at other times, I 
enjoyed following their clear-cut paths. Regardless of its form, data analysis was a prolonged 
and difficult process.  
For the data analysis, the data were firstly divided into the two main themes of health 
insurance and pensions. The respective themes were then divided again into the periods of 
critical juncture. Since “documents do not stand on their own, but need to be situated within a 
theoretical frame of reference in order that its content is understood” (Ray, 2001, p.191) and 
bearing my framework in mind, the data were further divided into categories related to 
political and social actors: governments and bureaucrats, the business circle, social movement 
organisation, interest groups, and so on. This data were re-examined across three dimensions; 
actors’ actions, actors’ strategies, and actors’ interactions. The interview data were also 
analysed in the same manner. In analysing the interview data, I tried to maintain a critical 
attitude towards interviewees’ evidence and arguments.  
After the first analysis was complete, I checked documents and interviewees’ responses 
wherever possible. As both a researcher and a journalist, cross-checking and triangulation is a 
very familiar process. I checked the documents and interviews by direct participants, their 
opponents, and observers against each other. Since this is a difficult and time-consuming 
process, it was not possible to do this in every case because there is a time limit for this 
research. Therefore, in order to ensure the greatest level of objectivity within the given time 
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frame, I chose to avoid quoting directly from the respondents’ interviews and primary sources 
as far as possible. 
 
4.3.8Personal advantages 
 
Regarding the research methods, I had considerable advantages because I have been a 
journalist working for a Korean daily newspaper for almost 20 years. During that period, I 
have covered social policy issues such as health insurance, pensions, unemployment, poverty, 
and so on. I have specialised in welfare issues as a senior reporter or professional journalist. 
In the course of covering these issues, I have conducted many interviews and made the 
acquaintance of many of the primary sources of data for this research, including influential 
policymakers that I had already interviewed for newspaper articles. In addition, I had already 
amassed a significant amount of data and many source documents through my work as a 
journalist, and many of my personal documents were useful for my research. My long-
standing position as a journalist also assisted me in arranging additional interviews with a 
number of people involved with health and welfare reforms. Finally, I also published three 
books bound up with my research that were of very great service in several respects.  
 
4.4 Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter, I have explained how I designed my research and also how I collected and 
analysed the data. First, I described the design of an analytic framework to systematically 
understand the new politics of Korean welfare reform since the economic crisis. This so-
called ‘new politics of welfare reform’ framework is primarily based on power-centred action 
theory but also recognises the contributions of historical institutionalism and state-centred 
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theory. The politics of stakeholders and stake challengers are the focal point of this 
framework, and it was briefly shown how the politics of stakeholders and stake challengers 
were the driving forces of health insurance and pension reform. I then described how I 
collected data and how I analysed and presented it. For this process, I adopted a historically 
oriented interpretive policy analysis and interviews as specific research methods.  
The next chapters form the empirical part of this research. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 are 
specific case studies of health care and pension reforms that aim to bring about a better 
understanding of these reforms with respect to the policy-making process and political 
interactions. 
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Chapter 5 
 
The politics of health insurance reform in Korea 
 
Introduction 
Although Korea’s health insurance system has a relatively long history compared to other 
major welfare state programmes, research on the political mechanisms surrounding Korea’s 
health insurance programme is inadequate. This chapter therefore examines the changing 
policy-making process and politics of health insurance policy in Korea. Since the 1997 
economic crisis, Korea has managed to merge more than 350 fragmented health insurance 
societies into a single administrative system (in 2000) and a single payer system (in 2003) in 
terms of financing. This achievement has come only at the end of a long and arduous road of 
health insurance reform in Korea and is unique in world history. This chapter will attempt to 
answer the following questions:  
 
1) How was this healthcare reform possible under the Kim Dae-jung government while 
Korea was in the grip of a severe economic crisis? 2) Why was this reform 
implemented, and who prompted it? 3) What kinds of strategies were adopted by 
stakeholders and stake challengers, and to what extent did institutional and political 
legacies constrain such strategies? 4) What was the meaning and what were the 
limitations of this health insurance reform? The answers to these questions are 
directly related to the politics of health policy and the peculiarities of welfare politics 
in Korea.  
 
My analytical framework will be used to explain first how the interrelationship between 
problems, policy, and political factors provided a window of opportunity for this healthcare 
106 
 
reform, and then how stake challengers overcame stakeholders’ opposition and obstruction to 
achieve their goals. For this, the current health insurance system in Korea will first be 
outlined and then the origin of health insurance in Korea and the administrative arrangements 
of pre-reform health insurance will be described. Next, I will determine whose interest was 
served by these arrangements as this provides the backdrop to the politics of health insurance 
reform. The reforms will be considered on the basis of two perspectives – a conservative 
‘separatist’ position and a more radical ‘unitarist’ position. The conflicts between actors 
within the time frame used for this study will also be discussed, drawing on my personal 
memories and notes taken as a journalist. 
Through this analysis, the dynamic nature of the process of administrative and financial 
integration of health insurance and the key actors’ strategies and political interactions within 
this process will be revealed. Throughout this chapter, there will be a specific focus on the 
political dynamics of the policy-making process rather than on the contents of the policies 
themselves. The remarkable activities of civil society groups such as the Coalition for the 
Integration of NHI will be shown to have been one of the most important factors and in 
health politics in Korea and civic groups.  
 
5.1 Overview of the health insurance system in Korea 
 
The healthcare system in Korea is composed of two different programmes, namely, the 
National Health Insurance programme (NHI) and the Medical Aid programme (MA). NHI is 
designed for the population as a whole, while MA is for people with low incomes and those 
receiving public assistance and who are unable to pay for healthcare. MA provides the poor 
with healthcare services via the national budget and is one of the public assistance 
programmes, whereas national health insurance (NHI) is part of a social insurance system for 
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healthcare with universal population coverage (Kwon,S. M, 2007). It is generally accepted, 
therefore, that NHI, in conjunction with a pension system, is one of the core pillars of any 
welfare state. Most advanced nations have well-developed welfare states with their own 
healthcare systems, the majority of which are founded on government-sponsored health 
insurance. The reason for this is that the two goals of welfare states are health security and 
income security, and a health insurance programme is a key institution for realizing health 
security (Jo, 2008). As a result, changes to and reform of health insurance policy are major 
political issues in most countries.  
 
5.1.1 A brief history of health insurance in Korea 
 
The first government-sponsored health insurance system in Korea was introduced alongside 
the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance (IACI) Act in 1963 under the military 
regime of Park Chung-hee. However, unlike the IACI, this health insurance legislation did 
not make insurance compulsory, and it therefore had only a limited effect as a social 
insurance programme. In 1970, mandatory health insurance was included in health insurance 
law, but the law was not implemented. The government revised the health insurance law 
entirely in December 1976 with the new National Health Insurance Act, and a compulsory 
health insurance system was finally established in July 1977. According to this Act, all 
companies with more than 500 employees were required to provide health insurance. Over 
the next several years, the compulsory coverage requirement was gradually expanded to 
include companies with more than 300 employees, firms with 16 employees, and in 1988, all 
companies with at least 5 employees. From implementing the first compulsory health 
insurance program in 1977 to achieving universal health insurance coverage in 1989 had 
taken the government only 12 years.  
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Administrative integration of Korea’s health insurance system to provide universal coverage 
was finally accomplished in July 2000, an achievement that would become the cornerstone of 
health insurance development in the new millennium. The integration of the health insurance 
system and the introduction of a new contribution system – a flat rate contribution for all 
employees and a single contribution formula for the self-employed– would lead to an 
increase in social solidarity and social partnership among social classes (NHIC, 2003)  
 
Table 5-1 A brief history of NHI 
Year Contents 1963 The Medical Insurance (hereafter, NHI) Act was introduced. 
1977 Compulsory NHI programmes introduced for companies with more than 500 employees. 
1979 NHI was extended to companies with more than 300 employees as well as to public officials and private school employees. Medical care institutions came to be compulsorily designated as service providers for the Medical Insurance programme. 
1981 Companies with more than 100 employees were included in the NHI programme. The first pilot programme for self-employed medical insurance started in three rural areas. 1988-89 The self-employed in rural areas and employees from companies with 5 workers or more were included in 1988. The self-employed in urban areas were included in coverage in 1989.  2000 All insurers were integrated into a single insurer. A contract system for determining medical fees was introduced. The separation of the prescribing and dispensing of drugs was implemented. 2003 The separate health insurance funds for employees and the self-employed were fully merged. (SCNR: The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, CSS; The Committee for Social Security, FKI; Federation of 
Korean Industries, which consists of Korea's major conglomerates and associated members. KMA; Korean Medical 
Association, KPA; Korean Pharmaceutical Association) 
 
5.1.2 A basic overview of NHI in Korea 
Population coverage 
All citizens residing in the Republic of Korea are covered by NHI, either as an insured person 
or as a dependent, and the system is administered by a single insurer, the NHIC (National 
Health Insurance Corporation). Enrolment is mandatory except for some Medical Aid 
beneficiaries. Those insured under the NHI programme are classified into two categories: the 
109 
 
employee insured and the self-employed insured. The employees covered by NHI are 
ordinary employees and government and private school employees.  
Table 5-2 NHI coverage, 2005 (unit: person) 
(Source: NHIC, 2007) 
According to the NHIC (2005), the total number of persons covered by NHI is over 47 
million, or about 96.4% of the total population. The remaining 3.6%, 1.7 million, who are 
poor or on low-incomes, are covered by the Medical Aid programme, a Korean public 
assistance programme. All self-employed people and their family members are considered as 
insured members. In the category of the employee insured, however, only the employees are 
insured and their family members are considered dependents. Dependents include the insured 
person's spouse, direct lineal descendants (including those of the spouse) and their spouses, 
and brothers or sisters of the insured person (NHIC, 2007). 
 
Contributions and Funding  
NHI is funded through contributions paid by the insured and their employers and government 
subsidies. The employee and employer contributions provide the major source of NHI 
36.718,023,286Urban Areas
3.61,761,565Medical Aid
4.32,135,468Rural Areas
41.020,158,754SubtotalSelf-EmployedInsured
55.427,233,298Employee Insured
NHIC
96.447,392,052SubtotalNHI
10049,153,617Total
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income, and their contribution rates are the same. Industrial workers and government and 
school employees pay contributions proportional to their income, and contributions are 
shared equally between the employee and employer. 
 
Figure 5-1 Sources of NHI revenue, 2005  
 
(Source: NHIC, 2007) 
Prior to the merger of insurance societies in 2000, government and school employees paid an 
average contribution rate of 5.6% of their income, and industrial workers paid 3.75% on 
average. This rate ranged between 3.0% and 4.2% depending on the insurance society. As of 
2006, the contribution rate across all employees was 4.48% (NHIC, 2007).  
The insurance contribution of employees is borne by both employee and employer. For the 
ordinary employee, the employer pays 50% of the contribution and the employee pays the 
other 50%. For government employees, the government, as their legal employer, pays 50% of 
the contribution, and the employee pays the other 50%. For private school employees, the 
owner of the private school, as their legal employer, pays only 30% of the contribution with 
the government providing 20%. The employee pays the other 50%. For the self-employed 
insured, contribution is calculated using a formula that takes into account the insured person's 
properties, income, motor vehicles, age, and gender (NHIC, 2007) 
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4%
Others
2%
Contribution
81%
Tobac o 
111 
 
Table 5-3 Types of Insurance Benefits  
Health Insurance Benefits Recipient 
Service Benefits Healthcare Benefits  The insured, Dependents 
Health Check-ups The insured, Dependents 
Cash Benefits 
Refunding Allowance  for Healthcare  The insured, Dependents 
Funeral Expenses Insured relative of the deceased 
Compensation for Excessive Co-payment The insured, Dependents 
Co-payment Ceiling System The insured, Dependents 
Appliance Expenses  for the Disabled  
The disabled insured and disabled dependents registered in accordance with the Welfare Act for the Disabled  
 
Benefits Package 
Benefits are payable to the insured and their dependents for the treatment prevention, 
diagnosis, or rehabilitation of sickness and injury (NHIC, 2007). As can be seen in Table 5-3, 
benefits come in the forms of both cash and service benefits. Although the health insurance 
benefit package mainly includes treatment and rehabilitation services, it also includes 
biannual check-ups and vaccination services which are provided free of charge in public 
health centres. 
 
Healthcare delivery 
Healthcare delivery in Korea relies heavily on the private sector; only about 10% of hospitals 
are public (Kwon, S. M, 2009), and more than 90% of healthcare services are provided by the 
private sector. All pharmacies are owned and operated by individual pharmacists. For patients 
who are insured under the NHI scheme (or their dependents), every legal healthcare 
institution is authorised to provide services. In 2005, there were 61,007 healthcare institutions 
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supplying services under the NHI system. These included 288 general hospitals, 672 hospitals, 
19,405 clinics, 137 oriental medical hospitals, 7,140 oriental herbal medical clinics, 60 dental 
hospitals, 10,553 dental clinics, 19,189 pharmacies, 127 midwifery clinics, and 3,436 public 
health centres(NHIC, 2007). 
Health expenditure 
In 2008, Korea spent 6.5% of its GDP on healthcare, up from 4.1% in 1985 and 4.8% in 2000 
(OECD Health Data, 2006, 2010). Although this level of expenditure is still lower than the 
OECD average of 8–9%, Korea’s health expenditure has risen sharply since 1985, and fiscal 
sustainability has become a key issue for the NHI system. 
 
Table 5-4 Total expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP 
year 1985 2000 2004 2006 2008 % 4.1 4.8 5.4 6.1% 6.5 
(Source; OECD Health Data, 2010) 
Operational Structure of NHI  
“Before the merger of all health insurance societies in 2000, there were three types of social 
health insurance schemes for: (1) government employees and teachers and their dependents, 
administrated by a single insurance society; (2) industrial workers and their dependents, with 
about 140 insurance societies; and (3) the self-employed and workers in firms with less than 
five employees, with about 230 insurance societies” (Kwon,S.M, 2009). Each insurance 
society was a quasi-public organisation controlled by the Ministry of Health and Welfare 
(MOHW).  
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Figure 5-2 Relations between parties in the NHI system 
 
(Source; NHIC, 2007) 
 
To guarantee impartial and efficient evaluation and review of healthcare services, the Health 
Insurance Review Agency (HIRA) was established as a statutory public organisation. The 
NHIC and HIRA are overseen by the Ministry of Health & Welfare (MOHW), which 
ensures that the organisations comply with the health insurance system’s regulations and 
approves their annual activities and budgets. These operational processes are shown in 
Figure 5-2. 
 
5.1.3 The Origin of NHI  
Legacies 
It is important to discover the origin of an institution or policy, but there is scant documentary 
evidence about the various pre-NHI systems and little is known about their origins. In this 
regard, Jo (2008) emphasises that the peculiarity of health insurance in Korea is that it has no 
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‘social origin’. By social origin, Jo is referring to crude but similar organisations that existed 
in the past. In the West, there were numerous guilds, friendly societies, and sickness societies 
before modern health insurance systems were introduced. They guaranteed sickness or 
disability benefits for workers and their families. In particular, sickness insurance for workers 
with diseases became widespread during the 19th century. However, the Korean situation 
differed significantly. There were no guilds or sickness insurance societies before the 
introduction of national health insurance.  
Although there is no evidence that a developed and far-reaching health insurance system had 
existed as in the West, there are a number of examples of pre-NHI healthcare insurance and 
provision in Korea. In this regard, Shin, Y. J and Park, S. H. (2009) have tried to uncover 
evidence of the existence of a health insurance programme in the pre-NHI period. He has 
discovered an embryonic form of social insurance existing during the Japanese colonial 
period: the ‘labour hospital’ created by ‘the Wonsan Labour Federation’. This organisation 
gave a 40 per cent discount off the price of medicine for union members. After Korea’s 
liberation and the foundation of the Republic of Korea, labour unions continued to develop 
health insurance programmes for their members. Pusan Labour Hospital, established in 1955, 
had almost forty thousand members and provided healthcare services for trade union 
members and their dependents.  
 
Introduction of NHI 
The first critical juncture for the development of health insurance in Korea was the enactment 
of NHI law. The military regime attempted to introduce a public health insurance system 
immediately after the so-called ‘5.16coup d’état’, but it was not until December 1963 that 
NHI became law. At the time that NHI was introduced, there were no social and industrial 
demands for the introduction of health insurance (Jo, 2008). Although opposition parties 
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wereallowed under the military regime, no party openly opposed the military as they could 
not engage in normal activities. Moreover, labour organisations and interest groups such as 
medical associations could not voice their opinions. Political parties and civic groups 
therefore played no role in the introduction of the NHI; in fact, they did not recognise its 
existence. Korea’s economic structure also contributed to the lack of social or political 
pressure for the introduction of health insurance. Korea’s economy was predominantly 
agrarian. Sixty per cent of the population was farmers and workers in the fishing industry, 
while miners and industrial workers totalled just 8.7%. Accordingly, the Park regime pursued 
economic growth above all other aims. Under these circumstances, the fact that NHI was 
introduced at all in 1963 was meaningful, even though NHI had little actual effect as a social 
insurance programme. How and why, then, was the Health Insurance Law enacted in 
December 1963? To answer this question, we need to explore the policy-making process 
from its initial ideas to the final enactment of NHI. On 28 July 1962, the chairman of ‘the 
Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR)’, Park Chung-hee, sent the Cabinet a 
memorandum on ‘The Establishment of Social Security Institutions’. The core contents of the 
memorandum (Document no 683, 28 Ju1y, 1962) were as follows: 
1. Our ultimate goal is to increase the national income and to establish a welfare state to 
protect people from social risks such as unemployment, disease, and ageing. 
2. …the parallel development of economic growth and permanent social security 
institutions … 
3. …take steps to establish comprehensive social security institutions in our country by 
setting up a pilot project to determine the most appropriate social insurance 
programme…. 
 
116 
 
Park also proclaimed his intention to establish a welfare state in a 1963 administrative policy 
speech, declaring thatthe introduction of the NHI and the IACI is part of the implementation 
of a series of far-reaching social insurance programmes(Jo, 2008). Many scholars have 
focused on this memorandum and have concluded that Park’s announcement was a decisive 
factor in the enactment of both the NHI Act and the IACI. 
It hardly needs to be said that, as an autocrat,Park was the top decision-maker, but what 
prompted Park to send the memorandum to the Cabinet? It is almost certain thatGeneral 
Park knew very little about health insurance and other social security programmes prior to 
his coup because he had served as a high-ranking military officer for several decades. 
Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the military elite in Korea would have taken much 
interest in this programme. If this is the case, then why did Park and the military regime 
resolve to introduce social insurances such as NHI and the IACI and what led him to make 
this decision?  
Most scholars have assumed that Park and the military regime announced this programme to 
gain political legitimacy, which was sorely lacking owing to the regime having seized 
powervia a military coup (Kim,Y.M, 2003a; Jo, 2008; Kwon, H. J, 1999, 2005; Kwon, S. M, 
2009). Kwon, H. J (1999), in particular, has argued that it was the military regime’s desire 
for political legitimisation that underpinned the introduction and extension of social health 
insurance in Korea (Kwon, S. M, 2009). Unlike Western welfare states, class struggles and 
the labour movement played no role in the introduction of health insurance. “There was no 
labour party or social democratic party, and labour unions became active only in the late 
1980s” (Kwon, S. M, 2009). This interpretation is very persuasive, and in fact, all key 
policies were enacted and implemented by Park. How, then, did General Park come to 
understand the purpose of and the components necessary for a functioning health insurance 
programme and bring about its introduction? 
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Policy experts as political entrepreneurs 
Another explanation for the introduction of health insurance in Korea is that it was entirely 
the product of a policy idea by policy experts. The first identifiable group of policy designers 
in Korea was (as called by its members) ‘A Research Society for the Introduction of Health 
Insurance Institutions’, founded in 1959 and consisting of a number of civil servants from the 
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (MOHSA) and civic experts. They proposed the 
establishment of a new deliberating committee for social security institutions within the 
MOHSA and produced a number of reports on the introduction of health insurance.On 28 
July 1962, this informal ‘deliberating committee for social security institutions’ “became an 
official government committee when the Chairman of the SCNR, Park Chung-Hee, requested 
the Cabinet introduce social provisions” (Hwang, 2002, pp.71–77, 2006), and The Committee 
for Social Security (CSS) was formed. According to Jo (2008), the members of CSS were 
policy experts and political entrepreneurs. The CSS would continue to provide important 
contributions on the institutionalisation of social welfare programmes.  
In October of that year, Choi Chon-Song and his colleagues in the CSS produced the first 
draft of the NHI law, which imitated the Japanese Health Insurance Law. In addition, they 
consistently explained the necessity of social provisions to key decision-makers. In this way, 
members of the CSS had a significant influence on the enactment of NHI law. It should also 
be noted that Son Chang Dal, one of the members of the CSS, was directly involved in the 
drafting of Park’s memorandum to the Cabinet on establishing social welfare institutions.  
However, despite their efforts, Article 8 of the draft legislation, which called for mandatory 
implementation of health insurance, was removed during the process of deciding which of the 
articles would form part of the final legislation by a standing committee of the SCNR. Son, J. 
K (1981) indicates that the omission of mandatory provision from the health insurance law 
was due to four reasons. The first reason was economic: the policy priority of the regime was 
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economic development, and policies in other areas were of secondary importance. The 
second was political: the military government feared that mandatory health insurance 
provision would lead to further demands by the people. The third concerned the bureaucratic 
policy-making structure under the regime. Its structure was too vertical and closed, with 
decision-making being one-sided and from above. The fourth reason was the bureaucrats’ 
lack of resolve to introduce mandatory health insurance.(Son, J. K, 1981) 
This early version of Korea’s health insurance programme (then termed medical insurance) 
was very limited. Its lack of mandatory provision meant that viable social insurance for 
healthcare was not actually implemented until the mid-1970s (Kwon, S. M, 2009, p. 64). 
Choi Chon Song (one of the CSS members who participated in the deliberations on the 
original legislation) later indicated:  
 
I regret very much that the (draft) Health Insurance Programme did not cover the poor 
who needed it most. It was designed to cover only the small numbers of workers who were 
relatively well off. However, we had to make a safe start rather than launch an ambitious 
Health Insurance Programme (cited in Kwon, H. J, 1999a, p.54). 
 
Choi points to the original NHI law’s fundamental flaw: if social insurance is not made 
compulsory and universal as far as possible, it can neither be redistributive nor risk-pooling. 
In viewpoint similar vein, Hwang (2006) points out that “abandoning the principle of 
universality within social insurance would inevitably undermine the distributive effect 
between different risk categories”. In fact, for the military government, which had placed 
economic growth above all other public policy areas, social welfare provisions would 
become meaningful only if they were introduced before the transition to a semi-civilian 
government took place so that the regime’s underlying political ends could be met (Hwang, 
2006). The CSS’s original proposal was revised during its reading in the SCNR to comply 
with the economy-first strategy of President Park and the SCNR. However, the policy 
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legacies resulting from this decision were to weigh heavily on the development of later 
health insurance programmes.  
 
5.1.4From voluntary insurance to compulsory insurance  
 
Voluntary insurance 
Despite the NHI law’s fundamental drawbacks, the MOHSA encouraged some companies to 
establish health insurance societies as part of a pilot project (Lee, K. C, 2009). In 1965, the 
first formal health insurance society was established at Honam Fertilizer Corporation 
(currently the Korean Synthetic Chemistry Corporation). 
 
Table 5-5 Health insurance societies in 1975  
Employee health insurance societies Self-employed health insurance societies Name Established Name Established Honam Fertilizer Corporation. Bongmyung Graphite Mining Station The Korea Oil Corporation Hyubsung Medical Insurance  
November 1965  April 1966  July 1973  May 1975  
Pusan Blue Cross Oku Blue Cross Cunsung Medical Insurance Gyoche Blue Cross Backryung Blue Cross Youngdong Medical Insurance Gungpyungmerinol Medical Insurance 
October 1968 October 1973 June 1974  July 1974 December 1974 February 1975  July 1975 
(Source: the MOHSA) 
 
Between then and 30 July 1975, when the second amendment to Korean health insurance law 
was passed, only eleven health insurance societies were in operation. The number of people 
eligible to receive benefits under this NHI system was 15,585 paying members and 67,486 
dependents, which, amounted to a mere 0.2% of Korea’s entire population. More details are 
given in Table 5-5.As such, the health insurance programme at this time existed only as a 
pilot project. The most crucial reason for this was its voluntary basis. In other words, 
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companies’ participation in health insurance programmes was low precisely because 
participation was not made compulsory.  
The voluntary nature of the health insurance system caused a number of problems. Since the 
design of social insurances such as health insurance and pension schemes is based on risk-
pooling the majority of the population, the voluntary nature of the health insurance system 
led to low participation, and low participation brought low level risk-pooling and an 
extremely low level of benefits. In this regard, Hwang (2006) states:  
 
the principle of voluntary participation is typically seen in private insurance, which tends to 
rely on an actuarial basis, meaning that the insurance may not be of any help in improving 
horizontal efficiency (i.e., in assisting all target groups) but favours vertical efficiency. 
 
Attempts to amend health insurance 
On 7 August 1970 the health insurance law was amended (Law no. 02228) with the aim of 
setting a legal basis for the establishment of a compulsory health insurance scheme, to 
implement the compulsory principle within a specific category of the population(Hwang, 
2006). However, this amendment was not implemented. While superficially the reason for the 
failure to implement the amendment may appear to have been a lack of financial resources 
and the burden of national defence spending, the chief reason was the attitude of President 
Park and high-ranking bureaucrats towards social welfare provision, which they felt was a 
wasteful expense and a barrier to rapid economic growth. Nevertheless, despite the 
increasingly authoritarian political situation in Korea – the Park regime had revised the 
constitution both to retain power for another decade and prohibit political activities by any 
opposition groups – a profound change in the official position on social welfare provision 
took place. In the spring of 1976, President Park announced that a new health insurance 
programme would be implemented the following year.On 22 December of that year, an 
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amendment to Korea’s health insurance law established the principle of compulsory 
participation. The amended health insurance law was Korea’s first major welfare programme 
to cover not only industrial workers but also other members of Korean society, including the 
middle class(Joo, J. H, 1999). 
 
Compulsory insurance 
A substantially amended health insurance law, which established compulsory health 
insurance coverage, was implemented in 1977 (Kwon, H. J, 2005a). Employees of companies 
with more than 500 workers were the first group covered by the new legislation (Kwon, S.M, 
2009). Health insurance coverage was then extended to employees in corporations with more 
than 300 employees in 1979 and to workers in firms with more than 100 employees in 1981. 
Gradual coverage expansion continued: A Medical Aid programme started for the poor in 
1977, and government employees and teachers joined the health insurance programme in 
1979 (Kwon, S. M, 2009). The most interesting points for discussion here are how the 
compulsory health insurance programme was introduced, who played the key decision-
making roles, and who influenced the decision-makers. 
According to Kim Jung-ryum (1990, pp.308-309), who was the chief of the Presidential 
Secretariat during 1969–1979, President Park already planned to carry out both economic 
development and social development from 1972 through the Third Five-Year Development 
Plan (Kim, J. R, 1990, p.308). Healso stated that as an indication of Park’s commitment to 
social development, he had appointed the most suitable candidate, Shin Hyun Hwak, as 
Minster of Health and Social Affairs(Hwang,2006). Kim recounts the following: 
 
President Park made up his mind to reshuffle the cabinet… As in previous cases, before the 
reshuffle, he ordered me to make a list of candidates, asking me to pay particular attention to 
the Minster of the MOHSA, which faced many difficult tasks such as the implementation of 
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the medical security programme, labour problems, and the protection of worker’s 
rights ...there was no suitable candidate except Mr. Shin … President Park asked Minister 
Shin to develop a medical welfare system fit for the country’s circumstances (Kim, J.R. 1990, 
p. 309; Joo, 1999). 
 
However, the MOHSA bureaucrats of the time tell a different story. Choi Soo-il, who was in 
charge of the government’s Social Insurance Bureau, claims that the health insurance 
programme had a different origin: 
 
With a firm determination, the head of the MOHSA (Shin) made a recommendation to 
President Park to implement a medical insurance programme …at that time all ministries 
bitterly opposed the idea, but Park decided to implement health insurance on Shin’s 
recommendation (Jo, 2008, p. 78). 
 
Kim Jong Dae, who was the section chief in charge of health insurance management, recalls 
the following: 
 
In the process of the debate on the implementation of compulsory medical insurance, Shin’s 
persuasion had a noticeable effect on Park’s position. I firmly believe that the process did 
not involve President Park making the initial decision to introduce compulsory medical 
insurance and the minister merely later implementing it ... Rather, it was Shin’s philosophy 
on social policy that persuaded Park (Jo, 2008, pp. 78–79) 
 
While Choi Soo-il and J.D. Kimplay down the role of President Park and emphasise Shin’s 
role, it should be stressed that they were bureaucrats within the MOHSA and therefore were 
unlikely to be fully aware of the political decision-making process, which was conducted 
behind a veil of secrecy. It should be noted, therefore, that while Shin played an important 
role in the introduction of the health insurance programme, he was not a key decision-maker.  
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Kim Jong-In, who was then a professor at Sogang University (later the MOHSA Minister and 
a member of the National Assembly), relayed new details regarding the decision-making 
process on health insurance policy in my interview with him.  
 
In May of 1975, Park called me regarding the establishment of a comprehensive health 
insurance policy for workers. I then set up an informal committee with bureaucrats and 
presidential secretaries. We called this organisation ‘the Friday society’. At that time, I 
proposed the introduction of a compulsory medical insurance programme to President Park, 
who was determined to introduce it. There was opposition to this plan within the Cabinet, 
this opposition couldn’t overcome the will of the top decision-maker, Park.  
 
Insummary, both of them(Kim, J. R and Kim, J. I) stressed Park’s role in the formulation and 
implementationof the compulsory health insurance policy,while two bureaucrats emphasised 
Shin’s role. Regardless of what may be the truth of the matter as regards the initial 
formulation of the compulsory health insurance policy, the fact remains that the final 
decision-maker was Park, and his attitude towards health policy was the most important 
factor in this policy-making process. Throughout the process, no other actors played a 
similarly influential role, and there were no veto players. The decision to introduce 
compulsory health insurance was a unilateral one made by the top decision-maker and high-
ranking bureaucrats within the Park administration. While some interest groups such as 
doctors and corporations were interested in a compulsory health insurance programme – for 
example, the Korean Medical Association (KMA) and The Federation of Korean Industries 
(KFI) had their voices heard during the policy-making process (Sohn, C. K, 1981; Hwang, 
2002) – they only tried to influence the programme in ways that were favourable to their 
positions. In section5.3, I will examine KFI’s role in moredetail. 
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Why was the Park regime so determined to introduce compulsory health insurance? 
Why was the Park regime so determined to introduce health insurance on a compulsory basis? 
While commentators have provided a variety of explanations, the majority suggest that it was 
a means of gaining political legitimation for the regime.  
Kang Myung-se argues that the health insurance programmewas akin to Otto von 
Bismarck’slate 19th century introduction of health insurance to stave off working class 
resistance to his rule. Lee K. C (2009) maintains that the decision to implement a compulsory 
health insurance programmeaimed to deal with the political crisis brought about by North 
Korea’s threat and the side effectsof the South’s economic growth-first policy. Hwang 
summarises this as follows: 
 
First, opposition movements, albeit sporadic and modest, were continuously demanding 
democratisation. Second, the Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972 between South and North 
Korea enabled the start of South-North dialogue, which eventually led to a comparison 
between their living conditions. It emerged that a universal healthcare service had been in 
operation in North Korea since 1972, and North Korea took full advantage of this fact for 
political propaganda (Hwang, 2006). 
 
In other words, the introduction of compulsory health insurance by the Park regime was an 
attempt to deal with complex crises in advance. It was a product of the politics of legitimation.  
 
Coverage extension  
Whatever the reasons for its introduction, the national health insurance programme 
implemented in 1977 under the authoritarian government was the first comprehensive social 
insurance introduced in Korea. As its coverage was incrementally extended, those previously 
left outside the scheme came to be covered (Kwon, H. J, 1999). As coverage extended to the 
self-employed in rural areas and employees at companies with five workers or more in 1988 
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and to the urban self-employed in 1989, the so-called ‘era of national health insurance for the 
whole population’ began. The significance of this development should not be underestimated, 
since it meant that the entire Korean population became tied into a social insurance 
programme that represented a form of social solidarity and provided an income redistribution 
function.  
However, this increase in insurance coverage was also a political project for the Fifth (1980–
1987) and Sixth Republics (1988–92), whose authoritarian military rule was facing sustained 
challenges from the middle and working classes alike (Hwang, 2009). Both the Fifth 
Republic under Chun and its successor under Roh were challenged by the resistance of the 
student and labour movements, resistance that posed a significant threat to both regimes. 
Accordingly, neither regime was interested in ensuring that the best health insurance system 
possible was developed, but rather that the expansion of coverage would serve to quell the 
possibility of more vehement resistance to their rule. As a result, the existing problems of the 
national insurance programme were retained, and no genuine attempts were made to address 
them. 
 
5.2 The administrative arrangements of pre-reform health insurance 
 
When the compulsory NHI system that was implemented in Korea in 1977 had two notable 
peculiarities: first, NHI covered only employees in firms with more than 500 workers; second 
the administrative system was fragmented, with individual health societies each managing 
their own affairs. This operational form imitated the Japanese model (Lee, J.H,2009). In 
formulating Korean NHI law in 1976, the MOHSA did not consult Korean policy experts and 
instead looked to Japanese health insurance law for inspiration, eventually settling on a 
slightly revised version of the Japanese system. It was this decision to adopt a fragmented 
insurance system that sparked the debate that would come to consume discussion on the 
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structure of Korean health insurance for the next two decades. In the modern history of social 
policy in Korea, no other controversy generated as much debate as the issue of health 
insurance integration. As time went on, the debate expanded to include participants from 
MOHSA bureaucrats, to academic policy experts, to members of civil organisations and to 
interest groups, and large-scale social movements were formed. In fact, the welfare politics 
that emerged in the course of the debate on health insurance integration in Korea were unique, 
and the history of health insurance integration and the social movements that it spawned 
helps to reveal the relationship between democratisation in Korea and social policy and the 
correlation between economic upheavals such as financial crisis and welfare reform (Kim Y. 
M, 2000). 
 
5.2.1 The arguments behind the controversy on health insurance integration  
 
The arguments for a fragmented healthcare system 
First, the arguments of the proponents of a fragmented healthcare system should be outlined 
(The Federation of Korean Health Insurance Societies or FKHIS, 1982, 1986, 1997). Their 
central argument against a single healthcare system was that it was inefficient. Since 
healthcare needs differ depending on people’s income and conditions, they argued that no 
appropriate single assessment system for equal contributions could be devised. Furthermore, 
they contended that if fragmented health insurance societies were merged, this would 
necessarily lead to managerial inefficiency and the weakening of managers’ abilities to deal 
with problems and an increase in the government’s political and financial burdens. Besides, 
there was another argument that the consciousness of community by the participation of the 
employees and the employers would decrease (Lee, K. C, 2009). Lee Kyu-sik argued that the 
adoption of a competitive and fragmented healthcare system would guarantee both the 
satisfaction of service users and the efficient management of funds (2000, p. 53). Lee, K. C 
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contended that integration of health insurance societies amounted to a risky social experiment 
that targeted the entire population (2000, p. 66). In particular, he argued that an integrated 
healthcare system would lead to inequalities between employees and the self-employed (or 
among the self-employed) because, while the income of employees is transparent, the self-
employed frequently do not report their real income, and government therefore cannot 
determine their precise income. Thus, if an integrated healthcare system were adopted, 
employees would lose out compared to the self-employed. Accordingly, he maintained that a 
fragmented health insurance system was preferable to an integrated system.  
 
The arguments for an integrated healthcare system 
For more than 20 years, the issue of an integrated healthcare system was consistently raised 
by scholars, civil activists, and labourers in Korea. What did these advocates of an integrated 
healthcare system mean when they called for the integration of health insurance? According 
to Kim Y. M (2000, pp. 100–101), health insurance integration had three meanings. The first 
referred to the integration of more than 300 individual funds into a single fund. The second 
referred to the integration of separate health insurance societies and the civil service into a 
single insurer at the national level, covering licence administration, assessment, and 
collection of contributions (premiums). The third referred to the implementation of a unified 
assessment system for contributions.  
For its proponents, what would be the likely effects of health insurance integration? On this 
question, the so-called ‘unionists’ argued that the foremost effect would be equality of 
contributions (Kim, Y. M, 1999, 2000; Lee, K.C, 2009;in Interview with Kang, C.K,Kim, Y. 
I and Cha, H.B).An interesting point here is that the unionists’ reasoning in calling for an 
integrated system was mirrored by the so-called separatists’ reason for advocating a 
fragmented healthcare system that established equality of contributions. The unionists argued 
128 
 
that administrative simplification would lead to an improvement in services. They also 
insisted that the integration of health insurance societies would positively affect the public 
use of health insurance funds, arguing that the existing fragmented funds system hindered the 
appropriate use of funds because funds could be privatised by companies at their will, 
whereas an integrated system could prevent any privatisation of funds. The most important 
issue for the unionists was that they felt that an integrated system would provide better 
benefits, that is to say, an integrated insurance system would extend the size of funds, which 
could be used more effectively to extend coverage and benefits at the national level. Whose 
argument, then, that of the unionists or that of the separatists, is more convincing? 
 
Table 5-6 Comparison of fragmented and integrated healthcare systems  
 Fragmented system Integrated system 
Administration  Regional or occupational individual health societies  A National administrative organisation 
Benefits  Equal statutory benefits Differing fringe benefits Equal statutory benefits 
Finance  Separate accounting system – limited risk pooling  A unified accounting system – risk pooling at the national level  
Peculiarity  Selective programme Universal programme 
 
 
The problems of a fragmented management and funding system 
The individual health insurance societies were self-regulating and autonomous insurers 
founded on the basis of direct payment by members. This meant that “national health 
insurance was not integrated in a single national health fund, but it comprised more than 300 
financially and administratively separate funds that collected contributions and paid hospitals 
and doctors for treatment on a fee-for-services basis. People who were newly covered by 
national health insurance formed their own health funds, Regional Health Funds, whereas the 
existing members maintained their own Governmental and Industrial Health Funds” (Kwon 
H. J, 2002, p. 160). According to their arguments, this fragmented management system did 
have somestrengthes. For example, Kwon, H. J (2002) states that it made extending coverage 
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of NHI easier because “the existing members’ funds did not have to transfer financially to 
new ones” (ibid.).  
However, “the redistribution effects of National Health Insurance were very low, as it only 
took place within fragmented health funds” (ibid.). Contributions were set at a rate of 
between 3% and 8% of monthly income and were paid directly by employees and employers, 
with employees paying 50% and employers the remaining 50%. When insurers experienced 
funding deficits, health insurance societies increased the rate of contribution (Lee, K. C, 
2009). Thi2s situation led to financial inequalities between health insurance societies, that is 
to say, a division emerged between poorer health insurance societies and richer ones, 
resulting in a vicious cycle whereby the rich got richer and the poor got poorer. This financial 
inequality also led to an inequality of benefits for the insured. The considerable difference in 
the benefits paid by employee health insurance societies and self-employed health insurance 
societies became evident over time. Above all, the level of contributions by participants 
differed according to the societies to which they belonged. However, the number of 
participants in societies was generally too small and so the effect of risk-pooling was low. In 
addition, although the operating costs and 10% of the benefits paid by most societies were 
subsidised by the government, operating costs were high and extravagant spending was 
frequent (Lee, K. C, 2009). Because of these problems, some societies were unable to 
function properly.In advanced welfare states, health security is regarded as a social right, and 
the most vulnerable people receive preferential treatment in these states. In Korea, however, 
social insurance was implemented not for the vulnerable but for the middle and upper classes 
(Lee, J. H, 2009). NHI and public pension implementation in Korea was for the privileged, 
such as civil servants, professional soldiers, employees working for large companies, and 
school teachers.  
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5.2.2 The fragmented system and the interests of the ruling coalition 
 
The interesting point is why these problems with Korea’s NHI became evident at an early 
stage. Lee, K. C (2009) argues that the problems with social insurance basically stemmed 
from the nature of the ruling coalition: the alliance between the state and subordinate 
capitalists. Its highest goal was retaining power, and economic growth was the means by 
which it aimed to achieve this end. Social policy was merely an instrument to be used 
towards accomplishing this goal and was therefore allowed only limited scope. Accordingly, 
the ruling coalition chose to implement a fragmented insurance system because it more 
actively served their interests. In this regard, Lee, D. H (1992) stated that the reasons for the 
adoption of a fragmented healthcare system by the military regime was that “the then 
government recognized that the fragmented system is more advantageous for incremental 
coverage extension and also government’s finance is minimized” (1992, p.318). Lee, K. C 
(2009) notes that at that time, the bureaucrats of the MOHSA had authority over staffing in 
health insurance societies and pharmaceutical industries, leading to the creation of vested 
interests for MOHSA bureaucrats. Notably, CEO positions at health insurance societies were 
generally held by outgoing MOHSA bureaucrats. After these ex-government officials gained 
CEO positions in health societies, they attempted to curry favour with current MOHSA 
officials in order to retain their jobs.  
Kim, Y. M (2000) has analysed the relationship between the integration of health insurance 
societies (or the fragmented health insurance system) and social actors’ interests, concluding 
that the reason why big companies advocated a fragmented system was that it more easily 
allowed them to control health funds because large companies controlled the administration 
of their own health insurance societies. In other words, the fragmented nature of the 
management and funding of the NHI system was directly related to the interests of 
bureaucrats and capitalists. This arrangement ensured that high-earning administrative posts 
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went to state representatives and bureaucrats, and since many large companies owned their 
own medical treatment facilities aid, it enabled capitalists to use some of the insurance funds 
for themselves. From the outset, then, the ruling coalition preferred the fragmented 
management system of individual health insurance societies over that of a single insurer. 
These factors hindered reform of health insurance societies for more than 20 years. 
 
5.3 The political dynamics of pre-reform health insurance integration  
 
For almost 23 years – from 1980, three years after NHI was first implemented, until financial 
integration was completed in June 2003 – the controversy about reforming health insurance 
in Korea centred on the administrative management of health insurance. As mentioned above, 
the long and arduous road to health insurance integration was marked by continuous clashes 
between the opponents (stakeholders) and proponents (stake challengers) of NHI integration. 
To explore the history and understand the political context of the health insurance integration 
process, we need to identify and classify its different phases (Won, S. J, 2006). For this, I 
employ Won’s (2006) division. According to Won, the long history of NHI integration can be 
divided into four phases, details of which are given in the table below. 
 
Table 5-7 The four phases of the controversy on health insurance integration 
Phase Period Key events Initiation 1980 The debate within the MOHSA by bureaucrats  Extension 1981–1986 The expansion of the debate to research institutes, academia, and National Assembly Social movement 1988–1990 The widespread struggle for health reform by a variety of civil organisations  Institutional integration 1997–2003 The completion of NHI integration under the Kim Dae-Jung government  
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5.3.1 The initiation and extension phases (1980-1986); the first battle between 
separatists and unionists 
 
The first person to openly question the existing health insurance societies was Chun Myung-
gi, the then Minister of the MOHSA, in 1980 (Won, S. J, 2006). He made it clear that he 
would pursue the integration of health insurance societies into a single insurer system 
immediately after his inauguration as the head of the MOHSA. How and why did Chun reach 
this decision? There are a number of explanations given for his decision. Won, S. J (2006) 
maintains that when Chun met with a Japanese counterpart from Japan’s Welfare Ministry, 
the Japanese experience of the harmful effects of separate health insurance societies were 
elucidated to Chun. However, Lee, K, C (2009), a MOHSA policy expert on health insurance 
argues that it was he who persuaded Chun to decide to integrate health insurance societies. 
Whatever the reason for his decision, Chun announced ‘a plan for the integration of health 
insurance administration’ to the president and obtained presidential sanction. The key ideas 
contained within the report can be summarised as follows. The existing system of separate 
health insurance societies made national coverage extension difficult. Although there had 
been some expansion of coverage, many societies suffered serious financial deficits (Won, S. 
J, 2006). In addition, there were serious financial inequalities between the individual health 
societies, and health insurance funds for the self-employed in rural areas were either lacking 
or chronically unstable (Hwang, 2006). In order to establish an insurance system on a 
national scale, therefore, health societies needed to be integrated (MOHSA, 1980). Lee 
recounts that Chun called on all civil servants in the MOHSA to cooperate on the integration 
of health insurance societies. 
However, Chun’s policy sparked strong opposition. Firstly, the main business associations, 
including the FKI and the KEF (Korea Employers Federation), opposed the integration. 
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Business actors raised concerns about a potential increase in the financial burden of an 
integrated system and anticipated that if health insurance societies were integrated, they 
would not be able to use health insurance funds at their will (Won, S. J, 2006). The 
Federation of Korean Medical Insurance Societies (FKMIS), which was established as a 
federation of employee health insurance societies, also opposed Chun’s recommendations. 
For the FKMIS, it was a matter of survival: integration would mean the extinction of 
individual employee health societies. Another opponent was the conservative media, 
including Chosun Ilbo, which is one of Korea’s leading newspapers. In fact, there was no 
progressive media in Korea at the time, and press freedom was tightly restricted. The Korean 
Federation of Trade Unions (henceforth the KFTU), which was the only national labour 
organisation at the time and was in fact largely controlled by the government, initially 
adopted an ambiguous position, but since the trade union represented employees covered by 
company-run health insurance societies, it later came to oppose the integration of health 
societies. 
An influential barrier to the efforts at integration was a minority of bureaucrats working for 
the presidency. Some bureaucrats in the Presidential Secretariat became a centre of 
opposition and in November 1980 produced a report against the integration of health 
insurance societies called ‘An Investigative Report on the Plan for the Integration of Health 
Insurance Administration’. Its key content was as follows. 1)The integration of health 
insurance societies would shift all medical responsibility from companies onto the state or 
government, and this did not conform to the original aims of social security. Moreover, they 
raised concerns about the potential for welfare dependency. 2) If contributions and benefits 
were coordinated, direct conflict between government and the people was more likely. 3) An 
increase in expenditure was to be expected because of unnecessary medical treatment. 4) If a 
deficit in insurance funding occurred, central government would have to meet the shortfall. 5) 
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People’s dissatisfaction would be likely to rise due to increased expectations. 6) A lack of 
consistency in management would lead to administrative chaos. (Won, S. J, 2006). The 
central theme of this report was its emphasis on the increased political burden that health 
insurance integration would bring.  
In stressing this particular aspect, opponents of an integrated health insurance system tried to 
increase the regime’s anxiety about integration and raise the spectre of a large budget deficit. 
Nevertheless, on the whole, public opinion was in favour of integration, and the National 
Assembly decided that the government should introduce health insurance integration by the 
end of 1982. However, the Presidential Secretariat pressured the MOHSA into not accepting 
the National Assembly’s recommendation (Cha, H. B, 2011, Author’s interview) 
The final decision was ultimately in the hands of President Chun Doo-hwan. In this regard, 
Kim Jong-Dae, who was one of the influential separatists and an executive official at the 
presidential residence, recalls the following:  
 
At 3pm on 2 November 1982...the president held a meeting on the health insurance 
integration proposal....The president said that “the party that advocated the integration 
needed to reconsider its position, and the Blue House (the presidential residence – here it 
meant the opponents of integration working in the Blue House) was right” …and so the issue 
was wrapped up. This decision formed a watershed. (2007.8.1, interview with Jo; Jo, 2008, P. 
85; Kim, J. D, 2013 interview with author) 
 
Cha recalled the following in my interview with him (5, Decmber, 2010):  
 
At that time, the Minister of the MOHSA, the floor leader of the ruling party, and the 
chairperson of the Standing Committee for Health and Social Affairs in the National 
Assembly explained the need for NHI integration directly to the President and the president 
secretaries but also made clear that the integration would increase the state’s financial 
burdens. Finally, President Chun decided that the integration must be deferred.  
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President Chun’s decision that day ended the first battle between the separatists and unionists. 
However, this did not mark the end of the integrationists’ problems. Their opponents in the 
presidential residence now attempted to suppress unionists’ efforts through violent means in 
1983. Cha, H. B (2011) witnessed the affair. 
 
I was taken to the secret intelligence agency, where I was accused of corruption. I was 
tortured in their secret building for a week (Cha, H. B, 2011, Author’s interview). 
 
After this, the debate on the pros and cons of integration continued in the academic arena, at 
research institutes, and in the National Assembly. With a few exceptions, the members of the 
Committee of Health and Social Affairs were in favour of integration (minutes of the 
National Assembly, 1981).The ruling party, the DJP (Democracy and Justice Party) also 
favoured integration. Research institutes, including the KDI (Korea Development Institute) 
and the KIHSA (Korea Institute of Health and Social Affairs), held various debates on the 
integration or separation of health insurance societies. Within academia, most scholars 
supported integration. 
 
Figure 5-3 The first battle between separatists (stakeholders) and unionists (stake challengers) 
in 1980–1986 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fragmented unionists  
A minority of reform-minded ministers 
and bureaucrats  
Political parties, the National 
Assembly, policy experts, etc. 
Solid separatists  
The president and presidency  
Anti-unionism bureaucrats 
Capitalists (FKI, KEP) 
Conservative media 
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5.3.2 The social movement phase (1988–1990): the second battle and veto power 
 
The conflict between the separatists and unionists around health insurance management again 
came to the fore during the process of the inclusion of the self-employed in health insurance 
schemes in rural (1988) and urban areas (1989). However, the conflict now took on a new 
dimension. The June Democratic Struggle, the announcement of a direct presidential election 
system by the Chun regime, the June and August great labour struggles, the division of 
democratic candidates, and the election of President Chun’s successor, Roh Tae-Woo, had 
created a new political situation in Korea. In this political climate, the opposition party at the 
end of 1987 proposed the extension of national health insurance to the self-employed in rural 
and urban areas (Hwang, 2006). Facing an imminent presidential election and a general 
election within months, the government extended the NHI programme to farmers and 
workers in the fishing industry in the first month of 1988 and raced to establish 138 health 
insurance societies in rural areas. 1,700,800 farmers and fishermen were forced to join these 
societies. However, the government’s move triggered strong resistance from farmers. In 
February 1988, immediately after President Roh’s inaugural address, 1,500 farmers came 
together at a square in Goesan-Gun, a small county in Chung Cheong province, to protest the 
government’s move, calling for equality in NHI contributions and equal access to affordable 
medical treatment. Their discontent centred on the contribution levels that they were expected 
to pay. While employees met 50% of their total insurance contribution (the other 50% was 
met by their employers), farmers had to meet 80% of the total insurance contribution. Cha, H. 
Bdescribed the situation as follows: 
 
In January, as soon as the farmers and fishermen health insurance started, serious issues 
were raised throughout the country. “We can’t pay the contributions”, “the contributions are 
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unequal”, “there is discrimination in using medical institutions". These complaints arose 
simultaneously (Cha, H. B, 1988, p.89). 
 
Farmers and workers in the fishing industry united with the urban poor and workers 
contributing to the regional health insurance societies to advocate integration. In June 1988, 
40 health insurance countermeasure committees and 48 other organisations from across the 
country came together to form ‘the National Medical Insurance Countermeasure Committee 
(NMICC)’ and call for the integration of health insurance. The significance of this 
development was that it marked the beginning of the attempts by social movements to 
intervene in the government’s one-sided policy-making process on health policy.  
Social movements would later play a key role in the movement for NHI integration. 
Meanwhile, a group of scholars joined the so-called ‘integration movement’. Scholars 
promoting NHI integration formed ‘a research society for social insurance’. Over the 
following weeks, they announced ‘a study on ways to integrate the NHI’, while other 
academic groups issued papers on separate NHI management in the name of ‘the whole 
health insurance researchers’ (Lee, H. K, 2009). Finally, the political community responded. 
Two opposition parties, the PDP (Peace Democracy Party) and the RDP (Reunification 
Democracy Party), submitted a new NHI integration law in a plenary session. The NDRP 
(New Democratic Republican Party) also changed their position after farmers staged a rally 
and occupied the headquarters of the party (Won, S. J, 2006). On 9 March 1989, an 
extraordinary event occurred.  
The integration law, ‘the National Medical Insurance Act’, was passed in the provisional 
session of the National Assembly. The opposition parties’ support for integration pressured 
the ruling party into agreeing to support the National Medical Security Law (Woo, 2004). 
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Table 5-8 The distribution of parliamentary seats in 1988 
Parties  299 seats 
DJP (the ruling party/Roh Tae Woo) 125 Seats PDP (Kim Dae-jung) 70 RDP (Kim Young Sam) 59 NDRP (Kim Jong Pil) 35 Independent and others 10  
This time, the conservative media emerged as the enemy of integration, arguing that if 
integration were achieved, the burden of contribution would increase twofold (Won, S. J, 
2006). The Hankyoreh Daily Newspaper, the only progressive newspaper at that time, and 
The Kukmin Daily News were the only supporters of the NHI integration proposal. The 
crucial barrier to implementation of the new law was the veto power of President Roh. 
Although Roh was a ‘minority president’ in that opposition parties held the majority of seats 
in the National Assembly, he exercised his veto to prevent the passage of the integration law 
and then argued that there might be legal problems in integrating different health insurance 
funds and making them public because health insurance funds, considered as private property 
by each health insurance society, could not be transferred to public organizations (Woo, 
2004).  
Roh’s decision was the result of persuasion by his secretaries, vigorous lobbying by the 
Federation of Korean Medical Insurance Societies (FKMIS), strong resistance from business 
sectors, and the KFTU’s (Korean Federation of Trade Unions) reluctance to accept insurance 
integration and its short-sighted selfishness. This marked the end of the second battle between 
the separatists and the unionists. Fundamentally, it can be concluded that the power of the 
vested interests network lay behind Roh’s veto. The proponents and opponents in the second 
battle on NHI integration can be tabulated as follows. 
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The ‘tipping point’ leading to NHI integration will be explored next. In examining this 
process, the new political dynamics of health insurance reformand the impact of social 
movements will become clear. 
Figure 5-4 The second battle of separatists (stakeholders) and unionists (stake challengers) in 
1988–1990 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3.3 The showdown between stakeholders and stake challengers  
 
The history of health insurance integration was the history of the showdown between 
‘stakeholders’ and ‘stake challengers’. This battle stemmed from the confrontation between 
the vested interests of separatists and the pro-reform grouping of unionists. It is necessary, 
therefore, to identify the participants in the respective coalitions and understand their 
characteristics.  
 
Separatist coalition: the vested interests network 
Stakeholders were opponents to the integration of NHI and are listed in Figure 5-3 and Figure 
5-4. They were mainly welfare providers and preferred the existing fragmented healthcare 
management system to an integrated one because their interests lay in the existing system. 
For example, bureaucrats were able to achieve their own primary objective with this system, 
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namely securing their legitimacy by implementing NHI with the minimum use of resources. 
In practice, they were more interested in attaining their own political legitimacy than in 
ensuring health security, and they continuously pursued this goal throughout the debate 
between separatists and unionists. The priority of the authoritarian government was to reduce 
people’s demands, dissatisfaction, and resistance. Accordingly, the government did not want 
healthcare to become a national issue and feared that integration of the healthcare system 
could heighten this possibility. In addition, “the presence of multi-health insurance societies 
gave the military government various advantages in terms of less financial and administrative 
commitment. Government was less responsible, so the issue was less problematic” (Kwon, S. 
M, 2003, p.125). This was, then, the military government’s position. Additionally, health 
societies provided retirees from the ruling party, the military and the MOHSA with decent 
jobs with a high salary, as shown in Table 5-8.  
 
Table 5-9 The Former Jobs of high-level figures in health societies (1988) 
Bureaucrats The ruling party Military Others (experts) Total 
144 101 69 47 361 
(Sources: minutes of the Health and Social Affairs Committee in the National Assembly, 1988) 
 
The capitalists’ attitude towards the administrative system for NHI was directly related to 
their continued control of the health insurance societies set up by and operating within their 
companies. These societies accumulated large reserves of health insurance contributions, 
funds that companies used as the occasion demanded. For example, many companies used 
these funds as deposits for loans or illegally profited from them by making multiple banking 
deposits, even though it was illegal for health insurance societies to deposit their funds with 
more than five banks. Companies also used these funds to placate labour demands. Another 
organisation with a close interest in the debate was the Federation of Korean Medical 
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Insurance Societies (FKMIS), which was established as an insurer organisation in 1976 and 
acted as an executive body for the separate health insurance societies and which had close 
ties with very influential financial and business vested interest organisations (as did most 
health societies). For example, the presidents of the FKMIS were, in succession, Kim Ib-sam 
(1977–1982), a key member of the FKI, Chang Won-chan (1983–1987), a bureaucrat, and 
Woo Jong-Lim (1987–1990), who was from the military. In effect, a large interest group 
network was formed by organisations and individuals with a vested interest in retaining the 
system of separate health insurance societies. This vested interests network is shown in 
Diagram 5-1 below. 
 
Illustration5-1 The key actors in the separatist vested interests network 
 
 
Unionist coalition; the challenger network 
Even though various problems inherent in the NHI programme were revealed as it matured 
(Hwang, 2006), no steps were taken to tackle the problems. The chief reason for this was that 
although there were groups that recognised the existence of the problems, there was no strong 
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stake challenger organisation to address them, and these groups remained weak, separate, and 
isolated. The government was not strongly challenged to improve matters until 1988, when 
farmers raised the issue of the unequal contributions that they had to pay to health insurance 
societies. Ironically, the motive for this challenge sprang from the extension of NHI coverage 
to farmers in 1988, which, as outlined earlier, led to many farmers withholding their 
contributions to health insurance societies. Democratic progress in Korea over the preceding 
years enabled farmers and civil organisations to make their arguments more forcefully. 
 
Illustration5-2 The key actors in the unionist challengers' network 
 
 
 
With the progress of democratisation, a new political geography emerged. In the late 1980s, 
farmers demanded and voiced the need for reform of health insurance societies, and their 
demands spread to several other social groups. The opposition parties and the National 
Assembly did not play a crucial role in the reform of health insurance societies. The 
emergence and proliferation of new actors gradually opened new possibilities for unification 
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and solidarity among the unionists. In particular, farmers and labourers, civil activists, and 
reform-minded policy experts formed a new coalition for the integration of NHI organisations. 
This created a new politics of healthcare and welfare reform in Korea. 
 
5.3.4 The stake challengers’ counterattack and strategies 
 
The battle between separatists and unionists on the integration of NHI organisations would 
change in the mid-1990s. The strongest driving force for this change was the wave of 
democratisation. After the June Democratic Struggle, social and labour movements 
campaigned continuously for social reforms. As regards health insurance integration, 11 
April 1994 marked the ‘tipping point’. On this day, various social movement groups came 
together and established a new large-scale organisation to push for the integration of health 
insurance societies: The Pan-national Solidarity Council for Medical Insurance Unification 
and Benefit Expansion (henceforth, PSC). This organisation had three main goals: 1) the 
unification of all NHI societies; 2) the expansion of coverage; and 3) equal contribution for 
all people. The PSC’s activities opened a new era for both the integration movement and 
welfare politics in Korea. The PSC’s participants can be divided into four categories: 1) 
health and medical organisations (progressive doctors, pharmacists, dentists, and oriental 
doctors); 2) trade unions; 3) the Federation of National Farmers Associations; and 4) social 
movement groups. While the background to the launching of the PSC originally lay in the 
deepening contradictions within separate health insurance societies, the key move leading to 
it being established was the setting up of `the Committee of Health Security Reform’ (CHSR) 
in 1994, a consultative body to the minister of the MOHSA, under President Kim Young Sam, 
the first ‘bona fide’ civilian president in thirty-two years. Even though this government was 
in many ways a successor to the previous authoritarian regime, it promoted a range of 
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reformist policies. These policies were later to open policy windows for the unionists. The 
CHSR consisted of bureaucrats and policy experts, including some progressive health 
insurance reformers, but due to opposition from within the MOHSA, this organisation could 
never actively promote NHI integration. 
The PSC’s first effort was focused on constructing an alternative insurance policy to that then 
in existence and was a response to setting up of the CHSR. The PSC issued an alternative 
policy for insurance integration on 20 May, one month and ten days after its formation. The 
CHSR also suggested an alternative policy that called for a partial extension of benefits 
within the existing system of separate insurance societies. The PSC’s other effort was 
strengthening the capabilities of participant organisations. 
The PSC held briefing sessions, public hearings, presentations, a petition-signing campaign, 
lectures, and symposiums to sway public opinion. The most noteworthy PSC activity, 
however, was securing the labour movement’s active involvement. Kim Yong Ik, who was 
Professor of Seoul National University and a commissioner of the PSC, played a major role 
in this process. 
 
“ I thought that in the case of health insurance reform, the most important actor would be the 
labour movement, so I visited the progressive trade unions and persuaded them to join the 
NHI integration movement. In reality, NHI funds were labour’s possession, but these funds 
were controlled by capitalists. I persuaded workers to realize that health insurance 
integration was a class issue.”(Kim, Y. I interview, 2010. 11.25)  
 
The PSC effort was also aimed at politicians. PSC representatives met several National 
Assembly members and visited the headquarters of political parties to elucidate the need for 
NHI integration. The interest of the mass media was aroused by these efforts, which were not 
antagonistic but were persistent and aimed to secure national support. The key event was the 
decision of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) to link NHI integration and 
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wage negotiation. In 1995, 119 trade unions called for NHI integration in their collective 
bargaining efforts with management.  
In the latter half of 1995, the PSC increased the pressure for integration and adopted a new 
strategy, calling directly for the enactment of a NHI integration law. The PSC endeavoured to 
make NHI integration a major political issue. In increasing its pressure, the withholding of 
insurance contributions in farming and fishing regions was encouraged by the PSC and a 
petition-signing campaign was employed. All these activities were aimed at stirring up public 
opinion for NHI integration.  
As the general election in 1996 and presidential election in 1997 approached, the expectation 
of the PSC movement increased. The key members of the PSC viewed the 1997 presidential 
election as the best opportunity for NHI integration and concentrated on enacting a NHI 
integration law. They had already compiled a draft bill for the opposition party of Kim Dae-
jung. Lee Sung-Jae, a robust member of Kim Dae-jung’s National Congress of New Politics 
(NCNP, the successor to the PDP) in the National Assembly, took responsibility for the 
enactment of the NHI law and submitted an NHI integration bill. However, Lee’s integration 
bill did not pass in the National Assembly. Nevertheless, to allay the rising political 
importance of the insurance integration issue, Hwang Sung-kyun and 30 Assembly members 
of the ruling party submitted ‘the National Medical Insurance Law’ on 30 October 1997, the 
key contents of which were the integration of 227 self-employed health societies and the 
absorption of regional health insurance societies for civil servants and private school teachers 
into a single body. This bill was passed by the National Assembly with the help of the 
opposition party. However, business sector stakeholders neglected this law, and the MOHSA 
bureaucrats meekly accepted it because they planned to devise alternative legislation later. 
Through the enactment of this law,the ‘National Medical Insurance Corporation’ was 
launched on 1 October 1998. This was a noticeable development and marked the first stage of 
146 
 
NHI integration, but genuine health insurance integration still lay ahead, despite all the 
efforts of unionist organisations. 
 
5.4 The politics of health insurance since the economic crisis: the 
institutional integration phase (1998–2003) 
 
The organisational integration of NHI was finally achieved in 2000. At the time of the 
economic crisis in 1997, NHI was administered and financed by more than 350 health 
insurance societies respectively. These societies were broadly categorised into three different 
types by the status of the insured; 139 societies for employees, 227 societies for self-
employed workers and a society for government employees and school teachers. As we have 
seen earlier, the 227 societies for self-employed workers and a society for government 
employees and school teachers were integrated in 1999. After this, the three categories of 
societies were integrated into a central agency in 2000. Finally, the formerly separate 
financial accounts for employees and self-employed workers were incorporated in 2003 
(NHIC, 2005). In this section, I will explore how the stake challengers achieved NHI 
integration and what were the internal and external factors that led to this.  
 
5.4.1 The emergence of new actors and new politics 
 
The stakeholders’ strategic retreat 
On 18 November 1997, ‘the National Medical Insurance Law’ was passed in the National 
Assembly. As explained earlier, the key component of this law was the integration of the 227 
self-employed health insurance societies and the creation of a single health insurance 
organisation for civil servants and private school teachers. A group of health insurance 
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society CEOs demonstrated at the headquarters of political parties in opposition to this law. A 
plenary session of the National Assembly’s Standing Committee on Health and Social Affairs 
was postponed owing to members’ absence from the session without notice.  
Generally, however, stakeholders reacted to the passage of the law with a kind of strategic 
retreat. The business sector, especially large companies and the large-scale health societies, 
which had always valued personal profit over the interests of insurance contributors, looked 
coldly upon the passage of the law. The MOHSA bureaucrats who had formally opposed the 
PSC’s integration bill meekly accepted the passage of the partial integration law in the belief 
that they could devise alternative legislation later and persuade the incoming president of its 
virtues. However, their plans were frustrated by unexpected events: the 1997 economic crisis 
and the power shift in Korean politics.  
 
The political and policy context of the 1997 economic crisis: the opening of a new policy 
window  
The 1997 economic crisis opened a new policy window for stake challengers. Above all, the 
economic crisis enabled the organisations calling for NHI integration to find new political 
and social spaces for their activities. By contrast, the economic crisis paralysed the active 
opposition of the stakeholding conservative bureaucrats. The power shift in 1998 from 
conservative government to the new progressive government was also another factor in 
opening up a new policy and political arena for welfare reform. It was the first time in 50 
years of constitutional government that an opposition party had taken power. Perhaps most 
notably, Kim Dae-Jung, a long-time pro-democracy activist who had been sentenced to death 
under previous military governments, became the president. Throughout his presidential 
campaign, he had consistently promised health insurance integration, and health insurance 
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reform rose to the top of the political agenda. The economic crisis and the power shift in 
Korean politics were the decisive factors in the ultimate success of the stake challengers. 
 
A pro-welfare president and setting the health insurance integration agenda 
While the MOHSA bureaucrats continuously attempted to devise alternative regulations to 
defeat ‘the National Medical Insurance Law’ passed by the National Assembly on 18 
November in 1997, the economic crisis and the split within the ruling party’s candidates 
delivered a historic victory to the opposition party’s presidential candidate, Kim Dae-Jung. 
“This was the first democratic transition of power from a long-entrenched, conservative 
ruling camp to an opposition leader” in Korea (Lee, H. K,2007, p. 39), and “it would be no 
exaggeration to say that a key factor in the Kim Dae-Jung victory was the indomitable man 
himself” (Oh, 1999, p. 232). President Kim is a key person in the history of social policy in 
Korea. He emphasised welfare expansion more than any other president. In a speech marking 
Korea’s 54th Liberation Day in August 1999, President Kim promoted the concept of 
productive welfare, declaring that he would implement a productive welfare policy that 
would maintain individual dignity and raise the living standards of all Koreans. 
 
President Kim said that the state’s purpose was to secure people’s happiness. He then added 
that people should never starve to death, should have access to good schooling regardless of 
their wealth, and should be able to receive proper medical treatment when they need it ... 
This is true nature of productive welfare (Author’s interview with Kim, S. J, 2010). 
 
President Kim had publicly pledged to implement health insurance integration. Accordingly, 
after he was elected on 18 December 1997, he pushed ahead with giving a concrete shape to 
the NHI integration plan. At the beginning of January 1998, the Presidential Transmission 
Committee announced one hundred tasks for reform, of which NHI integration was one. On 
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January 6, the Korea Tripartite Commission (KTC), comprising representatives of business, 
labour, and government, was set up as a consultative body to President Kim. The “members 
of this first-round commission (15 January through 9 February 1998) were the two union 
leaders of the KCTU and FKTU, the two business leaders of the KEF and FKI, two senior 
government officials fromthe Ministry of Finance and Economy and the Ministry of Labour, 
and a total of four representatives from the ruling party and the three opposition parties” (Lee, 
J, H, 2007, p.117).  
After deliberation, the KTC collectively agreed to the integration of NHI. At the time, the 
KCTU supported the NHI integration proposal, but this conservative federation of labour 
unions later came to oppose it. The business organisations (the KEF and the FKI), which 
were strong opponents of NHI integration, did not dare oppose the integration proposal 
because the new government and President Kim had already promised it.  
The economic crisis and the political power shift meant that the business sector did not 
actively oppose the plans to integrate NHI. However, the business community later openly 
came out in opposition to NHI integration, particularly the integration of funds, during the 
actual legislative process.  
 
5.4.2 The integration of health insurance administration  
 
Setting up the Executive Agency for Health Security Integration  
On 23 March 1998, almost one month after the inauguration of the Kim Dae-jung 
government, the Executive Agency for Health Security Integration (EAHSI) was established 
for the complete integration of NHI, including the integration of employee health societies. 
Its goal was the enactment of a comprehensive NHI integration law. 
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This agency consisted of representatives from various groups, including policy experts, 
activists from the Citizens´ Coalition for Economic Justice(CCEJ) and People's Solidarity for 
Participatory Democracy (PSPD), members of the labour movement, and representatives 
from organisations for farmers, women, consumers, government employees, and the 
healthcare and business sectors. This organisation’s role was topropose the 
fundamentalprinciples of the NHI integration law and the form that it should take. The Kim 
Dae-Jung government also created the ‘Establishment Committee of National Health 
Insurance Management Corporation’. Henceforth, NHI integration was not in doubt and 
entered a firmer phase. 
 
The stakeholders’ strategy and counterattack 
On October 1 1998, the ‘National Medical Insurance Corporation’ was launched. As 
mentioned above, this was the first stage for the integration. Despite the efforts of stake-
challenger organisations, however, the path to health insurance integration remained 
problematic. First and foremost, stakeholders rallied against NHI integration. At the centre of 
the stakeholder anti-integration movement was the National Trade Union of Employee Health 
Insurance Societies (TUEHI), which represented those working for employee health 
insurance societies. For TUEHI members, integration was likely to lead to the loss of their 
jobs. They feared that integration would bring restructuring and the sweeping dismissal of 
employees. 
In contrast to the TUEHI, the National Trade Union for Regional Health Insurance societies 
(TURHI) consisted of workers for regional health insurance societies. While the THEHI 
belonged to the conservative KCTU, TURHI belonged to the FKTU.  
As the TUEHI emerged as the new centre of opposition to NHI integration, the KCTU’s 
earlier ambiguous attitude towards integration turned into direct opposition. This time, 
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however, stakeholders had to adopt a different strategy because they no longer had the 
support of the top decision-maker and the bureaucrats. Unlike the previous regime, the new 
president supported health insurance reform. Under a system of presidential government, it is 
difficult for bureaucrats to openly oppose the president’s will, and although the bureaucrats 
were traditionally strong supporters of the stakeholders, they did not raise their voices in 
opposition because of the president’s strong ‘pro-integration’ attitude. Accordingly, the 
TUEHI launched an aggressive offensive, employing a major publicity campaign against 
comprehensive NHI integration, conducting walkouts, and taking the protest to the streets. 
Some scholars who opposed NHI integration joined this campaign. The conservative mass 
mediaincluding Chosun Ilbo and Donga Ilbo (daily newspapers)added their voices to the 
opposition and unquestioningly presented the TUEHI’s arguments. The stakeholders’ attack 
reached its peak immediately before the National Assembly’s review of the NHI integration 
law, focusing on the argument that workers’ contributions would increase sharply when NHI 
integration was completed. The stakeholders’ stubborn opposition continued for a couple of 
years after the integration law was passed by the National Assembly.  
 
The stake challengers’ strategy and counteroffensive 
The proponents of NHI integration actively dealt with the stakeholders’ attack. As the TUEHI 
and the KCTU issued anti-integrationist public statements, the TURHI and the FKTU also 
issued public statements for integration. Before the 1997 economic crisis, workers’ action for 
NHI integration had been limited, but now the FKTU actively supported the NHI integration 
movement. In the period prior to the review of the NHI integration law in the National 
Assembly, the battle between the two coalitions grew increasingly hostile. FKTU members in 
particular played a significant role in the struggle. 
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Similarly, the National Assembly and political parties had not played an important role in 
health insurance reform before the economic crisis. In the political context of a democratic 
society, the national legislative assembly functions in making, amending, and abolishing laws 
and acts. In such societies, the national assembly is the centre of politics and the crucial 
policy decision-maker. However, Korea’s legislature was devalued for several decades 
because it did not have this decision-making role under the authoritarian presidential system. 
Instead, the most important decision-makers were the president, first, and bureaucrats, second. 
After democratisation, the decision-making role of the National Assembly changed, and as 
democratisation progressed, the influence and power of the National Assembly increased and 
its members rose as a new power after the economic crisis. I will discuss this issue in detail in 
Chapter 7.  
The key members of the National Assembly in connection with the NHI integration law were 
Lee Seong-jae of the NCNP (the ruling party) and Hwang Seong-kyun and Kim Hong-sin 
from the Grand National Party (the leading opposition party). Lee, a radical progressive, was 
the leading proponent of NHI integration in the National Assembly. Hwang, and Kim were 
also strong advocates of NHI integration, even though many members of their party were 
opponents.  
These politicians played a crucial role in the passage of the two most important integration 
laws in the history of health insurance integration: in the first phase, the ‘National Medical 
Insurance Law’ (the partial integration law), and in the second phase, the ‘National Health 
Insurance Law’ (the complete integration law).  
In addition, Lee Seong-jae and Kim Yong-Ik, a core member of the PSC, understood each 
other very well, sharing a common goal and policy aim. Together they developed efficient 
strategies and established a covert coalition for NHI integration. Lee Seong-jae recounted the 
following in my interview with him (14, May, 2014, 6, Januarary, 2011).  
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During the first integration decision-making process, I met frequently with the Assemblyman 
Hwang Seong-kyun of the Grand National Party (GNP). We had a shared view about 
complete health insurance integration and promised each other that, to begin with, we would 
secretly work towards developing a plan of action because there was strong opposition to the 
integration… Hwang at first submitted a partial integration bill, and I later submitted a 
complete integration bill. We adopted a strategy of simulated public disagreement, and I 
made an artificial concession. In the end, the partial integration bill was passed by the 
National Assembly (2011). 
 
Lee, Hwang, and Kim continued with their collaboration for NHI integration until fiscal 
integration of NHI was achieved, and their activities transcended the scope of their respective 
political parties. In January 1999, the complete integration law was enacted, and in July 2000, 
the complete administrative integration was completed. With this, 142 health insurance 
societies for industrial workers and their dependents, the single health insurance society for 
government employees and teachers and their dependents, and 227 regional health insurance 
societies for the self-employed were all merged into one organisation, namely, the National 
Health Insurance Corporation (NHIC, 1999).  
 
5.4.3 Fiscal integration  
 
The stake challengers’ victory 
As Lee’s statement shows below, the final moments before the passage of the NHI 
integration law in the National Assembly were very tense.  
 
There was last-minute tension in the National Assembly in the run up to the reading of the 
complete integration bill. Some members of the GNP vehemently opposed the passage of the 
integration law, and Choi-Kwang, who was the then minister of Health and Welfare, 
attempted to sabotage it altogether. Nevertheless, we were of stronger mind than our 
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opponents. Because of the extreme opposition, Hwang, Seong-kyun, Kim Hong-shin and I 
held a strategy meeting before a plenary session of the National Assembly. We sometimes 
used clever tactics. For example, when the main opponents of NHI integration were 
campaigning in a rural region, we held a session in the National Assembly. I remember that 
the opponents of NHI integration continued in their attempts to derail the passage of the 
integration law until the very last moment (in my interview with Lee, Seong-jae on 6 January 
2010). 
 
A day before the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) submitted this law on 3 
December 1998, Hwang Seong-kyun and twenty assembly members submitted the ‘Health 
Insurance Revised Bill’. Hwang’s bill included provision for the integration of the National 
Medical Insurance Corporation (NMIC) and health insurance societies for industrial workers. 
These two laws along with another two similar laws were then unified into a single law called 
‘the National Health Insurance Law’, which was submitted before the National Assembly’s 
plenary session. Its key contents were 1) the integration of the NMIC and employee 
(industrial workers) health insurance societies, 2) fiscal integration would be postponed until 
31 December 2001, and 3) the term ‘Medical Insurance’ would be replaced by the more 
comprehensive concept of ‘Health Insurance’. This law was passed on 6 January 1999, with 
the NHIC launched on 1 January 2000 and then fully implemented in July 2000. As a result, 
the NHI system in Korea finally became a single insurer system through the merging of all 
health insurance societies. With this development, it seemed likely that the showdown 
between the separatists and the unionists would end.  
 
The stakeholders’ last-ditch offensive and the fiscal integration issue 
With the completion of its mission, the PSC was dissolved at the beginning of 1999. Many 
scholars adjudge the PSC to have played the most crucial role in the enactment of the NHI 
integration law, even though its limitations as a temporary solidarity organisation were also 
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apparent. However, the battle between separatists and unionists was not yet over. Despite the 
passage of the NHI integration law, stakeholders continued to agitate against further 
integration, focusing their opposition on fiscal integration. the National Health Insurance Law 
had postponed financial integration from 2001 until 2002, and although the organisational 
merger of all health insurance societies had been achieved, the core issue, financial 
integration, was yet to be completed. For stakeholders, this represented an opportunity, and 
their strategy focused on retaining the existing system and preventing fiscal integration.  
For both stakeholders and stake challengers, the most crucial NHI integration issue was the 
financial issue. As mentioned earlier, inequality in healthcare financing and the financial 
plight of many health insurance societies for the self-employed were major forces that drove 
reforms towards a single-payer system (Kwon, S. M, 2009). More specifically, before the 
integration, each separate health insurance society employed its own method of assessing 
contribution rates within legal limits. Thus, contributions for the self-employed were 
dependent upon people’s income, property and household size, whereas the contributions for 
the industrial worker groups were assessed on the only basis of income. The difference in the 
means of assessment brought about the differences in contribution rates, with contributions 
differing significantly even between industrial workers’ societies. This issue inevitably 
caused concerns about the inequitable burden of social health insurance (Kwon, S. M, 2009). 
Moreover, for the members of self-employed societies in poor areas, the burden of 
contributions as a proportion of income was much higher than for those in more affluent 
regions. In reality, many health insurance societies in rural areas were too small to pool the 
financial risks of their members efficiently. For these reasons, the reformers and proponents 
of NHI integration considered the integration process incomplete without fiscal integration. 
By contrast, opponents tried desperately to block fiscal integration, and despite the passage of 
the National Health Insurance Law, fiscal integration remained problematic.  
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The National Trade Union for Employee Health Insurance (TUEHI) and its umbrella body, 
the KCTU, played the key role in the stakeholders’ last-ditch offensive against NHI fiscal 
integration. They primarily called attention to the issue of the unequal contributions of the 
self-employed and industrial workers and pointed out how industrial workers’ wages had 
declined sharply due to the economic crisis. They demanded a more accurate and transparent 
assessment of the incomes of the self-employed and filed a lawsuit against the government’s 
plans to reform the funding of employee health societies. In October 1999, the TUEHI and 
the KCTU presented a five-million-signature petition to the National Assembly calling for 
fiscal integration to be delayed for two years. The business sector joined this move to oppose 
fiscal integration. Under the title ‘Opinion on the NHI Revised Law’, the FKI and the KEF 
presented its opinion on fiscal integration to the National Assembly and the MOHW. In 
combination, these actions marked a serious threat to the move towards fiscal integration of 
NHI.  
 
‘Opinion on the NHI Revised Law’(December 2001):The funds of the employee and the 
regional health insurance societies should remain separate and fiscal integration deferred 
until a unified payer system acceptable to people might be established.  
 
In this regard, Cha H, B, who was the Minister of the MOHW, witnessed the following: 
 
The interest groups and the stakeholders’ resistance raised problems for NHI integration. In 
particular, the members of the TUEHI flocked to obstruct integration plans. They even 
demonstrated outside my house. I tried to persuade them by explaining the aim of the 
integration. However, their arguments did not concern the goal of the integration. Instead, 
they were focused only on the practical means of payment, that is, whose contribution would 
increase and whose might decrease (11 March 2011). 
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It can be seen, therefore, that the various stakeholders opposed the NHI integration law 
because they believed that it would lead to the loss of their vested interests. The business 
sector feared losing its control over the insurance societies funds and losing the profits that it 
obtained from them. Many anti-reform MOHW civil servants were worried about their loss of 
control over the fragmented health insurance societies and funds. In addition, as mentioned 
earlier, some bureaucrats also profited financially from controlling health insurance societies. 
Others opposed the integration on grounds of genuine ideological difference. The major 
opposition party’s (the GNP) antipathy to NHI integration had a political basis. The GNP had 
to represent their supporters in the business sector, the TUEHI and the KCTU, and so on. The 
reason that the TUEHI vehemently opposed the NHI integration law was due to their concern 
that NHI restructuring would lead to a loss of their jobs. The KCTU’s opposition stemmed 
from the TUEHI’s membership of the KCTU, which had no interest in losing a key client. 
 
The fiscal integration of the NHI 
After the dissolution of the PSC, the civil organisations and progressive health professional 
groups involved created a new organisation on 22 July 1999 called ‘Health Solidarity’ (HS), 
a shortened version of its more formal name, the ‘Pan-National Solidarity for Securing 
People’s Health Rights’. With the passage of the NHI integration law and the PSC’s key aim 
having been accomplished, civil organisations needed to establish a new solidarity 
organisation with a more fundamental goal: securing health rights as a social right. However, 
until fiscal integration was completed, HS could not pursue its stated aim and instead had to 
continue to promote the integration movement due to the stakeholders’ continued sabotaging 
of further reforms.  
HS made steady and persistent efforts to support NHI fiscal integration. HS members issued a 
public statement criticising the KCTU and the TUEHI’s actions and demanded that the 
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government press ahead with fiscal integration. Under an agreement between the ruling party 
and the most influential opposition party, the GNP, on 4 January 2002, the implementation of 
fiscal integration was suspended for a year and six months. The following day, HS released a 
strongly worded condemnation of this decision.  
 
Figure 5-5 The all-out battle between separatists (stakeholders) and unionists (stake challengers) in 1998–
2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ultimately, however, stakeholders could not block the move towards fiscal integration of 
NHI. After many difficulties, on July 1 2003, fiscal integration was achieved, and the battle 
between stakeholders and stake challengers finally ended with the stake challengers’ 
continuous efforts having come to fruition. 
In the wake of the economic crisis, another key health reform was implemented by the Kim 
Dae-jung government: the separation of medical and pharmaceutical practices.As with NHI 
integration, under the pro-reform government, civil organisations had a great influence in the 
reform of the dispensing and prescribing system (Kwon and Reich, 2005, p.107). Although 
there were strikes by doctors in opposition to the reforms, the Kim government implemented 
a new system that separated the prescription and dispensing of medication.  
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5.5 Concluding remarks  
 
In this chapter, I have explored the health insurance reforms under the Kim Dae–jung 
government after the economic crisis, with a particular focus on the health insurance 
integration movement. As was shown, the process of health insurance reform was drawn out 
and was characterised by conflicts between stakeholders and stake challengers, both of whom 
set strategies and mobilised power. It was demonstrated that the economic crisis and the 
subsequent power shift was the decisive ‘tipping point’ for the attainment of health insurance 
integration. In addition, the chapter revealed how the interaction between the stakeholders 
and stake challengers brought the emergence of a new policy-making process in terms of 
welfare politics. 
In sum, health insurance integration led social and political actors in Korea to develop a new 
policy-making process and a new political arena. For several decades, policy-making power 
was concentrated in the hands of the authoritarian president and high-ranking bureaucrats, 
and decision-making took place very much within a closed structure. However, in the process 
of democratization the economic crisis and power shift, this structure cracked, and civil 
organisations in particular played a pivotal role in the emergence and development of 
healthcare reform. On these points, a more detailed analysis will be undertaken in Chapter 7.  
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Chapter 6 
 
The welfare politics of national pension reform in Korea 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the policy-making process and politics of the National Pension Scheme 
(NPS) in Korea. In 1999, Korea began a new era of universal pensions by extending pension 
coverage to the self-employed and to the urban workforce of small firms with fewer than four 
employees. With this extension of pension coverage, “most workers and self-employed 
persons were covered by the single unified pension scheme, except for the government 
employee, military personnel, and private school teachers, who were covered by the three 
occupational pension schemes” (Kim, Y. M, 2005, p. 208). Along with coverage extension, 
another reform for focusing on the long-term financial sustainability of the national pension 
fund was introduced. These were surprising developments considering the economic hardship 
of the time and the significant pressure from international economic agencies such as the IMF 
(International Monetary Fund) to adopt neo-liberal structural reform policies. This chapter 
will therefore attempt to provide answers to the following questions:  
 
1) How was public pension expansion and reform possible in a severe economic crisis? How 
was the principle of social solidarity retained in the face of intense pressure from economic 
bureaucrats and international organisations for structural reform?. 
2) Who prompted this reform and why was its implementation cancelled?  
3) What kinds of strategies were adopted by stakeholders and stake challengers, and to what 
extent did institutional and political legacies constrain such strategies?  
4) What were the effects and limitations of this pension reform?  
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5) What were the key characteristics of pension politics in Korea?  
 
All the answers to these questions relate directly to the politics of pension policy in Korea, 
and they will reveal the peculiarities of Korean welfare politics.In terms of the number of 
participants and the size of its funds, the NPS is the largest public pension scheme in Korea. 
In exploring the institutional pathways to its initiation (1973), implementation (1988), and 
reform (1998), this chapter employs my analytical framework for the politics of welfare 
reform to examine how and why NPS reform was achieved under the Kim Dae-jung 
government after the 1997 economic crisis. This chapter will also explain how the 
combination of problems, policy, and political developments during the Kim Dae-jung 
government provided a window of opportunity for pension reform and how stake challengers 
overcame stakeholders’ opposition and obstruction and ultimately achieved their goals. 
In the same way that NHI reform was explored in Chapter 5, the current public pension 
system will first be outlined and then the formation and development of Korea’s pension 
programme and its politics will be discussed. Finally, the dynamic process of pension 
expansion and reform and the key actors’ strategies and political interactions will be explored. 
As in Chapter 5, this chapter will focus on the political dynamics of the process rather than 
the contents of the policy itself. It should be noted at this point that although research on 
Korea’s pension system is relatively extensive and well developed, it primarily focuses on 
specific aspects such as institutional reform and fiscal crisis. Unlike in the West, the research 
on Korean pension politics is lacking in the sense that although some scholars have made 
attempts to address this issue, most have focused not on the dynamic strategies and 
interactions of actors within the wider political context of pension reform but on fragmented 
specific points and institutional change. I will aim, therefore, to address the absence of this 
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analysis in the literature and reveal the political dynamics of pension reform in terms of the 
actors’ strategies and interactions within the policy-making process. 
 
6.1 Overview of the National Pension Scheme (NPS) in Korea 
 
Korea’s social protection system for old age is composed of three types of schemes; four 
public pension schemes, a retirement allowance system or retirement pension for regular 
workers in the private sector, the basic (old age) pension for the low income elderly.  
 
Table6-1 The structure of the old age income security system in Korea 
Social 
insurance 
 Retirement allowance 
or pension 
 Public pensions MPPS GEPS PSTPS NPS Public assistance National Basic Livelihood Security (NBLS) system Basic Old-age Pension (Non-contributory old-age pension allowance) (Source; figure modified from Kim Y. M, 2005, p.210) 
 
The four public pension schemes in Korea are the Government Employees Pension Scheme 
(GEPS), the Military Personnel Pension Scheme (MPPS), the Private School Teachers 
Pension Scheme (PSTPS), and the National Pension Scheme (henceforth, NPS). These 
schemes can be further divided into two groups: the first group comprises the Special 
Occupational Pension Schemes (SOPS) for government employees, military personnel, and 
private school teachers and employees, and the second is the National Pension Scheme (NPS) 
for the rest of the population (Kim S.K and Lee, E. N, 2004). Of these, the NPS is the single 
largest pension scheme in Korea.  
The most advanced countries and many developing countries employ a similar system 
because it guarantees income security in old age. In Korea, the public pension system in 
Korea with health insurance is also the most important social insurance system for income 
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security. So it is generally accepted that the examination of a country’s public pension is 
crucial in understanding the welfare politics of that country. 
 
6.1.1 A brief history of the NPS  
 
The public pension scheme is ‘an income maintenance program providing its members with 
life-time pensions as a protection against the economic and social distress caused by 
retirement or substantial reduction of earning from old age, disability or death’. The first 
public pension scheme to be introduced in Korea was GEPS, which was set up in 1960 for 
civil servants. In 1963, a pension scheme for military personnel (MPPS) was added, and a 
pension scheme for private school teachers (PSTPS) followed in 1974. Prior to the 
introduction of the NPS, most pensioners were financially stable and from relatively 
privileged groups, and they were generally loyal to the authoritarian military regimes. The 
history of public pensions for ordinary people dates to 1973, when President Park Chung-
hee’s government (1962–1979) enacted the National Welfare Pension (NWP) Act. However, 
it was not immediately put into effect and was postponed for political and economic reasons. 
After a number of revisions to the NWP over the intervening years, a universal NPS was 
enacted in 1986 under the autocratic government of President Chun Doo-hwan (1980–1987) 
with the passage of the National Pension Act, which was implemented on January1988.  
According to Kim, Y. M, “the Korean NPS started from the beginning as an integrated 
occupational model covering all major groups, such as white- and blue-collar workers, 
farmers, fishing people and the self-employed under a single umbrella” (2005a. p. 208). The 
reason that the NPS, unlike health insurance, began as an integrated occupational model is 
elucidated by Kim as follows: “there was no social basis to build up some cooperative or 
voluntary pension schemes by companies, labour unions or friendly societies, as the social 
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fabric for cooperatives and the labour union movement all but disappeared during the Korean 
war (1950–1953)” (2005a, p.208).  
 
Table 6-2 A brief history of the NPS 
(SCNR: The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, CSS; The Committee for Social Security, FKI; Federation of 
Korean Industries, which consists of Korea's major business conglomerates and associated members. KMA; Korean Medical 
Associations, KPA; Korean Pharmaceutical Association/KEF; Korea Employers Federation/MFE (Ministry of Finance and 
Economy) 
 
In its initial stage, the NPS covered only those employed in workplaces with ten or more full-
time employees. NPS coverage was gradually extended to cover workplaces with five or 
more full-time employees. In 1995, the self-employed in rural areas were included. The next 
extension of coverage, despite the economic crisis, was to the urban self-employed and 
employees of small firms with fewer than five working people. In July 2003, coverage was 
extended to workplaces with one or more employees, thus making the National Pension 
Scheme a universal pension programme covering the entire general public. 
In summary, almost ten years after the implementation of the NPS, a new era of universal 
pensions began in Korea. (Kim, Y. M, 2005). In terms of critical junctures, its origin and 
year Contents  
1973 The NWP Act passed 
1974 Implementation of the NWP Act is deferred 
1986 NP Act amendment  
1988 Implementation of the NP Act and the establishment of the NPS, the key characteristics of which were a partially funded system with a redistribute element, 70% replacement rate for an average worker with 40 years of contributions, and a 3% contribution rate  
1992–1995 Extension of coverage to firms with 5 or more employees (1992). Extension of coverage to farmers and workers in the fishing industry (1995)  
1997–2000 Setting up of the ‘NPS Improvement planning Agency’ (1997). Extension of coverage to the urban self-employed (1999), leading to a new era of universal pensions. Benefits down (60% replacement rate) and contribution rate up (9% of individual earnings). Coverage widened to urban self-employed persons and all employees (1999)  
2003 Fiscal integration   
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development can be divided into three periods: first, the period covering the formation of the 
NPS in the 1970s; second, the period of implementation and gradual extension; and third, the 
period of partial reform and coverage extension to the self-employed in urban areas. In the 
following sections, the politics of the pension policy-making process will be explored 
through these critical periods for pension development in Korea. The chronology of the key 
events dealt with in this chapter is presented in Table 6-2 below. 
 
6.1.2 A basic overview of the Korean NPS  
 
Coverage 
All residents in Korea aged 18 to 59, regardless of their income, are covered under the NPS. 
Working foreign residents aged from 18 to 59 are also subject to joining the scheme, except 
for a few special cases (NPC, 2010).  
The NPS excludes government employees, military personnel and private school teachers 
because they are covered under their own special schemes. There are two types of coverage. 
Since NPS insurance is compulsory for all persons engaged in paid work, the first type covers 
compulsorily insured persons, such as employees and the self-employed, and the other covers 
voluntarily insured persons (those outside the workplace), such as housewives and students.  
Since the implementation of the NPS on January 1 1988, the number of insured persons has 
continuously increased alongside the expansion of coverage, and the NPS is now the single 
largest pension scheme in Korea, with the total number of insured persons having reached 
21,171,389 in October 2014 (NPC, 2014). 
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Figure6-1 Number of Insured Persons 
(January 2010) (Unit: persons, %) 
 
(Source; National Pension Corporation, 2010.Individually Insured Persons = Self-employed persons and non-income earners 
aged 27 or older. Voluntarily Insured Persons = non-income earning spouses of those covered and students. Voluntarily and 
Continuously Insured Persons = an insured person of 60 years of age with an insured period of less than 20 years) 
 
Finance and contribution  
The NPS is chiefly financed through contributions paid by insured persons and their employers. 
According to the National Pension Corporation (2010), “the contribution of workplace-based 
insured persons is equally shared by the employer and the employee (the insured person), 
while individually insured persons, including voluntarily insured persons and voluntarily & 
continuously insured persons, pay the entire amount of their contributions themselves. The 
government's financial support is temporarily provided for some portion of contributions paid 
by farmers and fishermen” (NPC, p. 15). On the other hand, the government provides financial 
support for the administrative costs of the national pension scheme’s management organisation, 
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the National Pension Service, and part of the contributions of farmers and workers in the fishing 
industry.  
In order to lighten the financial burden on the insured and employers during the early stages of 
the scheme, the contribution rate was set at a low level for the first ten years and was increased 
gradually. The contribution rate for the employed and those covered by voluntary insurance 
increased from 3% of income in 1988 to 9% in 1998, and has remained so since. From 1988 to 
1992, fifty per cent of the NPS contribution of the employed was met, by the employed person 
and half was met by his/her employer. From 1993 to March 1999, the employed, the employer, 
and the retirement payment reserve each paid a third of the contributions. From April 1999, the 
employed person and the employer have again each met half of the employed person’s 
contributions. Until June 2000, the contribution rates of the self-employed, including farmers and 
workers in the fishing industry, and voluntarily insured persons in urban and rural areas was 3% 
of income, which was then increased by 1% every year from July 2000 until it reached 9% in 
2005, the rate at which it remains today. While the self-employed pay their entire contributions 
themselves, from July 1995 to December 2004, the government subsidised 33% of the 
contributions of farmers and workers in the fishing industry to an amount equivalent to the 
lowest of the 45 Standard Monthly Income grades (NPC, 2010). 
 
Benefits 
NPS benefits are calculated by the principle of income redistribution among the social strata. The 
formula for the Basic Pension Amount employs a "double layer" approach that combines the 
average Standard Monthly Income (SMI) of all insured persons (equalized part) and the average 
Standard Monthly Income of an insured individual (earnings-related part). An increment of 5% is 
added to both parts per year in the case of excess of 20 years. Upon completion of a 40 year-term 
of insurance contributions, the standard level of pension is estimated at 60% of the insured 
person’s income at retirement for those whose monthly income is within the median of the SMI 
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of all insured persons. Benefits range from 60% to 100% of his or her income if their monthly 
income at retirement is lower than this median. In cases where the insured person earns above the 
median SMI, they receive less than 60% of their income at retirement. The value of all pension 
benefits is secured through a sliding-scale cost-of-living index system. Pension benefits are 
divided into the Old-age Pension, Disability Pension, and Survivors' Pension. Lump-sum benefits 
are classified into the Lump-sum Refund and the Lump-sum Death Payment. 
 
Management and funds 
The National Pension Service is responsible for the management of the NPS. This public 
agency was established in September 1987. The “NPS covers various different groups of 
occupations of waged workers, farmers, fishing people and self-employed under a single 
umbrella” (Kim, Y. M, 2005, p. 211) and, unlike health insurance in Korea, was conceived 
from the start as an integrated occupational scheme with its funds to be managed by a single 
body. 
As stipulated in Article 101 of the National Pension Act, the National Pension Fund serves as 
a reserve fund for financing the National Pension Scheme and for paying pension benefits. 
The fund is financed by contributions from insured persons, proceeds from fund management, 
and the earnings of the National Pension Service. The fund has accumulated more than 20 
trillion Korean Won annually for the past five years. As of December 2009, the fund’s assets 
amounted to KRW 277.6 trillion (USD 238 billion), making it one of the largest pension 
funds in the world. Furthermore, since the NPS is continuing to grow, the fund’s assets are 
expected to increase significantly and peak at around USD 2 trillion in 2043. The Ministry of 
Health and Welfare supervises the Fund under the National Pension Act. The National 
Pension Fund Management Committee is the ultimate decision-making body and has the 
authority to approve most important matters. The National Pension Service has established a 
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unit, the National Pension Fund Management Centre, for professional investment 
management. Since its inception, the centre has gradually changed in its policies and strategy 
to achieve its objective more effectively. 
In keeping with the three chronological periods used throughout this thesis and the notion of 
critical junctures employed in my analytical framework, the following sections will explore 
the politics of pension reform in Korea during the period of authoritarian rule in Korea, the 
post-democratisation period, and the post-economic crisis period. First, pension policy 
development and its politics under the authoritarian regimes for the period 1973-1987 will be 
examined. 
 
6.2 Pension politics under the authoritarian regimes; the formation of the 
NPS 
 
From its inception, the NPS in Korea has been strongly affected by political and economic 
factors. In this section, I will explore the political and economic factors that played important 
roles in the formation of the NPS and reveal the actors involved in the decision-making 
process and how they influenced the process. The origins of the NPS reveal a good deal of its 
nature, showing not only how social policy decisions have been made in South Korea, but 
also what the goal of the programme was when it was introduced. This will also explain why 
the NPS took on its present form (Kwon, H. J, 1998). In examining the formation and early 
expansion of the NPS, this section will explore the nature of Korean pension politics under 
the authoritarian regime, indicate the chief characteristics of the NPS, and suggest that the 
NPS, like other social policy programmes, was an instrument for maintaining economic 
growth and securing political support. 
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6.2.1 The origin of the NPS 
 
Enactment of the NWP  
Fifteen years before the NPS was implemented in 1988, the National Welfare Pension Act 
(NWP) was enacted in 1973. However, the NWP had no immediate effect on pension policy 
in Korea because its implementation was postponed by the Park government. This section 
explores why the then authoritarian government initially attempted to introduce this 
programme and why it deferred its implementation so soon after its enactment.Previous 
research by notable Korean scholars has attempted to address this question (Kwon, H.J, 
1999a; Chung, M. K, 1992; Yang, J.J, 2008). These studies have made a major contribution 
to revealing the origin of the NPS and its nature. In this section, with the help of these studies, 
I will firstly re-examine the origin of the NPS by focusing on the key actors’ actions and 
interactions. In general, the introduction of a national public pension programme is closely 
related to the issue of an ageing population, and an increase in the number of elderly people 
in a society inevitably forces the government to consider the elderly’s income security. 
However, at the time that the national pension programme was enacted in Korea, the issue of 
an ageing population was not a pressing concern as the elderly (those aged 65 or more) 
accounted for only 3.3% of the population. By contrast, the most advanced countries 
introduced national public pensions when elderly people accounted for approximately 5% or 
more of the population (Yang, J. J, 2008). With this in mind, other reasons for Korea’s 
introduction of a national pension scheme need to be sought. As seen in Chapter 3, the Park 
Jung-hee government, which had come to power in the 1961 military coup, began to face new 
challenges in the 1970s amid a growing socio-political tension due to sharply rising public 
demands and the emergence of economic problems such as inflation and recession. Why, 
then, did the Yushin Regime enact the National Welfare Pension (NWP, 1973) under these 
circumstances? 
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A means of mobilising domestic capital  
Most previous research has sought to find the answer to this question in terms of economic 
and political reasons. In tracing the economic developments of the early 1970s under the Park 
regime, most studies emphasise economic reasons for the introduction of the NWP. In the 
early 1970s, the Park regime pursued a heavy and chemical industrialisation programme in an 
attempt to maintain the rapid economic growth that Korea had experienced during the 1960s. 
From the end of 1972 to the beginning of 1973, the military government and public 
authorities announced a succession of plans: the Development Strategy for Shipbuilding 
Industry (1972. 12), the Development Programme for General Machinery Industry (1973.1), 
the Development Strategy for the Precision Apparatus Machine-driven Industry (1973.1), and 
the Plan for the Nonferrous Metal Smelting Construction Industry (1973.1) (Yang, 2008). 
While this economic strategy towards heavy and chemical industrialisation was encouraged 
by President Park himself, the enormous initial investment that would be required for 
manufacturing plants presented a problem. In this regard, an important witness was Oh Won-
chul, who was chairman of the ‘Executive Agency for Heavy and Chemical Planning’.  
 
President Park questioned the cabinet on the costs of financing of the heavy and chemical 
industries. Nam Duk-woo, the Minister of finance, answered that “a total of 10 billion US 
dollars were needed in domestic and foreign capital” (Yang, J. J, 2008, p.107). 
 
Accordingly, the economic ministries within the Cabinet hastened to prepare a financial 
expansion plan. The EPB proposed the introduction of a NWP programme as one strategy for 
mobilising domestic capital. This proposition originated from Kim Man-je – the head of the 
KDI (Korean Development Institute) and later the Minister of the EPB – who had played a 
crucial role in setting Korea’s economic strategy for decades. Kim Man-je proposed a 
national pension programme which would mobilize capital as well as contribute to social 
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security, both of which President Park desperately needed to justify his authoritarian 
regime ”(Kwon, H. J, 1998). However, another witness to the events argues against the 
findings of scholars that ascribe the introduction of the NWP to a means of raising domestic 
capital. Lee Hyung-ku, the then secretary of the EPB, was also in attendance during the 
process of the NWP Act enactment and recounted the following in an interview with Yang, J. 
J (25. 05.2006). 
 
I don’t believe that the introduction of the NWP programme was a means of mobilizing 
domestic capital. At that time, Korean taxation policy used general income tax and a value-
added tax (VAT) as the key means for the accumulation of domestic capital …Supporting the 
heavy and chemical industry through the introduction of a NWP programme was not 
necessary (Yang, J. J, 2008, p.117). 
 
However, Lee Hyung-ku’s statement should be treated with caution because as a hands-on 
member of an economic ministry, he was unlikely to have a complete picture of the entire 
decision-making process. In addition, his statement that the NWP programme was not a 
strategy for mobilising domestic capital must be regarded primarily as an opinion rather than 
a fact, as he provides no evidence for this assertion. 
 
A means of mobilising political support 
Although much previous research has argued that the enactment of the NWP Act sprang from 
the need to mobilise domestic capital for Park’s economic strategy of expanding the heavy 
and chemical industries, economic reasons alone do not fully explain the reasons for the 
introduction of the NPS. The political conditions then existing in Korea cannot be neglected, 
because the economic strategy of the regime was very much intertwined with its political 
strategy, a strategy that had its origins in the unexpected political and socio-economic 
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difficulties that emerged at the turn of the 1970s. Having already pressurised the National 
Assembly in 1969 into accepting a constitutional amendment that permitted him to stand for a 
third presidential term, Park then ran for president in the 1971 presidential election, winning a 
narrow victory. In 1972, the Park government then attempted to deal with these crises by 
dissolving the National Assembly on 17th October, imposing martial law, suspending existing 
constitution, and announcing the establishment of the authoritarian Yushin Constitution 
(Restoration Constitution) on 27th October. In justification for his imposition of authoritarian 
rule, President Park argued that constitutional revision was necessary in order to be prepared 
against the North Korean threat and to mobilize resources for economic development (Kwon, 
1998). The Yushin regime led to the paralysis of the political environment. The regime 
abolished competitive presidential elections, prohibited opposition parties and political and 
social forces from opposing the regime’s decisions, and through the 1973 amendment to the 
labour Dispute Adjustment Act prohibited any collective bargaining without prior Labour 
Committee certificate of legality (Yang, J. J, 2008). The highly oppressive political 
atmosphere led the Park regime to pursue economic growth as a means to legitimising its 
authoritarian rule. In 1972, Park declared in his beginning-of-the-year press conference that 
the government had begun preparation of a NPS programme for retired employees, the 
disabled, and their dependents. Some scholars have argued that this declaration also aimed to 
garner support for the ruling party at the general election that was due to held the following 
year and that the enactment amounted to a means of mobilising political support for the 
regime (Yang, J. J, 2008). As such, the enactment of the NWP Act was closely tied to the 
political and economic context of Korea at the time. 
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6.2.2 Bureaucratic Politics: the policy-making process of the NWP enactment 
 
Another route: the CSS design for a NPS 
As has been seen, the economic bureaucrats of the EPB and the KDI experts played a 
crucial role in the introduction of the NWP. However, the introduction of a NWP was not 
solely the idea of the economic bureaucrats and KDI experts. In fact, there was another 
move made towards introducing a public pension programme by the CSS, which differed 
from the proposal of the EPB and KDI in that it did not arise from consideration of a means 
of mobilizing domestic capital for industrial expansion.  
The members of the CSS mentioned in Chapter 5 had already developed a design for the 
introduction of four social insurances modelled on the social security framework in OECD 
countries. In October 1972, the CSS announced its ‘Long Plan for the Introduction of a NP 
Programme: 72–81’. According to this plan, implementation of the NPS was scheduled to 
begin in 1974; by 1976, the plan anticipated that 300,000 employees would have joined the 
scheme; and by 1976, two million workers would be part of the programme. It was also 
planned for the already retired elderly to receive a monthly benefit on a regular basis (NPS, 
1998). The CSS plan clearly demonstrates that the idea of a national public pension 
programme had already been studied extensively within the Korean government for some 
time prior to the EPB and KDI experts’ concept of a national pension scheme as a means of 
mobilising domestic capital. In addition to the CSS plan, the Ministry of Health and Social 
Affairs declared in 1972 that the introduction of a national pension was a key policy goal. In 
preparing its proposal, the MOHSA called on the services of a young researcher from within 
the CSS, Min Jae-seong, who wrote a dissertation entitled ‘A Study on Pension and 
Insurance in Korea’.  
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The Minister of the MOHSA then presented the draft plan to the president in its 1973 new-
year report (Yang, J. J, 2008). By this time, President Park had already received the EPB 
and the KDI programme, and the MOHSA proposal now faced competition from the EPB 
plan.  
 
The confrontation and compromise between the EPB and MOHSA 
President Park then instructed the EPB and the MOHSA to devise a new plan for 
implementing a NWP programme from 1974, with extensive discussion to take place 
between the two ministries. Accordingly, the ministries jointly formed a Working Group 
Committee (WGC) for the drafting of the NWP Act. The WGC was formally announced by 
the Prime Minister and consisted of representatives of the EPB, the MOHSA, and the MOF, 
the MGA (the Ministry of Government Administration), the Labour Office, and members of 
the CSS. Nevertheless, the main actors in developing the WGC final draft proposal were the 
EPB (+KDI) and the MOHSA. 
 
Table 6-3The major issues for the NWP programme and the differences between the EPB/KDI and the 
MOHSA draft proposals 
Issue EPB/KDI’s draft MOHSA’s draft Final decisions The targets and scope The firms with over 10 employees  The firms with over 30 employees (10 employees in 1977) 
The firms with over 30 employees (10 employees in 1977) Contributions (premiums) Employees; 5%, the employers; 5% Employees; 2%, the employers; 3% Employees; 4%, the employers; 4% The level of old-age pension 30% of latest 5 years average income  40% of latest 5 years average income 40% of latest 5 years average income Administration and collection agencies National Tax Service Administration: MOHSA Collection: labour office 
 
Fund management Fund system/ funds should be allocated for social security 
Fund system/ funds should be allocated for national investment in HCI  
 
(Source: Yang, J. J, 2008) 
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The EPB/KDI and the MOHSA each prepared their own concrete schemes for NWP 
implementation. The MOHSA submitted its draft proposal for the NWP programme to the 
WGC in February 1973, with the KDI submitting its draft proposal on 2 March 1973. These 
individual proposals by the MOHSA and the KDI/EPB were fundamentally different in terms 
of their targets and their scope of eligibility, the kinds and level of benefits, their 
administration, and their means of determining contribution levels. The WGC then set about 
drafting its own proposal through a process of compromise and negotiation on the key points 
to be included in the NWP programme (see Table 6–3 for details of the key issues involved 
and the differences between the MOHSA and EPB/KDI proposals). 
As can be seen from Table 6–3, there were considerable differences between the two initial 
proposals. The EPB/KDI’s proposal was basically designed to mobilize as much savings as 
possible by covering more workers from the beginning with a higher contributions rate, 
whereas more concerned with a smooth and stable installation of a NWP scheme, the 
MOHSA’s plan adopted a more practical approach by gradually expanding the coverage over 
time from workplaces with more than 999 employees at the contribution rate of 3% of 
salaried income (Yang, J. J, 2000). Intense debate and competition between the two 
ministries continued until the WGC produced its first draft NWP proposal on 18 May 1973. 
This content of this draft was closer to the EPB/KDI proposal than to that of the MOHSA. 
The WGC then presented the draft at a ministerial meeting, but it was felt that reaching a 
decision on the form that the final draft would take would prove too difficult at the time, and 
the presidential office therefore proposed that the WGC send an inspection team to Japan and 
South-East Asia to investigate their pension systems. After this, a number of public hearings 
with scholars and journalists, employers and employees, and politicians were held. 
Throughout the public hearings, the conservative mass media generally criticised the 
introduction of the NWP as a means of mobilising domestic capital: “It is too early to 
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introduce NWP” (Donga Ilbo, 22 September 1973); An unreasonable demand by 
employees(Chosun Ilbo, 22 September 1973); A means of mobilizing domestic capital” 
(Donga Ilbo, 26 September 1973); and “The coercion of one-sided sacrifice (Kyunghyang 
shinmun, 21 September 1973). In response to these public opinions, the first draft was 
modified and revised.  
The second draft was completed on 30 July 1973, and the government then announced the 
outline of the NWP to the general public. On 30 1973, the draft was presented to President 
Park. As soon as Park had authorised the project, progress towards the introduction of the 
NWP scheme was swift, and on 1 December, the NWP Act was passed in the National 
Assembly. 
 
The actors in the NWP policy-making process  
Due to the lack of strong stake challengers at the time, the actors who participated in the 
process of enacting the NWP Act were those in positions of authority: the president, 
bureaucrats, and a few governmental policy experts. Although the most influential decision-
maker was President Park, and the decision to introduce the NWP Act was ultimately his, the 
NWP legislation was greatly influenced by the EPB/KDI’s proposal. Two governmental 
organisations were instrumental in the enactment of the NWP Act: the Presidential Secretariat, 
and the EPB/KDI. Although MOHSA and the CSS were to be in charge of the programme, 
their roles in bringing about the NWP were smaller than those of the EPB and KDI. In this 
way, the agenda setting and decision-making for the NWP Act was wholly undertaken by 
members of the government: the president, bureaucrats, and policy experts from a 
government agency. Neither the National Assembly nor members of the ruling party played 
any role in the enactment of the NWP Act. In light of this exclusion of those outside the 
decision-making inner circle, the opposition party expressed its suspicion about the 
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motivation that lay behind the introduction of the pension programme (Chung, M. K, 1992; 
Yang, J. J, 2000a). The enactment of the NWP Act was therefore characterised by a strict 
delineation between the actions of policy insiders (government actors) and a complete lack of 
input from those outside the process (policy outsiders: everyone else). 
Interest groups, trade unions, and civil organisations also did not play an important role in 
enacting the NWP programme. While the FKI insisted that the contribution rate would be a 
heavy burden for employers that employers should be able to utilise the pension fund by 
retaining control over the contributions made within their own companies (Yang, J. J, 2000a), 
and the only labour movement organisation at the time, the FKTU, argued that it should also 
have a role in the management of the pension fund, both the FKI and the FKTU were firmly 
under the control of government in all respects. These organisations were not therefore 
genuine policy outsiders, their arguments were not critical to the formulation of the NWP Act, 
and they played no role in its enactment. The politics of policy-making existed only among 
bureaucrats and their subordinate agencies. The confrontation and competition between the 
MOHSA and the EPB/KDI over the form that the NWP should take provides a good example 
of where the politics of the policy-making process lay. Ultimately, the circumstances 
underpinning the policy-making process were fundamentally intertwined with the political 
and economic situation under the military regime, that is, centralised control over all aspects 
of the policy-making process. 
 
The sudden suspension of implementation of the NWP  
On 14 January 1974, just ten days after the NWP Act had been publicly announced, the 
government suddenly suspended the implementation of the NWP Act and announced the 
imposition of emergency powers. This suspension of the implementation was surprising 
given that the government had completed all its preparations for the implementation of the 
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NWP during 1974 by establishing the NWP Bureau within the MOHSA and the Pension 
Contribution Collection Bureau within the NTS (National Tax Service). Why, then, did the 
authoritarian government suspend the NWP Act?Previous research has generally given an 
economic reason for the suspension, namely, the 1973 oil crisis and the worldwide economic 
downturn that followed. Yang, J. J(2008), however, argues that there were two additional 
reasons for the government’s decision to suspend implementation of the NWP Act. He 
suggests that the North Korean regime’s changes to its income tax laws were at least partly 
responsible. At a time when South Korea was facing serious competition from its northern 
rival, especially in terms of winning the ‘propaganda war’, North Korea abolished income tax, 
and this policy led South Korea’s government to delay the implementation of the NWP Act 
because the South Korean population regarded NWP contributions as another form of 
taxation. The second reason was the Presidential Secretariat’s judgement that the NWP would 
have little effect as a means of mobilizing domestic capital, especially when there were 
practical alternatives such as the introduction of VAT (Yang, J. J, 2008). Perhaps the most 
noteworthy aspect of the suspension of the NWP Act’s implementation was that EPB, which 
had strongly pressed for the implementation of the NWP Act, was excluded from the 
decision-making on the deferment of the NWP Act’s implementation. Both in the enactment 
and suspension of the NWP Act, the power relations that existed among the principal actors 
of the Fourth Republic are apparent, and these power relations were reflected in the policy-
making and decision-making process for the NWP Act. 
 
6.3 Implementation and expansion of the NPS before the economic crisis 
 
In this section, the political–economic background and the policy-making process that led to 
the introduction of the NPS are explored. As was seen in the first section, the NWP 
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programme was postponed suddenly in 1974. In 1988, the plans for a national pension were 
reintroduced and implemented. The aim this section is to find the answers to the following 
questions. What were the driving forces behind the reintroduction and implementation of a 
national pension scheme? Whose decisions made this implementation possible?  
 
6.3.1The policy-making process of the NPS 
 
Political and economic background 
After the NWP Act was deferred, almost 10 years passed. During this period, the social, 
economic, and political situations in Korea changed dramatically. For example, Korea 
experienced a rapid increase in the number of elderly people in its population, people that 
were directly affected by the public pension issue. The percentage of the population aged 
over 60 increased from 5.2% in 1973 to 6.8% in 1978 (Yang, J. J, 2008). However, the real 
issue for Korean policy-makers was the rate at which the elderly population was growing. 
This was occurring at a much faster rate than in other advanced and developing countries 
because of the improvements in health care and the rise of the average life span of Koreans, 
and policy-makers became acutely aware that Korea would have a significant proportion of 
its population dependent on pension payments in the future. Nevertheless, this rapid increase 
in the elderly population did not in itself force policy-makers to introduce a NPS. Rather, the 
most important factors were strong demands by social groups and the necessary political will 
to set up a national pension system. Under the authoritarian military regimes, there were no 
strong social or political actors demanding the introduction of a NPS, and the authoritarian 
governments were not genuinely interested in introducing such a scheme. The 
implementation plan was included in the government’s Sixth Economic Social Development 
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Five-year Plan. This plan was scheduled to be implemented between 1987 and 1991. Another 
reason for this social and political indifference to the NPS was from ignorance of NPS itself.  
Nevertheless, the social and economic conditions for implementation of the NPS were 
ripening. As was seen in Chapter 3, the Korean economy had recovered from economic crisis 
by the end of the 1970s, and with the EPB’s change in direction on economic policy from a 
focus on rapid industrialisation to stabilisation, the economy finally entered a period of 
stability. According to Shin, D. M (2003), the stabilisation policy was again driven by 
President Chun’s strong push for anti-inflation. With this development, the national income 
rose considerably, and people’s ability to meet their tax contributions improved. Accordingly, 
in 1984 the EPB assigned the KDI to review the original NWP scheme and to prepare for a 
revised pension (Yang, J. J, 2000a). By this time, the government ministry concerned with 
public pension programmes, the MOHSA, had also recognised the need for a national 
pension scheme and made preparations to implement a NWP programme. Both the EPB’s 
directive and the MOHSA’s preparations point to the fact that there had been a gradual 
movement within the state apparatus towards the implementation of a comprehensive pension 
programme (Chung, M. K, 1992). On 16 August 1984, the government set up a preparatory 
committee for NWP implementation. This committee consisted of the Minister of the 
MOHSA as chairperson, vice-ministers of the EPB, the MOF, the MND (Ministry of 
National Defense), the MOE (Ministry of Education), the MOL (Ministry of Labour), the 
MOHSA, the MGA and five representatives from the FKTU and corporations (Yang, J. J, 
2008). However, this committee was a preparatory committee for the implementation of the 
NWP Act in little more than name, and on August 11 1986, President Chun unilaterally 
announced at a summer press conference that the NWP would be implemented. 
 
A double-edged strategy for concession and repression  
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President Chun’s declaration began a new phase of NWP (the NPS’s former name) 
implementation. From that point forward, developments were relatively rapid. In September 
1986, President Chun reconfirmed his will to implement NWP with the promulgation of three 
measures for the promotion of social welfare: implementation of the NWP Act, the 
introduction of a minimum wage system, and the implementation of national health insurance. 
Yang, J. J (2008) suggests two reasons for Chun’s decision to introduce these measures. One 
is that two people close to the president, Kim Man-je, who was the Minister of the EPB, and 
Sa Kong-il, who was a presidential secretary for economic affairs, persuaded him. Yang’s 
explanation is based on testimony by Min Jae-seong, who claims that these two figures were 
instrumental in persuading the president that Korea’s continued economic development 
would be guaranteed only with the expansion of the social safety net and the implementation 
of the NWP.  
 
Table 6-4 Labour disputes in the 1980s 
Year Number of unions Number of labour disputes 1984 2365 114 1985 2534 265 1986 2658 276 1987 4086 3749 1988 6142 1827 (Source: KLI, 1993) 
 
The second reason given by Yang is that the President’s resolution was a response to 
increased democratic demands in the wake of the June Democracy Movement of 1987 and 
the emerging power of the labour movement. In reality, alongside the growing democratic 
movement, labour disputes increased sharply at the end of 1980s, as can be seen in Table 6-4. 
Chung, M. K (1992) also contends that the latter reason was instrumental in Chun’s decision. 
He argues that Chun’s action was a response to the growing power of labour and was a 
double-edged strategy for concession and repression in response to the radicalization of 
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distributional conflicts. In one sense, President Chun’s resolution was a kind of Bismarckian 
response to the changing socio-economic-political climate in Korea. Accordingly, the 
National Pension Act of 1986 was criticized as a political instrument to gain votes in the 
presidential election of 1987 and the general election of 1988, and to mobilizedomestic 
capital (Hwang, 2007). 
 
The second confrontation between the EPB and the MOHSA 
After the president’s declaration, the process of NWP implementation progressed quite 
quickly. After discussions and meetings, the revised bill for the 1973 NWP Act was settled 
upon on 30 September. Although the basic framework of the revised bill was almost identical 
to the 1973NWP Act, its key contents were slightly different. According to Yang, J. J (2000a), 
the changed contents were more conservative in nature than those of its 1973 predecessor. 
Firstly, the name of the bill was changed from the NWP Act to the NP Act (National Pension 
Act), with the word ‘welfare’ omitted. Yang interprets this change of name to be a reflection 
of “the conservative approach of the EPB. The deletion of welfare signalled the minimalist 
role of the state in old-age security and highlighted the insurance principle of self-reliant 
contributors” (2000, p.20). The real issue, however, was not the changed name of the bill. 
The basis for the calculation of earnings-related benefits (pension) in the previous NWP Act, 
supported by the MOHSA at that time, was the last three years of employment, whereas the 
new NP Act, which was supported by the EPB, based its earnings-related calculations on the 
entire employment history of the insured. In addition, while the NWP Act had included 
subsidies for low-income workers, the new programme eliminated all state subsides. 
Moreover, the new programme stipulated that “the indexation of pension benefits was applied 
only when the inflation rate reached more than 10% in order to lessen the financial burden of 
the government” (Yang, J. J, 2000a). As for the burden of contribution, the new bill made an 
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amendment to the NWP Act. After 1993, 2% (3% after 1998) of the total contribution would 
come from the retirement allowance of workers. This amendment would later lead to 
opposition from labour organisations. Yang, J. J maintains that the reason for these 
conservative changes to the NWP Act was very simple: the conservative economic 
bureaucrats of the EPB were the most influential in formulating the revised act. On the whole, 
economic bureaucrats took a senior position over their counterparts in the Ministry of Health 
and Social Affairs throughout the policy-making process of the national pension programme 
(Hwang, 2007). 
Another dispute between the MOHSA and the EPB concerned the nature of the lump-sum 
fund. A lump-sum refund refers to the total contributions paid by the employee and his/her 
employer plus the fixed interest. A lump-sum refund is payable when a current or former 
insured person falls under one of the following categories and the refund is to be paid to 
him/her or his/her survivor: 1) when a person whose total insured period is under 10 years 
reaches the age of 60; 2) when a current or former insured person dies and a survivor pension 
is not paid; 3) when a person loses his/her Korean nationality or emigrates to a foreign 
country. The MOHSA insisted that the lump-sum fund should be restricted to paying for the 
insured over 60 years of age, while the EPB maintained that a lump-sum fund could be paid 
after his/her disqualification was passed over 1 year. Again, this dispute resulted in the 
acceptance of the EPB’s position. One of the most controversial issues was over ‘who would 
gain and control over the pension fund’ (Yang, J. J, 2000a). The EPB contended that the 
Minister of the EPB should be the chairperson of the newly established National Pension 
Fund Operations Committee (NDFOC), whereas the MOHSA insisted that the Prime Minister 
should be the head of the NDFOC. Again, the EPB won the argument, and the minster of the 
EPB became the NDFOC chairperson.  
 
185 
 
Actors’ actions and responses 
The revision of the NPS Act by the Chun Doo-hwan government proceeded silently without 
raising any significant responses from society(Chung, M. K, 1992). Neither the opposition 
party nor even the ruling party played a role in the policy-making process for the new NP Act 
and the revision of the NWP Act. While the opposition party did not truly recognise the 
importance and political significance of NPS implementation, the ruling party was not 
interested in the form and content that the NPS programme would take. The ruling party’s 
interest lay only in the political effect of NPS implementation. This was unsurprising given 
that the ruling party had suffered a stunning defeat in the general election in February 1985, 
and the party therefore needed new policy initiatives to counter the decrease in its legitimacy 
and its loss of popularity. As for the opposition party (as was shown in Chapter 3), its key 
interest was constitutional change to establish direct presidential elections. Furthermore, in 
light of the growing democratic struggle after the events of June 1985, social movements 
were more interested in social and political issues such as constitutional amendment and 
social democratisation than in the enactment of a national pension system.  
After the draft of the revised NWP Act was completed, the Chun government, and the 
MOHSA in particular, felt that soliciting the views of some social actors and other ministries 
would be worthwhile. The FKTU, which had a direct stake in the national pension system 
that was planned, offered its opinions on the revised bill and presented a report on the 
revisions at its national conference in February 1985. The report made the following 
observations: 
 
The financing of pensions should be principally met by three parties: employers, employees, 
and the government. According to world surveys, the general practice is to place the burden 
of contribution more on employers than on employees. Therefore, the fact that 3.3% of the 
186 
 
entire contribution towards pensions would be allocated from the retirement allowance was 
unfair (KCFU, 1984). 
 
The revised bill triggered a series of new disputes between labour and management on 
retirement allowances. The business community and the KEF reacted strongly against the 
article related to retirement allowances in the revised bill. The KEF insisted that the burden of 
payment for retirement allowances and contribution to the NP was a double burden on 
employers. Against the KEF’s argument, the KCTU argued that retirement allowances were 
not related to social security as the deferred wage and so the two programmes should both 
continue to exist. The government did not welcome the KEF’s argument in terms of 
retirement allowances, and although the final content of the new pension programme was 
favourable overall to capital (Chung, M. K, 1992), the policy-making process for the 
amendment of the NPS was ultimately a one-sided affair, with the authoritarian president and 
bureaucrats again in charge.  
 
The final content of the NWP amendment and its policy legacies 
The revised pension programme was enacted in December 1986. By 1988, under the Roh 
Tae-woo government, about 4.2 million workers were covered by the NP Act. The final form 
and key content of the revised bill is tabulated below in Table 6-5. Of particular note was that 
NP coverage was expanded from covering the employees of firms with 30 or more workers to 
firms with 10 or more employees. The new pension programme lowered the initial 
contribution rate to 3 per cent (1.5% paid by employers and 1.5% by employees) from the 4 
per cent rate of the previous NWP Act (Yang, J. J, 2008), resulting in a so-called ‘low 
contribution, high benefit structure’ to the NP programme. However, the revised contribution 
rate was too low to meet the high benefit level of 70% of lifetime average income after 40 
years of contribution (Yang, J. J, 2000a), and this too generous contribution-benefit structure 
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necessarily led to the programme being underfunded from the outset. However, farmers, the 
urban poor, the self-employed, and workers in small workplaces, who really required the 
income security, were excluded from the programme, although they were allowed to 
voluntarily participate in the programme (Chung, M.K, 1992). 
 
Table 6-5The final content of the amendment to the NWP Act 
Key Content NWP Act The revised Act Coverage  Firms with 30 or more employees  Firms with 10 or more employees Contribution Employee: 2–3% employer:3–4% Employee: 1.5% (1988–1992), 2.% 
(1993–1997); employer:1.5% (1998–
1992), 2% (1993–1997) 
Retirement allowance:2% (1993–1997) Lump-sum fund Insured persons aged 60 years or older with 10 years of contributions Insured persons with fewer than 15 years of contributions and 1 year after disqualification  
6.3.2Pensionexpansion before the economic crisis  
 
Similar to the development of NP systems in most countries, the coverage of Korea’s NP 
programme was gradually extended after its introduction. In this section, I will explore the 
process of partial and gradual extension of pension coverage from the Roh Tae-woo 
government (1988–1993) to the Kim Young-sam government (1993–1998) up to the 1997 
economic crisis. During this period, the coverage of the NP scheme was extended from firms 
with 10 or more employees in January 1988 to firms with 5 or more employees in January 
1992. In July 1995, pension coverage was extended to farmers and workers in the fishing 
industry. However, the urban poor remained uncovered by the NP scheme. Why, then, was 
NP coverage extended to people in rural and fishing areas but not to the urban poor? 
 
The expansion of coverage to rural and fishing areas 
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The MOHSA anticipated the gradual extension of NPS coverage and studied ways to increase 
coverage. Firstly, as mentioned above, coverage was extended to firms with 5–9 employees 
in 1992, and as a result, most companies were included in the NPS framework. The pressing 
issue now was NPS coverage for the self-employed. However, expanding the NPS to include 
farmers, workers in the fishing industry, and the urban self-employed was difficult at that 
time. This was because calculating their contribution rates was almost impossible since 
authorities and the NPC (National Pension Corporation, formerly the NP Service) had to 
depend on these sectors’ self-reporting of income if coverage was to be extended to them. 
This difficult situation was compounded by the fact that although there were high-income 
earners such as doctors and lawyers among the self-employed, many of the self-employed 
were low-income earners. The MOHSA and the NPC therefore initiated a number of projects 
to study how NPS coverage could be expanded to include farmers and workers in the fishing 
industry. In 1993, a joint working group comprising members of the MOHSA and the NPC 
was established, and a public hearing was held at the end of 1993. The joint working group 
then set up two pilot projects to study the extension of the NPS programme to farmers and 
workers in the fishing industry in 1994. After the amendment of the NP Act in 1995, NPS 
coverage was extended to rural and fishing villages in the same year (NPC, 1998; Yang, 2008) 
 
Economic and political background 
The reason that NPS coverage of the self-employed was expanded to rural and fishing areas 
before urban areas was closely related to the situation of Korean farmers at that time. Firstly, 
feelings were running high in farming areas due to the Uruguay Round drawing to a 
conclusion. The Uruguay Round was the 8th round of multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) 
on solving the problems of world trade policy existing under GATT, a multilateral trade 
agreement that had set out the principles of world trade from 1947. The Uruguay Round 
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began in September 1986 and the agreement reached came into effect on January 1 1995, 
transforming the GATT arrangement into an institutional body, the World Trade 
Organization. The primary focus of the Uruguay Round was on agriculture and trade in 
agricultural products. In short, the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, administered 
by the WTO, brought agricultural trade more fully under the trade terms agreed under GATT, 
whereby trade in agricultural goods was liberalised and import tariffs for particular products 
were removed. In other words, the Uruguay Round brought about the liberalisation of 
Korea’s hitherto protected domestic agricultural market, and Korean farmers now had to 
compete against overseas farmers, including large US growers. Even prior to the Uruguay 
Round agreement, farmers had begun to act against moves to liberalise the agricultural 
produce market in Korea. In 1990, a number of farmers’ organisations came together to found 
the National Federation of Farmers Organizations (NFFO) and later the Pan-national 
Committee for Opposing the UR Agreement (PCOUR). In particular, farmers strongly 
opposed the opening of the rice market through the lifting of the ban on the importation of 
rice, which the Korean and US governments had agreed to in 1993. At the end of 1993, 
350,000 farmers demonstrated in opposition to the opening of the rice market, but the 
government and the EPB rejected the farmers’ demands and continued to pursue their goal of 
economic gain through export-oriented industries. Nevertheless, the Korean government 
needed to mitigate the farmers’ angry reaction to the liberalisation of trade in agricultural 
products. In this vein, Yang argues in his PhD thesis that the pension coverage expansion to 
…rural areas in 1995 was a compensation for the opening of the Korean agricultural market 
due to the Uruguay Round (UR) trade negotiations(2000a). In sum, the pension expansion to 
the rural area was one of the main compensatory measures that the Kim Young-sam 
government offered to farmers and fishermen, who would suffer from income loss and 
increased risks associated with the opening of the agricultural market (Yang, J. J, 2000a, 
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Kwon, H. J, 1999). In the same sense, another explanation is that the extension of the pension 
programme to rural areas aimed to improve the structure of the agricultural sector.  
 
Actors’ strategies and responses 
Although the coverage expansion had a political and economic basis, there were also 
practical necessities in terms of social security. According to Min Jae-seong’s report (1991), 
which was called ‘A Plan for Introducing a Farmers’ and Fishermen Pension Programme’, 
the acceleration in the growth of the ageing population in rural areas was a pressing concern. 
In 1980, the percentage of persons aged 60 or over in all rural areas was 10.5%; by 1991, this 
figure had increased sharply to 21.7%, and the figure for fishing areas as a whole was 14.3%. 
Moreover, Min (1991) also noted in his report that the income of farmers was lower than that 
of employees in urban areas.  
Due to these concerns, it was clear that pension expansion to rural areas was necessary. 
Without any particular complications, the NP Act was amended and the extension of the 
pension programme to rural and fishing areas was implemented. Unlike with health insurance, 
there was no strong opposition to the plan from farmers, and resistance to the plan focused on 
its format rather than on the plan itself. For example, the business sector submitted a 
proposition on the proposed plan to the government in 1994 that stressed that the contribution 
rates for farmers and employees should be made more equal and that supported increased 
contribution rates for farmers and workers in the fishing industry. Trade unions and civil 
organisations adopted different attitudes from the business sector and other groups. Their 
interest was focused on pension reform rather than the gradual extension of pension provision. 
For example, the two federations of trade unions, the KFTU and the KCTU, questioned the 
democratic management of the pension fund. Civil organisations such as People’s Solidarity 
for Participatory Democracy (henceforth, PSPD) also raised concerns about the democratic 
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management of pension funds, the integration of other pension programmes, and reconciling 
the issue of public pensions and retirement allowances. After the introduction of national 
pensions for farmers and workers in the fishing industry, the voices of the stake challengers 
for pension reform began to grow stronger.  
 
6.4 The politics of pension reform leading up to the 1997 economic crisis 
and the new politics of pension reform under the Kim Dae-jung 
administration 
 
In this section, I will explore the political dynamics of pension reform since the 1997 
economic crisis. Prior to the economic crisis, the Kim Young-sam government faced 
demands for pension reform, and debates took place on this issue within the government. As 
briefly mentioned earlier, trade unions and civil organisations such as the PSPD had 
demanded institutional improvements to the NPS, and in particular, democratic control over 
the national public pension fund. The MOHSA and some other bureaucrats also recognised 
the need for reform, especially with regard to NPS coverage expansion to the urban self-
employed. Thus, considerable debate and agenda setting for pension reform took place during 
the Kim Young-sam government, before the economic crisis occurred. By the end of this 
government’s term of office, detailed plans for the reform of the pension system had been 
made. 
However, the 1997 economic crisis and the subsequent power shift towards a relatively 
progressive government created a fundamentally different policy environment, as was seen in 
the previous chapter on National Health Insurance reform. The changed economic and 
political environment and the emergence of new stake challengers led the new progressive 
government to abandon the pension reform plan made by the previous government. Instead, 
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the new government and civil organisations took the initiative in pension reform, pushing for 
the expansion of coverage to the urban self-employed and retention of the existing mono-
pillar, universal coverage arrangement of the NPS. This section will explore as to why this 
was the case.  
 
6.4.1 The disputes about pension reform under the Kim Young-sam government 
 
Emerging voices for pension reform and the problems with the NPS 
By the middle of the 1990s, voices calling for pension reform, both inside and outside of 
government, were emerging, particularly in regards to the improvement of the institutional 
framework of the NPS. The calls stemmed from the increased interest of civil organisations 
and trade unions in public pension programmes. The two trade union federations, the FKTU 
and the KCTU, became increasingly interested in NPS reform, one of the key reasons for 
which was that retirement allowances were closely related with this system. As mentioned 
above, during the process of extending NPS coverage to people in rural areas, labour 
movement organisations showed more interest in improvements in the institutional 
framework of the NPS than expansion of its coverage. At the same time, civil organisations 
and interest groups became more conscious of the importance of welfare programmes such as 
NHI and NPS, with representative civil organisations such as the PSPD calling for the Kim 
Young government to introduce a more advanced social security system. The PSPD 
campaigned for the guarantee of national minimum living standards, calling for the state to 
set minimum standards of social security for income, health, education, housing, and 
employment. In addition, the PSPD and the KCTU explicitly called for the democratic 
management of the NPS fund. This was a significant political issue at the time because the 
government was empowered to spend part of the NPS fund at its disposal, justifying this 
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appropriation of funds as investment in Social Overhead Capital (SOC). Furthermore, critics 
felt that the government’s control over NPS funds was increasing, and its openness about the 
future direction of NPS policy was lacking. From the outset, the NPS fund had suffered from 
the fundamental problem of financial sustainability. However, despite the low contribution 
rate, the government promised the same high benefit level (70% of lifetime average income 
at 40 years of contributions) (Yang, J. J, 2000a). This ‘low contribution, high benefit system’ 
aimed to increase participation in the NPS. Despite this financial discrepancy, the fund 
reserve of the NPS was originally designed to be exhausted in the early 2030s(Kim, Y. M, 
2005), and the organisations calling for democratic control over the fund believed that the 
government would have to change the payment system or gradually increase contribution 
rates.  
Other pro-reform voices called for NPS coverage extension to the self-employed in urban 
areas. As explored above, NPS coverage was gradually extended after its implementation in 
1988, and after coverage was extended to farmers and workers in the fishing industry in 1995, 
it covered 7.25 million people.  
 
“Considering that some 1.29 million public sector employees were covered under the three 
occupational pension schemes in 1995, the total number of people covered by public pensions 
stood at 42 percent of the economically active population in 1995”(Ministry of Health and 
Welfare, 1998, cited in Kim, Y. M, 2005).  
 
However, the urban self-employed and people working in very small firms remained outside 
the scheme, and 58% of the economically active population remained uncovered by the NPS. 
In fact, economic and social changes in Korea already necessitated pension coverage for the 
entire population. According to National Statistical Office (NSO) statistics, Korea would 
become an ageing society as early as 2000, with people aged 65 years or older accounting for 
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more than 7% of the population. As shown in Table 6-6, Korea at the time was rapidly 
becoming an ageing society. In this sense, pension reform would necessarily entail NPS 
coverage expansion. 
 
Table 6-6The trend of ageing in Korea (%) 
 1997 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 People aged 65 or older as a percentage of the population 6.3 7.1 9.9 13.2 19.3 23.5 People aged 60 or older as a percentage of the population 9.9 11.0 14.2 20.1 26.5 30.2 People supporting the elderly 14.6 16.4 21.6 32.1 46.0 55.8 (People supporting the elderly = (People 60 or older/people 15–59)×100 *Source: NPO, Estimated Future Population, 1996) 
 
In conclusion, the NPS faced two key challenges in the 1990s: coverage extension so that it 
would become a universal pension and the problem of financial sustainability (Kim, Y.M, 
2005). Simultaneously, new emerging actors – civil organisations and labour movement 
organisations – started to voice their concerns on these issues as stake challengers. 
 
Agenda setting for pension reform within the Kim Young-sam government 
The beginning of pension reform within government stemmed from President Kim Young-
sam’s announcement of ‘the globalisation (segyehwa in Korean) of the quality of life’ on 23 
March 1995, three months ahead of the June 27 local election and a year ahead of the April 
11 general election (Yang, J. J, 2000a). In support of this declaration, the government set up 
the National Welfare Planning Board (NWPB), which consisted of 22 members, including the 
Minister of MOHW (Ministry of Health and Welfare) and policy experts from the academic 
field and government-run research institutes. The NWPB identified some long-term tasks and 
proposed the following key policies: 1) the completion of four social insurances and the 
extension of NPS coverage to the entire population and 2) improvements to the efficiency of 
the social insurance administrative system. Even though the NWPB policies were not 
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developed further, largely because they were lacking in specific details, they provided the 
basic foundations of later NPS reforms.  
 
The first debates on pension reform: what was to be done first?  
In June 1996, ‘The Long-term Development Plan for the Public Pension System’ was 
produced by the secretarial office for social welfare in Blue House. This plan was ordered by 
President Kim Young-sam because one of his presidential campaign promises was the 
expansion of pension coverage. Park Se-il, the senior secretary for social welfare, and a 
number of policy experts were responsible for the plan. Park and his colleagues investigated 
the existing public pension programmes and concluded that the NPS required fundamental 
reform before it was expanded to the urban self-employed. The reason for this conclusion 
was the system’s financial unsustainability. They deemed that the other public pension 
programmes for military personnel, government employees, and schoolteachers also needed 
to be reformed due to similar financial problems. Their conclusion was similar to the opinion 
of the World Bank on public pension programmes. According to Yang, J. J (2000a), the core 
contents of the plan were threefold: 1) the replacement of the current NPS with a two-pillar 
system, namely a basic pension and an earnings-related pension; 2) reduction in the benefits 
paid in order to reduce the financial burden of the NPS; and 3) reform of the three other 
occupational pension schemes. This plan was supported by the president, the KDI, and the 
Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE). However, the bureaucrats of the MOHW and the 
NPC held a different opinion on the Blue House’s plan, arguing that priority must be given to 
the expansion of NPS coverage to the urban self-employed. They reasoned that the plan’s 
proposed changes to the pension system would be a barrier to the expansion of coverage to 
the entire population because its proposed reduction in benefits would lead to people’s 
dissatisfaction with the system. They therefore contended that pension policy should follow 
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an ‘expansion-first and reform-later course’, unlike the Blue House’s ‘reform-first and 
expansion-later policy’. Debates among scholars on this issue failed to make much headway. 
In addition, because the Blue House plan included proposals for the reform of public 
pensions for the military and government employees, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of 
Government Administration, and the Ministry of Education also opposed the plan.  
The confrontation between actors on the subject of public pension reform was complicated by 
the various interests of the competing actors. The Blue House, which had an advantageous 
position in terms of power relations, took the initiative and set up a task force, the National 
Pension Reform Board (NPRB), in June 1997 to produce a concrete pension policy. This task 
force then set about drawing up three alternative proposals, which would be debated and a 
final proposal submitted to the government. Despite this seemingly impartial and thorough 
approach to deciding upon a definitive proposal, the three alternative proposals for pension 
reform drafted by the NPRB were nevertheless similar to the Blue House’s original plan.  
The Blue House’s plan for pension reform also increased the interest of the opposition 
political parties in the pension system, which held a seminar in the National Assembly on 
why improvements in the NPS were needed. Although the opposition parties expressed 
particular interest in reforming the way in which the NPS fund was managed, the strength of 
feeling among the political opposition was as yet insufficient to press for changes to the 
administrative system of the NPS.  
 
The policy-making process of the NPRB 
The debate on pension reform was originally triggered by the Kim Young-sam government’s 
announcement of its plan and the schedule for its introduction, but as time progressed, the 
debate increasingly focused on the nature of the Blue House’s proposed reform. It was 
increasingly felt by opponents that the reform was essentially neo-liberal in nature, since it 
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proposed efficiency reforms to the pension system before coverage had been expanded to the 
entire population. A more detailed discussion of this issue will be presented in Chapter 7. 
The National Pension Reform Board (NPRB), which was established to address the issues 
raised by the Blue House’s plan the special committee and to devise a concrete policy, 
consisted of 24 members and was a kind of policy network. The majority of its members was 
neo-liberal economists and was inclined to favour neo-liberal pension reform, with members 
from the social policy and the NPS arena in a minority, although members of interest groups 
were represented on the committee. The nature and the direction of the debates that took 
place within the NPRB were heavily influenced by the neo-liberal economics-biased 
composition of the committee. 
The most noteworthy feature of the NPRB, however, was that the KCTU and the KEF both 
participated in the debating process and that these two interest groups together held a seminar 
on the pension reform issue, the first time that a joint seminar had been held by labour and 
management organisations. In this seminar, the KEF stressed its support for the government’s 
plans and the wider participation of interest groups, whereas the KCTU argued for the 
democratic management of the pension fund. This seminar indicated that pension reform had 
come to the forefront of both groups’ interest. 
 
The three alternatives proposals of the NPRB and the final report 
On 5 August 1997, the NPRB released its first draft for NPS reform. As shown in Table 6-7, 
the draft proposal did not present a single definitive programme, but rather provided three 
options, each of which differed considerably.  
The first alternative presented in the draft was a partial improvement of the existing system 
that involved reforming the levels of contribution and benefits but involved no structural 
change. This option was supported by working-level officials of the MOHW, trade unions, 
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farmers, civil activists, and the NPC (National Pension Corporation). The second alternative 
entailed structural reform of the pension system and proposed the introduction of a bi-pillar 
system, where the NPS would be split into two schemes: a basic pension scheme and an 
earnings-related scheme 
 
Table 6-7 The NPRB’s three alternatives proposals for pension reform  
 The first option The second option The third option Final proposal 
Basic structure Keeping the basic framework (mono-pillar) Bi-pillar (basic pension + earnings-related pension) 
Mono-pillar savings (individual account) Bi-pillar (basic pension + earnings-related pension) 
Contribution rate 3-6-9% (gradual increase) Basic part: 0.4–4% Earnings-related part: 8% 
3-6-9% (gradual increase) 9%–12.5%  
Income replacement rate (at 40 years of contributions) 
40–53.3% (existing system: 70%) Basic: 0.4–6% Earnings-related: 30% 
Principal + capital returns 40% (basic pension 16% + earnings-related pension 24%) 
Funding system Partial funding  Basic: PAYG Earnings-related: partial funding 
Full finding Partial funding  
(Source: Yang, J. J, 2000a) (PAYG; Pay-As-You-Go)  
 
These two schemes would place them under different financing and payment arrangements 
(Yang, J. J, 2000a). This alternative was supported by economists, the MOFE, and the 
Presidential Secretariat in the Blue House. The third option was a privatised mandatory fully 
funded defined contribution (FFDC) Scheme. In this option, all the insured would have an 
individual account. Although the NPRB proposed three alternatives, debates focused on the 
first and second options, with the third option being generally disregarded due to its lack of 
redistributive function. 
After the NPRB had drafted its proposals, discussions among the committee members 
continued, but no consensus was reached. At the NPRB’s final meeting on 27 December 
1997, a vote to decide upon the form of the final proposal was held and the decision was 
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reported to the Prime Minster. The key contents of the final proposal are listed in the fifth 
column of Table 6-7 and were as follows:  
1) split the present mono-pillar scheme of the NPS into a two-pillar scheme composed of a 
basic pension and earnings-related pension; 2) reduce the earnings-related benefits of the 
scheme from the current level of 70 percent to 40 percent;3) the present contribution rate of 9 
percent will be maintained until 2025 and it will be raised to 12.6 percent thereafter; 4) the 
legal retirement age will be raised by one year every five years starting from year 2013 so 
that it will be 65 by 2032; 5) strengthen the powers of the National Pension Fund 
Management Committee and expand the representation of farmers, unions, and NGOs; 6) 
extend the coverage to the urban self-employed in the second half of 1998 (Kim, Y. M, 2005). 
 
Actors’ reactions to the final report on NPS reform under the Kim Young-sam 
government 
This final proposal was announced immediately. The reactions to it, however, were highly 
negative both inside and outside of government. First and foremost, the MOHW, which was 
responsible for overseeing and implementing changes to the existing system, was pessimistic. 
As mentioned above, the MOHW was concerned that this final proposal would make the 
extension of coverage to the urban self-employed in 1998 extremely difficult. Civil 
organisations and trade unions also strongly opposed the proposal. On 30 December, the 
PSPD issued the following public statement: 
 
The life of people has been hugely affected due to the IMF crisis, etc. In this situation, the 
plan for the improvement of the NPS, which concerns the entire population’s life in old age, 
was made without the consensus of the nation, but any decision so made in this way will be 
absolutely unworkable. Improvements can only be achieved through the comprehensive 
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reform of social security and its framework. Therefore, attempts at improving the NPS must 
be made much more carefully under future governments (30 December 1997, PSPD). 
 
In summary, under the Kim Young-sam government, the contents and direction of pension 
reform was decided by the logic of the neo-liberal approach rather than by the principle of 
redistribution of income and solidarity. The focus of reform was financial sustainability 
rather the security in old age. These competing ideological positions informed the policy-
making process of pension reform and led to the confrontation between actors. Advocates of 
the former position were the members of the Presidential Office, the bureaucrats of the 
MOFE, and economists within the policy community and business, whereas adherents of the 
latter position were the social bureaucrats of the MOHW, reform-minded and progressive 
civil organisations, trade unions, and some progressive academics. The competing actors are 
broadly categorised in Figure 6-2. The noteworthy aspect of this policy-making process and 
the disputes about NPS reform was that civil organisations and trade unions were no longer 
passive actors. Along with social bureaucrats, they actively voiced their views, an expression 
of their beliefs and interests that would soon be revealed not to have been wasted, for the 
following year, everything was to change under the situation brought about by the economic 
crisis and the political power shift. 
 
Figure 6–2Thebattle between mono-pillar advocates and bi-pillar advocates before the economic 
crisis 
 
 
 
 
Bi-pillar advocates 
The presidency/The ruling party 
Economic bureaucrats of the MOFE 
The KDI/Capitalists/ 
neo-liberal economist. 
Mono-pillar advocates  
Social bureaucrats of MOHW 
NGOs such as the PSPD,  
the KCTU, the KFCU, 
The NPC 
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6.4.2 The policy-making process of pension reform under the Kim Dae-
jung government  
 
The economic crisis, political power shift, and pension reform 
Korea experienced an historic upheaval during the closing years of the last millennium. The 
country became a member of the OECD in 1996, joining the club of advanced countries. 
However, the following year, Korea was engulfed by an unprecedented economic crisis, 
followed by a large bailout loan from the IMF. Subsequently, there was another historic event. 
For the first time in modern Korean history, a candidate from the opposition party won the 
presidential election. Moreover, the elected president, Kim Dae-jung, was relatively 
progressive and pro-welfare.  
As explored in Chapter 3, these rapid changes in terms of the economic and political 
environment had a tremendous effect on the entire social policy arena, and pension policy 
and reform was influenced by these sudden changes as well. As we have seen in the previous 
section, the Kim Young-sam government and the Presidential Office had, with the assistance 
of neo-liberal economists, established a neoliberal blueprint for pension reform, despite 
resistance from NGOs and the MOHW.  
Now, faced with the economic crisis at the end of 1997 and the political power shift in 1998, 
an alternative blueprint rapidly emerged. In response to the changed economic and political 
situation in Korea, the Kim Dae-jung government opted for the active expansion of the 
national pension programme and the retention of a redistributive principle, an approach that 
was directly in contrast to the previous government’s neo-liberal approach to pension reform. 
As mentioned earlier, this approach also differed historically from that pursued by the 
advanced countries when confronted with economic crises. In this section, I will trace the 
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process of pension reform and expansion, in particular focusing on actors’ activities and their 
interactions.  
It should be noted at this point that during the period in which this welfare reform took place, 
I was a journalist specialising in social welfare issues and the MOHW’s policies, and I 
followed, covered, and wrote many articles on these developments and the issues surrounding 
them. My exploration and investigation of pension reform in this section draws heavily upon 
my notes taken at the time.  
 
Changes in the policy-making veto power of economic ministries  
It is generally recognised that the economic ministries enjoyed an overwhelmingly dominant 
position over social ministries within the government in terms of policy-making and decision-
making. This was also the case in social policy decision-making. However, after the 
economic crisis and the political power shift, this trend changed. The senior officials of the 
MOHW took advantage of the economic crisis and the period of power transition. On 21 
November 1997 at the height of the Asian financial crisis, the Kim Young-sam government 
asked the IMF (International Monetary Fund) for stand-by loans, admitting its inability to 
serve its debt payments by its own means(Yang, J. J, 2000a) and losing the presidential 
election held on 18 December 1997. The economic crisis led the economic bureaucrats to 
lose their previous veto power temporarily and superiority over social bureaucrats in social 
policy-making, and the political power shift provided a window of opportunity for social 
bureaucrats to oppose the NPRB’s final pension reform proposal.  
On 31 December 1997, one day after the PSPD had made a public statement opposing the 
NPRB proposal, the MOHW briefed the chairman of the policy committee of the NCNP (the 
incoming governing party) on the NPRB proposal and the current tasks facing the MOHW. 
The MOHW subsequently delivered two reports on the proposal to the Committee for 
203 
 
Presidential Transition (CPT) of the new government, one on 10 January 1998 and the other 
on the 18th of the same month. During this process of briefing and reporting to the new 
government team, the MOHW expressed its opinion on the NPRB proposal and its problems. 
The gist of the MOHW’s argument was as follows: 1) a change in the basic structure of the 
national pension scheme from the existing mono-pillar system to a bi-pillar system was 
unlikely to yield any profit to the new government and the incoming ruling party politically, 
and a bi-pillar system was less capable of achieving social integration and having a 
redistributive effect; 2) the proposed reduction in benefits would trigger resistance from the 
insured, leading the government to lose popular support, and it would be more difficult to 
accomplish the scheduled coverage expansion to the urban self-employed; and 3) as regards 
the management of the NPS fund, the MOHW proposed that the National Pension Fund 
Operation Committee (NPFOC) should have authority over pension fund deposits. At the 
time, government could forcibly borrow pension funds under the Public Fund Management 
Act (PFMA), and NGOs and trade unions therefore questioned the government’s continued 
management of the public pension fund. 
The MOHW’s reports and comments to the CPT had a strong influence on the Kim Dae-jung 
government’s attitude towards the direction that pension reform should take. The MOHW 
emphasised that there was a lack of public confidence in the NPS owing to the financial 
unsoundness of the existing pension system, its ‘low-contribution, high-benefit’ formula, the 
low rate of return on public investment, and the long-term schedule for and the lack of 
progress towards coverage expansion to the urban self-employed. The CPT largely accepted 
the MOHW’s position and plan. However, the CPT’s acceptance was not merely the result of 
the MOHW’s persuasive briefing, but also the strong voices of civil organisations and the 
labour unions, which were supporters of the Kim Dae-jung government (Yang, J. J, 2008).  
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The actors’ positions and debates on pension reform in transition politics 
On 22 January 1998, the MOHW and the Korea Institute of Health and Affairs (KHISA) held 
a public hearing in order to gather public opinion on the issue of pension reform. Various 
actors participated in this event and argued for and against the NPRB’s proposed reforms. 
The key issues raised were the level of benefits, the financial stability of the pension system, 
coverage expansion, its basic structure and the function of redistribution, and improving the 
management of the NPS fund. Of these, the most controversial issues were the level of 
pension benefits and the financial problems of the system. 
The FKTU, which had a direct stake in pension reform, raised its voice most strongly on the 
level of pension benefits, arguing that raising the age for receipt of old-age pensions was not 
a viable option and that contribution rates should be equal between workers and management. 
The FKTU above all emphasised that NPS benefits should amount to over 60% of a person’s 
final salary. Civil organisations also voiced concerns over the drastic reduction in benefits 
that would result from the implementation of the NPRB proposal, arguing that “the basic 
NPS benefits …should be kept at the current level to ensure income redistribution” (Yang, 
2000). As regards coverage expansion, Kim Yeon-myung, a PSPD representative and a 
professor at Chung-Ang University, stated that coverage expansion must not be deferred on 
account of the problem of ascertaining the incomes of the self-employed. Kim Sang-kyun, a 
social policy expert and a professor at Seoul National University, also argued for the 
expansion of coverage. The existing system’s management of the public pension fund was 
also a contentious issue, but most of the actors reached an agreement on the improvements 
that were required. Labour and management representatives both argued that Article 5 of the 
PFMA should be abolished and also insisted that the chairman of the NPFOC should be the 
Minister of the MOHW. Kim Yeon-myung of the PSPD argued that members from the 
NPFOC must be included in the management arrangement to secure the participation of the 
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insured. These arguments by civil organisations, policy experts and trade unions were later to 
be reflected in the final pension reform decision-making process. 
 
The MOHW’s 1998 revised pension reform bill 
As mentioned above, the MOHW succeeded in persuading the new government to accept its 
views on pension reform. The MOHW’s core interests were accomplishing pension coverage 
expansion in as timely and straightforward a manner as possible and securing its position as 
the ministry in charge of pension policies. In this regard, the MOHW’s strategies and 
activities were wholly successful. However, as will be discussed it in more detail later, its 
ability to ensure that the policy performed well was less so. After discussion and debates, the 
Minister of the MOHW signed the National Pension Amendment Bill on 21 January 1998, 
and on the same day, the revised bill was sent to the National Assembly under the approval of 
the incoming Kim Dae-jung government, which started its term four days later (Yang, J. J, 
2000a). The key contents of the revised bill differed from the NPRB proposal as follows (the 
differences between the revised bill and the NPRB’s final proposal can be seen in Table 6-8): 
-The NPS would not be split into a bi-pillar scheme of a basic pension and an earnings-
related pension. 
-The target replacement rate (for workers with a 40-year contribution record) would be 
reduced from the existing 70 per cent to 55 per cent. 
-The contribution rate of 9 per cent would be maintained up to 2009 and would gradually be 
raised thereafter. 
 
Table 6-8 The NPS Act as revised by the MOHW 
 The MOHW’s final revised bill for pension reform The NPRB’s final proposal for pension reform Basic structure  Retention of the mono-pillar system New bi-pillar system Contribution rate 9%–19.1% 9%–12.5% Income replacement rate 55% 40% Retirement age 65 in 2033 (61 in 2013) 65 in 2033 (61 in 2013) (Source: Yang, J. J, 2000a) 
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In addition, the Minister of the MOF was replaced as the chair of the NDFOC by the Minister 
of the MOHW. However, the MOHW was unable to abolish Article 5 of the PFMA, which 
civil organisations, trade unions, and the business community all demanded, due to strong 
resistance from the MOF, and a compromise was struck between the two ministries to pay 
equal interest to average market returns. 
 
The modification of the Act and the role of the National Assembly 
The revised NPS bill submitted by the MOHW was a partial reform that aimed to stave off 
the exhaustion of NPS funds and extend the period for which the pension system would 
remain financially viable. As mentioned above, its key features were a cut in benefits and an 
increase in the retirement age, measures that were expected to prolong the financial viability 
of the NPS from 2031 – the anticipated date at which the fund would be exhausted – to the 
2050s. However, for their own respective reasons, social actors were not satisfied with this 
revision, and during the process of deliberation in the National Assembly, civil organisations 
and labour unions argued against the bill’s imposition of a drastic reduction in pension 
benefits. They emphasised that the aim of a public pension programme should be to 
guarantee satisfactory incomes for ageing people and that reform should be focused on this 
goal rather than on fears of depletion of the pension fund. As for the FKTU, it continuously 
demanded improvements to the revised bill and stated its opinion in a report as follows:  
 
-presently, most workers and other people are suspicious about the NPS and more and more 
people distrust the NPS 
- in particular, in the current situation of mass unemployment, high prices, and low wages 
owing to the economic crisis and the IMF bailout, people are responding negatively to the 
proposed increase in contribution rates, the reduction in benefits, and the increase of 
retirement age. 
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-as regards the direction that a revised bill should take: 1) at least the current income 
replacement rate should be maintained; 2) labour and management should pay a 
contribution rate of 6%, respectively; and 3)the retirement age should not be 
increased…(from the FKTU’s 1998 divisional report). 
 
Business groups also condemned the bill, arguing that the proposed increase in the 
contribution rate would increase their financial burden. In their report on the revised bill, 
entitled ‘The Opinion of the Business World’, they argued that the increase in the 
contribution rate would further negatively affect businesses, which were already suffering 
difficulties due to the economic crisis. A common issue raised by civil organisations, the 
labour unions, and the business sector was that the revised bill did not deal with the 
mismanagement of the public pension fund. The KCTU, in particular, strongly voiced its 
support for the abolition of Article 5 of the PFMA and its opposition to benefit reductions. 
In response to these concerns, the ruling party and the opposition party in the end agreed to 
limit the reduction in the replacement rate to 60 per cent of average earnings instead of 55 per 
cent as proposed by the government. Although the contribution rate was kept at 9 per cent, 
the contribution burden of labour and management shifted. The National Assembly reversed 
the controversial decision to take a 3 per cent share from the retirement allowance and forced 
employees and the employers to pay an equal share of NPS contributions. Accordingly, the 
contribution rate for employees was raised from 3% to 4.5%, with an identical increase for 
employers. No actor had demanded this change in the contribution rate, neither the MOHW, 
trade unions, civil organisations, the mass media, nor the business communityand although it 
met with resistance from employers, the changes to the contribution rate were retained. This 
decision marked the start of a new role for the National Assembly in terms of pension reform. 
In the past, the deliberation of bills in the National Assembly had been little more than a 
meaningless formality, with all decision-making power in the hands of the president, the Blue 
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House, and senior bureaucrats. With the progress of democratisation and the revitalisation of 
parliamentary politics in Korea, the role of the National Assembly in terms of policy-making 
was finally beginning to mature. In December 1998, the final revised NPS bill was passed in 
the National Assembly. 
 
6.4.3 The pressure of the World Bank and the Kim Dae-jung government’s 
and the MOHW’s responses 
 
International organisations as a new player in policy-making  
Although the revised pension reform bill was passed in the National Assembly in December 
1998, the disputes and controversies about pension reform continued. Most fundamentally, 
the high-benefit low-contribution NPS system had not changed and the issue of the NPS’s 
financial sustainability had not been solved. Accordingly, as was noted earlier, labour unions, 
civil organisations, and management together demanded the abolition of the PFMA (Public 
Fund Management Act). Notably, the tripartite commission, a Labour-Management-
Government Tripartite Apparatus for overcoming the economic crisis (Lee, J. H, 2007) 
established on the suggestion of the KCTU, also demanded its abolition. Nevertheless, the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) remained immovable in its opposition to the repeal of this article.  
Surprisingly, it was an international financial institution, the World Bank, whichwas pivotal 
in forcing the MOF to change its position. At that time, both the World Bank and the IMF 
called for the phased reduction in forced government appropriation and revision to the PFMA 
as a condition for the $2.0 billion Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) I and II (Yang, 2000). 
The loan was agreed in March under the Kim Dae-jung government. In concrete terms, the 
World Bank demanded that the government implement the following policy measures in 
terms of the NPF (National Pension Fund) in SAL I: 
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agreement to gradually phase out government borrowing from pension fund reserves in the 
form of direct credits and to gradually phase in government borrowing from pension fund 
reserves in the form of sale of marketable government bonds so as to improve the 
transparency and efficiency of pension fund management (World Bank, 1998). 
 
The World Bank also called for the government to:  
 
adopt and announce a timetable for implementation of the reduction in forced government 
appropriation of the flow of NPF surpluses as follows: 65% of the NPS surplus flow in 1999, 
40% in 2000, 20% in 2001 and 0% in 2002 … implement the phased reduction of forced 
government appropriations from NPF agreed with the Bank, through adoption of legislation 
satisfactory to the Bank, including necessary revisions to the Public Fund Management Act 
(World Bank, 1998). 
 
Due to this pressure by the World Bank, the MOF changed its adamant attitude towards 
exercising control over the NPF, and Article 5 of the PFMA was ultimately abolished. 
However, the World Bank and the IMF did not merely demand that the management of the 
NPF be reformed through the revision or abolition of Section 5 of the PFMA, but insisted that 
fundamental changes be made to the structure of Korea’s public pension system, with the 
World Bank favouring replacing the existing NPS arrangement with a multi-pillar pension 
system (Yang, J. J, 2008; Kim, Y. M, 2005a). One of the World Bank’s more detailed 
demands was that the Korean government should delay coverage expansion of the NPS until 
preparation for a more fundamental structural reform of the pension system had been 
undertaken. For this, it called for the Korean government to set up a Pension Reform Task 
Force by October 1998 to complete a draft White Paper no later than November 1999 (with 
background papers completed by June 1999) on an integration pension reform package 
combining public/private and mandatory/voluntary pensions pillarsV(SAL II, World Bank, 
1998). Following the World Bank’s demands, the Kim Dae-jung government established the 
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Pension Reform Task Force (PRTF) in December 1998 to review four alternative public 
pension schemes. As will now be explored, the Korean government settled on a partial 
acceptance of the Bank’s demands, establishing the PRTF and taking steps to improve the 
management of NPS reserves, but also pursued its own agenda, refusing to delay coverage 
expansion and rejecting the implementation of a multi-pillar pension system.  
 
The strategies of the World Bank and the MOHW and pension reform alternatives 
The World Bank’s intervention continued. The Bank sponsored a PRTF research trip to 
countries with privatized pensions such as Chile, Argentina, and Australia in the summer of 
1999 and twice presented its reform proposal before the PRTF (Yang, J. J, 2000a). The 
World Bank’s message and its strategy were clear: structural reform and the establishment of 
a more privatised pension system. In fact, the World Bank had consistently pursued a pension 
reform strategy based on its advocacy of multi-pillar pension systems since 1994 and had met 
with considerable success in its efforts in South America and Eastern Europe, with ten South 
American countries and five Eastern European countries having introduced private pension 
systems.  
The World Bank pressed for the staged introduction of a similar system in Korea, and the 
NPRB proposal outlined in the earlier section was strongly influenced by the Bank’s 
conviction that all four public pension schemes then existing in Korea could be united into a 
single bi-pillar pension system containing a basic component and an earnings-related element. 
The Bank’s strategies were clearly revealed in its report published in May 2000 on the 
Korean pension system, entitled ‘the Korean Pension System at a Crossroads’. In the 
conclusion of this report, the Bank’s experts recommended systematic reform of Korea’s 
pension system: 
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A systematic reform would also go further than partial reforms in addressing the key 
question of fund management. Even if the goals of prefunding were not threatened by the 
government’s tendency to increase its own consumption and finance it with NPS surpluses, 
the concentration of assets in one institution is inherently susceptible to political interference; 
nor is it conductive to efficient allocation of capital in the economy ... The Korean system is 
at a crossroad… A shift to a system less dependent on the state and on high payroll taxes on 
future generations can still be made comfortably. This means setting the public pension 
promise to an affordable level and securing a strong private pension system (World Bank, 
2000). 
 
Meanwhile, the MOHW responded deftly to the Bank’s pressure. In pursuing its own aims, 
the MOHW sometimes bowed to the Bank’s pressure and sometimes did not. The MOHW 
also made its own strategic moves with the stated aims of the president and the ruling party in 
mind. As Yang (2000) explains, the MOHW’s strategy towards the Bank was a typical case 
of non decision-making”, and “the MOHW made strenuous efforts to suffocate a decision 
that would be a latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of the MOHW (2000). 
The same strategy was applied to the composition of the PRTF. The majority of this body’s 
21 members were anti-structural reform MOHW representatives, and only eight members 
were economic bureaucrats and economists with pro-structural reform views. The dominance 
of MOHW members in the PRTF ultimately allowed the MOHW to control the content of the 
PRTF’s final proposal on pension reform, which, as shown in Table 6-9, set out four 
alternatives, including the World Bank’s multi-pillar pension proposal. This situation allowed 
the government to push ahead with pension reform (Yang, J. J, 2008) 
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Table 6-9The four alternative pension systems contained in the PRTF proposal  
 The 1st alternative The 2nd alternative The 3rd alternative The 4th alternative 
The basic structure A multi-pillar system with separation of public and private pensions  
A multi-pillar system with unification of public and private pensions 
A multi-pillar system with separation of public and private pensions 
A multi-pillar system with the unification of public and private pensions 
The income replacement rate 60% (special occupational scheme 80%) 
45% –65% 60% 60% 
The management of the pension fund Public management (occupational and individual pension: private management) 
Public management (individual pension: private management) 
Public management Public management (occupational and individual pension: private management) 
 
Coverage expansion to the urban self-employed 
While facing the most severe economic crisis in Korean history and under pressure from the 
World Bank and economist groups for neo-liberal structural reform, the Kim Dae-jung 
government promoted partial pension reform. The government and the MOHW carried out 
the plan to extend pension coverage to the urban self-employed by revising the National 
Pension Law. After the new legislation came into effect on April 1 1999, the number of 
insured increased hugely to reach almost 17 million people.  
They included an additional 10 million urban informal sector workers and the self-employed 
from the previous 7 million company employees, farmers, and fishermen (Yang, J. J, 2000a). 
With this revision to pension law, Korea finally entered an era of universal national pension 
provision, with almost all Koreans covered by the public pension system. This marks a 
pivotal point in the history of social policy in Korea. Perhaps the most surprising aspect of 
this achievement is that it was implemented during the worst economic crisis in Korean 
history.Although the extension of pension coverage to almost all of the population was a 
significant achievement by the Kim Dae-jung government, the practical process of 
implementing the new legislation triggered strong resistance. Due to mismanagement and a 
lack of preparation, dissatisfiedvoices were raised against both the NPC and the MOHW and 
their handling of the coverage extension. A deluge of complaints ensued, and the 
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implementation became a considerable political burden for the government. The issue that 
raised the most dissatisfaction was the problematic calculation of the income of the self-
employed. Ascertaining the actual incomes of this group was difficult because it relied on the 
self-reporting of income by the self-employed, many non-self-employed people did not 
believe that the figures reported by the self-employed were accurate reflections of their 
incomes. Furthermore, since the pension system was fundamentally a redistributive system 
and pension contributions and benefits were calculated according to income, those people 
already covered by the previous system were concerned that as the average reported income 
of the urban self-employed was so low, pension benefits for those whose NPS contribution 
was deducted from their income at source would be significant reduced (Yang, J. J, 2000a). 
These dissatisfactions led the some civil organisations and labour unions to oppose the 
extension of pension coverage, although other labour unions and NGOs supported it. The 
most noteworthy thing about this development was that the pro-welfare alliance that had 
existed between the MOHW, civil organisations, and labour unions on the 1999 pension 
reform fell apart, with some members of this partnership fiercely opposing any potential 
reduction in benefits. In addition, the dissatisfaction brought about a deeper scepticism 
towards the NPS, which would prove to be an obstacle to later pension reform. 
 
6. 5 Concluding remarks 
 
The history of Korean pension developments was remarkable in that it took only eleven years 
from its introduction in 1988 for the NPS to cover almost every person in Korea. The NPS 
was introduced as a mono-pillar system with a strong redistributive element and began as a 
low-contribution, high-benefit scheme. These unique characteristics of the Korean pension 
system meant that it had strengths in terms of redistribution but weaknesses as regards its 
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financial sustainability. As the pension system developed over time, it triggered conflicts and 
disputes among social and political actors, and the scheme was one of the most controversial 
political issues in Korea. 
It seems clear, however, that the NPS was originally introduced as a means of gaining 
political legitimacy for the authoritarian regime and ensuring capital accumulation, an 
argument borne out by the fact that its implementation was immediately deferred. From the 
outset, the creation of the NPS was a political and economic matter. As for the politics of 
policy-making, the president had absolute supremacy over decision-making on NPS policy 
during its early stages, but with the advance of democratisation, a number of different actors 
– political, economic, and social – became increasingly influential in terms of policy-making. 
With the increasingly number of influential actors, pension politics became increasingly 
complex and pension reform became more difficult.  
Like the politics of health insurance, Korean pension politics became increasingly dynamic 
and was significantly different from that of the advanced countries. In short, pension politics 
in Korea was unique in that it exhibited the articulation of the interests of actors within an 
arena of struggle between pro-welfare actors and anti-welfare actors, neo-liberalists and anti-
neo-liberalists, partial reformists and structural reformists, and a national institution, the 
MOHW, and international financial institutions. In the next chapter, I will discuss pension 
politics in more detail. 
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Chapter 7 
 
New politics of welfare reform in Korea:Analysis and Discussion 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the nature and peculiarities of welfare politics in Korea, as revealed through 
the two case studies presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, will be discussed. As Imentioned 
earlier, Korean welfare politics were dominated by dynamic political battles between 
stakeholders and the stake-challenger coalition throughout the policy-making processes of 
both health insurance and pension reform. From this observation, I have developed a 
theoretical framework for ‘the new politics of welfare reform in Korea’, namely, ‘the politics 
of conflict between stakeholders and the stake-challenger coalition’. This framework focuses 
on the strategies and interactions of political and social actors in the policy-making processes 
of health insurance integration and pension reform since the economic crisis and the political 
power shift in Korea. Using this theoretical framework, I will endeavour in this conclusion to 
point out the implications of the actors’ strategies and interactions in terms of welfare politics.  
 
7.1 The new politics of health insurance reform since the economic crisis 
and their meaning 
 
Under the Kim Dae-Jung government after the 1997 economic crisis, the health care field 
underwent rapid changes and entered a period of unprecedented turbulence. Among other 
health reforms, health insurance integration was implemented, NHI was launched, and 
medical and pharmaceutical practices were separated during this period. In the course of 
these reforms, however, intense resistance emerged and unintended side effects such as 
delays to the introduction of programmes occurred. One such instance of resistance and 
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unexpected developments during the reform process was explored in Chapter 5, that of health 
insurance integration. In this section, based on the findings in Chapter 5, I will discuss the 
contents and meaning of health insurance integration in the wider context of health insurance 
reform.  
 
7.1.1 The characteristics of pre-reform health insurance before the economic crisis 
 
According to Kim, Y. M (2000), Korea’s national health insurance (NHI) system before the 
integration (1998–2002) implemented by Kim Dae-jung government can be summarised as 
having three main characteristics: 
First, NHI was based on the principle of social insurance and was specifically a contributory 
social insurance provision where health service provision was conditional upon contribution. 
This compulsory social insurance programme was introduced in 1977, and while initially 
only for employees at large companies, its coverage was extended to the whole nation in 
1989 (Hwang, 2006). The Korean NHI’s most distinctive characteristic was its management 
and funding system. Unlike the pension system of the time, NHI was managed and funded by 
numerous separate health societies from its inception. This fragmented NHI consisted of over 
400 health societies, which each set different contribution and benefit levels and managed 
funds independently. Second, NHI in Korea was characterised by its relatively strong market 
dependence. Since Korea’s NHI was predicated upon a low contribution system, its scope of 
coverage was very limited. This so-called ‘low contribution, low benefit’ system meant that 
the security provided by NHI was sufficiently low to be able to be guaranteed. Moreover, the 
proportion of the public covered by NHI was very low, and most medical provision was 
provided by the private sector (Kim, Y. M, 2000). Third, health services were not directly 
supplied by the insurer, but were indirectly supplied by third parties (mostly private hospitals 
and clinics that made contact with the insurer).  
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The health insurance reforms carried out under the Kim Dae-Jung government were 
concentrated on the first of these problematic characteristics, and as a result, health insurance 
integration was the first reform to be implemented. 
 
7.1.2 Health insurance reform and its meaning under the Kim Dae-Jung government 
(1998–2003) after the economic crisis  
 
The core outcome of health insurance reform after the economic crisis was the complete 
integration of NHI. The numerous health societies were unified into a single insurer, and 
funds were managed by respective health societies on a self-paying basis. The meaning of 
NHI integration is enormous. Kim, Y. M. (2000) contends that NHI integration had five 
main positive outcomes: 1) the guarantee of equity in terms of contribution; 2) efficiency 
improvements in the management of the system; 3) increased convenience for the insured; 4) 
reinforcement of the argument for the public management of funds; and 5) the possibility of 
transforming the system from one of low benefits to one of moderate benefits. 
Prior to NHI integration, members of health insurance societies in urban areas had a lower 
contribution burden than the members of health societies in rural areas, but because they 
lived in cities, they had greater benefits than their counterparts in rural areas, and the 
management of funds by urban health societies was more transparent and systematic. First 
and foremost, NHI integration led to changes in the pattern of social solidarity in Korea. 
After NHI integration, social solidarity on the issue of health insurance shifted from being 
concentrated at the local level to the national level, and there was increased solidarity 
between employees and the self-employed on the subject of health insurance. Nevertheless, 
although NHI integration had a considerable effect in terms of increasing the Korean 
population’s awareness of and solidarity on the issues related to health insurance, it did not 
improve the NHI system’s most fundamental problem, namely, ‘the low-benefit system’.  
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7.1.3 The changes in policy-making in health insurance reform and health politics 
 
Even though the conflict that emerged between the advocates and opponents of NHI 
integration had its origins within a state body, the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 
(MOHSA; formerly the MOHW), the NHI integration process brought about changes to 
Korea’s long-standing health insurance policy-making process. In particular, the process of 
gradual democratisation in Korea led social and political actors to become more involved in 
the conflict and to pursue their own interests more actively. As democratisation progressed, 
the number of actors involved multiplied, the conflict over NHI integration became 
increasingly complicated, and influential civil activists and policy experts gradually became 
involved in the policy-making process. For example, in 1998 when the Executive Agency for 
Health Security Integration (EAHSI) which was one of the apparatus of government was 
established for the purpose of complete NHI integration, this agency consisted of 
representatives from various circles, including policy experts, civil activists from the 
Citizens´ Coalition for Economic Justice(CCEJ) and the People's Solidarity for Participatory 
Democracy (PSPD), representatives of the health care and business sectors, and members of 
labour, farmer, women, and consumer organisations. The multilateral constitutionof the 
EAHSI and the form of policy-making that this produced was significantly different from that 
which had preceded it. From this time forward, the presence of civic groups in the 
government’s policy-making process (or sometimes the partnership between these groups and 
the government) was institutionalised, although the role of civic groups was sometimes 
limited to ‘rubber-stamping’ government policies. In effect, later NHI integration law was a 
government-sponsored reform. While civic groups often clashed with government on various 
issues, it is clear that they had a stronger voice and sometimes played a crucial role in the 
process of reform. In particular, they were a key driving force for welfare reform under the 
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Kim Dae-jung government. In the following section, I will analyse in greater detail the role 
played by civic organisations as the driving force for health insurance reform. 
 
7.2 The new policy-making of public pension reform and its meaning since 
the economic crisis 
 
Under the Kim Dae-Jung government after the 1997 economic crisis, there were 
unprecedented calls and even international pressure for pension reform. As a result, pension 
reform was undertaken, the practical content of which was coverage expansion to the entire 
nation in spite of the most severe economic crisis in Korean history, which was a 
fundamentally different approach to reform than that taken by other advanced countries 
during periods of economic crisis. As seen in Chapter 6, there was conflict among social and 
political actors in the process of this reform. In this section, based on the findings of Chapter 
6, I will discuss the content and meaning of pension reform in terms of welfare politics.  
 
7.2.1 Characteristics of the pre-reform NPS before the economic crisis 
 
In order to establish the position that the Kim Dae-jung government took towards pension 
reform, the characteristics and principles of the NPS before reforms were implemented need 
to be considered. As regards its institutional characteristics, there were four key features. 
Firstly, the structure of the NPS was a mono-pillar system in which the basic pension and 
earnings-related pension were integrated into a single system. Secondly, this structure was 
designed include two elements: an income redistribution function and an earnings related 
function. In fact, the original design of the NPS was intended to promote income 
redistribution and social solidarity. As Kim,Y. M (2005a) state, the NPS was designed to 
provide higher income replacement rates for lower income earners and to provide lower 
income replacement rate for higher income earners.  
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Thirdly, the most important characteristic of the NPS was that it provided coverage regardless 
of occupation, sex, geographical location (rural or urban), or age. To this day, this 
characteristic has been retained, and so NPS coverage applies equally to employees, farmers 
and workers in the fishing industry, and the self-employed under a single umbrella. The only 
exception to this coverage was for civil servants, members of themilitaryand private teachers. 
The reason that the NPS was originally designed as a strong integrated occupational scheme’ 
was because the principle on which the NPS was founded was a “strong sense of social 
solidarity and the idea that risk diffusion is spread to the national scale. Accordingly, unlike 
health insurance or pension sustainability in the West, the integration of pension schemes for 
employees and the self-employed was not an issue in Korea. Fourthly, as regards the 
management of the NPF, the low contribution, high benefit system employed by the NPS 
mean that it was not fully funded, and the accumulated fund reserves of the NPS would 
inevitably be exhausted in the future. This meant that contribution rates would have to be 
increased at some stage and resulted in the basic form of financing being changed to a pay-as-
you-go funding system. 
 
7.2.2 Pension reform, its meaning, and pension politics under the Kim Dae-Jung 
government (1998–2003) after the economic crisis  
 
Generally speaking, public pension reform during economic crises has resulted in the drastic 
reduction of benefits and changes to the structure of pensions in many countries. However, as 
explored in Chapter 6, the Korean case was entirely different. Pension coverage was 
expanded under the Kim Dae-jung government, and the basic structure of the NPS was not 
changed, even though there was strong pressure from both internal and external actors to do 
so. 
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The reform was initiated in 1997 by the Kim Young-sam administration, which called for the 
National Pension Reform Board (NPRB) to draft a number of pension reform alternatives and 
to agree on a final proposal. The key content of the NPRB’s final draft scheme involved 
splitting the existing mono-pillar scheme into a two-pillar scheme comprising a basic pension 
and an earnings-related pension and reducing the income replacement rate from 70 per cent to 
40 per cent. However, this proposal was deemed unacceptable by the Kim Dae-jung 
administration, which pursued a totally different path to pension reform due to its orientation 
towards maintenance of the solidaristic principle of the NPS rather than towards neo-liberal 
pension reforms. Despite the considerable pressure applied by proponents of neo-liberal 
pension reform, the government refused to countenance changes to the integrated 
occupational structure of the NPS, which provided coverage for all job sectors in one system. 
In early 1999, the process of national pension expansion to the self-employed in urban areas 
encountered problems when it came to establishing the actual income of the self-employed. 
As a result, some policy advisors strongly suggested that the national pension be divided into 
two schemes, one for the employed and one for the self-employed, but the Kim Dae-jung 
administration refused to accept this and made a commitment to preserving the existing 
system. In addition, the government stated its commitment to retaining fixed benefits, the 
mono-pillar system, the principle of social solidarity between generations and income 
brackets, and the existing funding system. Nevertheless, the NPS system did undergo partial 
reform, with the income replacement rate changing from 70% to 60% and the pension age 
increasing from 60 to 65. Generally, however, pension reform under the Kim Dae-jung 
administration adhered to the principle of social solidarity inherent in Korea’s national 
pension system, although this commitment caused many problems during the process of 
pension coverage extension to the self-employed in urban areas (Kim, Y. M and Kim, K. S, 
2005). 
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7.2.3 Changes in the policy-making process in pension reform 
 
In the process of pension reform, like that of health insurance reform, changes in the nature of 
the Korean policy-making process are evident. The most significant change was the increase 
in the number and variety of players. Under the authoritarian regimes, such as the 
governments of President Park Jung-hee and President Chun Doo-hwan, Korean policy-
making was strictly hierarchical and linear. At the apex of the power hierarchy was the 
president, who exercised ultimate decision-making power within the presidential system. 
Even after democratisation, this remained the case in terms of policy-making. The second 
rank of policy-making power was wielded by bureaucrats. In terms of social policy, although 
social bureaucrats were nominally in charge, policy-making hegemony belonged to economic 
bureaucrats. However, with the progress of democratisation, the characteristics of Korean 
policy-making shifted. As was seen with regard to policy-making on NHI, the course of 
democratisation led social and political actors to become increasingly active in asserting their 
own interests in conflicts about policy. Accordingly, the numbers of actors involved in the 
policy-making process mounted, and the process itself and the conflicts involved became 
more complicated. The decision-making power and policy-making influence of social 
bureaucrats and economic bureaucrats changed, with economic bureaucrats losing their 
previous dominance and a more even distribution of power between these rival groups 
becoming evident. Within government, the phenomenon of bureaucratic politics emerged. 
The most noteworthy change in policy-making under the Kim Dae-jung government after the 
economic crisis was that it was civil organisations and labour unions that set the agenda for 
pension reform, the most prominent of which were the civil activists of People's Solidarity for 
Participatory Democracy (PSPD) and members of the KCTU. In addition, the international 
financial apparatus (the World Bank and the IMF) emerged as a new player in Korean policy-
making. After the economic crisis and the subsequent political power shift, pension politics 
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became even more complicated and an arena in which stakeholders and stake challengers 
battled for supremacy. 
 
7.3 The new politics of welfare reform in Korea since the economic crisis  
 
Welfare politics still matter 
The establishment of the welfare state and social (welfare) policies such as health insurance 
and pension programmes should not be regarded simply as an altruistic response to particular 
needs. While they might be based on the spirit of charity and philanthropy, the welfare state 
and social policies are from their inception a product of the state and politics and require 
substantial political planning to achieve their goals. Since they involve the redistribution of 
resources, they provoke social and political conflicts, and tensions and struggles between the 
haves and the have-nots inevitably occur. This very nature of the welfare state and social 
welfare policies has been played out throughout the history of social policy. The 
redistribution of resources that the welfare state represents and the conflicts that this 
engenders led Briggs (1961) to assert that the welfare state is “the deliberate use of politics 
and administration to modify the play of market forces”. In a similar vein, Kim, Y.S (2007) 
states the following: 
 
“Unlike market changes, welfare programmes are designed by laws and government policies, 
inevitably producing winners and losers. Social groups in democratic capitalism naturally 
intervene in the making of the operational principles and the methods of the welfare state in 
order to benefit themselves. Therefore, the interests and political capabilities of social actors, 
as well as power relations among them, are critical in shaping the characteristics of a 
welfare state.”(p.23) 
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From this viewpoint of welfare politics, therefore, welfare politics can be defined as the 
conflicts between political forces or actors around the formation, establishment, and 
restructuring of a welfare regime or welfare state. 
Welfare politics in Korea has developed and changed in its own particular way since modern 
welfare programmes were firstly introduced in Korea in the 1960s. However, as you see in 
Chapter 3, Korean welfare politics before democratisation was not welfare politics in any 
meaningful sense, because all decision-making was unilaterally undertaken by the military 
government. However, progress in the activities of actors and the interactions among them 
during the policy-making processes for health insurance and public pension reform illustrate 
the changes that occurred in Korean welfare politics after democratisation. In particular, this 
new wave of welfare politics after democratisation ignited a fire for welfare reform that 
continued to blaze after the economic crisis and the political power shift. I witnessed this 
spectacle at first hand as a journalist and have described it in Chapters 5 and 6 in detail. In 
section 7.1~7.2, the meaning of the pension and health insurance reforms was explored. In 
this section, the key actors’ activities, strategies, and interactions in the process of the reforms 
will be analysed. 
 
7.3.1 The strategic actions and interactions of key actors in the policy-making processes 
of health insurance and pension reforms 
 
Civil organisations as an influential stake challenger 
The most obvious characteristic of welfare politics since the economic crisis in 1997 and the 
subsequent political power shift was the key role played by civil organisations or ‘the 
citizen’s movement’, as they were otherwise known. This citizen’s movement refers to the 
new type of social movement that emerged in Korea in the late 1980s as an alternative “to a 
radical and militant people’s movement that had radical goals” (Shin, K.Y,2006) and was 
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clearly different from the past social movements calling for democratisation, which had 
concentrated on direct opposition to the military regime and were very defiant and militant. 
However, after the Roh government’s capitulation to the demands of the June Democracy 
Movement in 1987 and the announcement on 29 June of that year that constitutional changes 
would be made to initiate democratic reforms, a new type of social movement emerged and 
grew in strength as democratisation progressed. “The new type of social movement 
organizations were comprehensive social organizations that dealt with a variety of issues such 
as political corruption, housing, transportation, human rights, legal justice, economic justice, 
and environmental protection” (Shin, K.Y, 2006. p.5).  
Social welfare development was among the issues that these organisations were founded to 
address. This new movement was widely supported by the public in the 1990s and was 
particularly popular with the urban middle class. Although some radicals railed against this 
new movement, calling it reformist or opportunist, it fundamentally changed the character of 
social movements in Korea from one of violent street protests against the authoritarian state 
to one of peaceful movements focusing on the concerns of ordinary citizens. The two most 
notable groups in this new movement were the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice 
(CCEJ), established by relatively liberal activists in 1989, and the People’s Solidarity for 
People’s Democracy (PSPD), founded by a relatively progressive group in 1994. According 
to Shin, K. Y (2006), as political parties failed to represent the demands and interests of the 
people, civil organisations replaced the role of the political party in submitting new bills and 
policy proposals (pp.5-34),becoming in effect quasi-legislative organisations. 
In practice, as was shown in Chapters 5 and 6, civil organisations along with progressive 
trade unions and the farmers’ movement were the driving force for welfare reform under the 
Kim Dae-jung government. The success of this government’s health insurance reforms after 
the 1997 economic crisis was due to the long and continuous demands and actions of stake 
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challengers, who were civic groups, labour, farmers, and strong-willed policy experts. As Lee, 
K.C (2009) argues, the core driving force behind the completion of NHI integration was the 
unprecedented solidarity network and large-scale alliance that was forged between farmers, 
civil organisations, technocrats, and some assemblymen. The civil movement was central to 
this network. During the process of pension reform, the same phenomenon is evident. Civil 
organisations and the labour movement powerfully expressed their views and exerted 
considerable pressure on the government, with the result that pension reforms such as the 
improvement of the NPF, coverage expansion to the self-employed in urban areas, and, above 
all, the retention of the redistributive principles of the NPS were made possible.  
For both health insurance and pension reforms, it was the civil organisations’ capacity to 
organise a far-reaching solidarity with and among other groups that was critical to the success 
of the reforms. This coalition network of civil society organisations, farmers, unions, 
technocrats, and political representatives collectively made them more powerful than if these 
groups had acted independently and had remained fractured. If this had not been the case, it is 
likely that the Kim Dae-jung government would have found it very difficult to defend its 
position and its reforms against the attack of stakeholders.  
Throughout the reform process under the Kim Dae-jung government, civil organisations were 
sometimes a countervailing power against vested stakeholders and sometimes political 
entrepreneurs.  
 
Labour unions as a pro-welfare reform actor and the split between the FKTU and the 
KCTU 
Historically, the development of the welfare state and social policy has been closely 
associated with the labour movement. While the labour movement has been the central force 
behind the development of the welfare state, the reverse has also been the case, with the 
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establishment of the welfare state and the evolution of social policy being a key driving force 
in the development of the labour movement. However, this logic has not applied equally to 
all welfare states. The influence of the labour movement on the development of the welfare 
state and social (welfare) policy has varied under conservative and liberal regimes. According 
to Kim Yeon-myung (1998), the Korean labour movement’s interest in social welfare issues 
began in the middle of the twentieth century. Representatives of the Korean labour movement, 
such as the FKTU, formed in 1961, and its counterpart, the KCTU (established in 1995), 
began to recognise the importance of social reform and gradually became highly vocal 
proponents of welfare reform. In practice, in the process of pension reform, the labour 
movement played an important role, making a significant contribution to the abolition of 
Article 5 of the PFMA, which had granted the government the power to forcibly borrow from 
the NPF. The labour movement’s most noteworthy contribution, however, was made in 
achieving NHI integration. As was seen in Chapter 5, according to Kim Yong-ik (in the 
author’s interview), the vigorous support of parts of the labour movement, and especially that 
of the KCTU, was critical to the success of NHI integration. By comparison, however, the 
FKTU was relatively passive on this issue. For example, while the KCTU enthusiastically 
supported NHI integration as a reflection of the principle of social solidarity and as a means 
of increasing it, the conservative FKTU supported the integration in principle but in reality 
adopted a more passive position, fearing that integration would lead to a decrease in NP 
reserves and an increase in contributions for its members. Moreover, in the case of NHI fiscal 
integration, the KFTU along with the opposition party, the GNP, continuously tried to 
postpone its introduction. In the case of NPS reform, a similar scene emerged. The FKTU 
called for separated management of the NPF, whereas the KCTU supported the government’s 
plan for integrated management.  
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In fact, the 1997 economic crisis was a turning point for the Korean labour movement in 
terms of welfare politics. Before the economic crisis, the labour movement had largely been a 
policy outsider demanding welfare reform, but after the economic crisis, the labour 
movement became an important partner of the government and, crucially, a participant in the 
policy-making process. A good example of this new role for the labour movement was its 
participation in the Tripartite Commission, which was established in 1997 to seek ways to 
overcome the economic crisis and was composed of representatives of the government, the 
business community (the KEF (Korea Employers Federation) and the FKI (Federation of 
Korean Industries)), and the two main labour union confederations (the FKTU and the 
KCTU). These partners signed the ‘Tripartite Accord for Overcoming the Economic Crisis’ 
in February of the following year, otherwise known as the ‘February 6 Agreement’. As was 
seen in Chapter 5, this agreement was a historic event because it marked “Korea’s first 
attempt to overcome an economic crisis by dividing the burden among major actors in the 
labour market, and it was an attempt to grant full industrial citizenship to workers by 
extending them the right to organise labour unions. In addition, for the first time in Korean 
history, welfare as a social wage became leverage for compromise among workers, 
employers, and government” (Kim, Y. S, 2007) However, this experiment in creating a form 
of social pact politics through establishing the Korean Tripartite Commission was ultimately 
to result in failure. The business community’s attitude (as represented by the KEF and the 
KFI) towards welfare reform remained fundamentally conservative, and it did not regard 
labour as a genuine partner, while the labour movement quickly split into participants and 
non-participants in the Commission, with the KCTU leaving on 24 February 1999 and the 
FKTU remaining part of it. The government then used the Commission as a means to 
obtaining legitimacy for economic reforms such as large-scale layoffs. In this regard, the 
destabilization of the Tripartite Commission seemed to have made a considerable impact on 
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welfare politics in Korea(Kim, Y. S, 2007). For example, after leaving the commission, the 
KCTU began to focus on more company level issues such as wage increases and occupational 
welfare than social level issues such as welfare reforms and the social wage. 
 
The business community as a leading stakeholder 
In the policy-making process of welfare reforms immediately before and after the economic 
crisis, the business community was an active stakeholder, playing a vigorous role in 
articulating its own interests in regard to health insurance integration and pension reform. The 
main representatives of the business community were the KEF (Korea Employers Federation) 
and the FKI (Federation of Korean Industries). As was seen in Chapter 6, the FKI represented 
the conglomerate, large enterprises, and capitalists.  
According to Kim Y. M (1996, 2005a), the Korean capitalists’ opposition to social insurance 
reforms was founded on three concerns: 1) increases in their contribution rates; 2) increases 
in labour costs; and 3) potential weakening of their competiveness. From the outset, the 
business community displayed a general opposition to social insurance programmes, and the 
KEF and the FKI maintained their negative stance on issues regarding the NHI and the NPS. 
They thought that NHI integration and the expansion of NPS coverage would increase their 
contribution burden, and they therefore opposed both reforms. Moreover, in the case of health 
insurance, they had a direct interest because NHI funds were administered by numerous 
individual health societies controlled by the companies themselves. While small companies 
combined to set up health societies that were controlled by health society executives, large 
companies ran their own health societies, with the funds of these health societies directly 
under their control. These administrative differences between the two types of health society 
led to them adopting slightly different responses to reform. The health societies run by large 
companies actively opposed the integration of heath societies, whereas those set up by small 
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companies were relatively passive by comparison (Kim, Y. M, 2005a). Inevitably, the 
expansion of public health insurance coverage and the development of public pensions were 
intimately related to the interests of private insurance companies. For example, insurance 
companies would necessarily be concerned about sales of their individual pension and life 
insurance schemes if a national pension system was equally available to all citizens. Owing to 
the business circle’s stakes and interests, therefore, capitalists played a major role in opposing 
NHI integration and the expansion of national pension coverage. However, their efforts to 
oppose the reforms were ultimately unsuccessful due to the strength of the challenges made 
by stake-challengers against these vested interests.  
 
The president as the supreme decision-maker 
Although Korea’s governmental system is in principle divided into legislative, judicial, and 
public administration components, the president has held supreme power and has been an 
absolute decision-maker for much of modern Korean history, exerting overwhelming power 
over the legislative and even the judicial. Under the military regimes, the president held 
almost autocratic power and had absolute control over social policy developments. The 
introduction and implementation of health insurance and national pension policy was entirely 
at the behest of the president. In the case of the NWP, for example, President Park introduced 
and then suspended implementation through his declaration of emergency measures. 
Alongside this, until the late 1980s, the ruling party was always the majority party in the 
National Assembly and was subordinate to the president and Blue House administration. 
After democratisation, Korea’s presidents continued to hold a concentration of power, but 
changes to this political system began to appear after the economic crisis and the political 
power shift in 1997–1998.  
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Although the power of the president remained dominant after democratisation, it was 
inevitably somewhat weakened in comparison to the dominance it had enjoyed under the 
authoritarian regimes from 1961 to 1987. As a result, other political and social actors began 
more fully to express their opinions publicly, and the policy-making process of pension and 
health insurance reforms became more dynamic. Nevertheless, during this period, the relative 
pro-welfare or anti-welfare stance of the president continued to influence the course that 
welfare reform took. Kim Dae-jung’s victory in the presidential election had a huge influence 
on the policy-making process. As mentioned earlier, President Kim Dae-jung’s victory 
marked the first time in the fifty years since the beginning of constitutional government in 
Korea that an opposition candidate had come to power and heralded a qualitative shift in 
political power away from the established order. After the economic crisis (in 1997) and this 
political power shift (in 1998), the most important factor in making welfare reforms possible 
was, in fact, Kim Dae-jung himself. Many of the demands of civil organisations and labour 
unions, which had supported Kim Dae-jung in the election and his political life, were 
accepted by the pro-welfare president. Accordingly, “it would be no exaggeration to say that 
a key factor in the Kim Dae-jung victory was the indomitable man himself” (Oh, 1999). In 
support of the assertion that Kim Dae-jung’s election victory and his pro-welfare stance were 
crucial to the success of welfare reform in the post-economic crisis environment, Kim Yong-
ik, a professor at Seoul National University and the leader of a civil organisation for NHI 
integration, stated the following in my interview with him (08 January 2008): 
 
“The first factor in the success of NHI integration was that we established ‘the Pan-national 
Solidarity Council for Medical Insurance Unification and Benefit Expansion’ (henceforth, 
PSC). The second factor was our presentation of a very plausible logic for NHI integration, 
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and we made all the progressive actors rally behind this logic. And then the pro-welfare 
president Kim Dae-jung came to power. With Kim’s rise to power, the policy window opened.” 
 
In practice, it was President Kim Dae-jung’s direct support for NHI integration and revision 
of the pension system that led to the implementation of these reforms. The Kim Young-sam 
government’s structural reform proposal for the national pension system was abolished, and 
NPS coverage expansion was implemented thanks to President Kim Dae-jung’s ascent to 
power. It should be noted that Kim Dae-jung’s commitment to welfare policy reform was not 
limited to the implementation of NHI integration and NPS expansion, and as was seen in 
Chapter 5,Kim Dae-jung’s presidency oversaw other significant achievements in social 
policy, such as the enactment of the NBLS (National Basic Livelihood Security System). The 
very fact that further welfare reforms were undertaken under the Kin Dae-jung presidency is 
indicative of Kin Dae-jung’s commitment to a pro-welfare agenda. 
 
The still influential public administration and bureaucrats 
Although bureaucrats are formally controlled by the supreme executive body, such as the 
president, the prime minster, or the king in some countries, they have played a practical role 
in the policy-making process through their autonomous actions for many decades, and this 
situation continues today. Generally speaking, the level of autonomy enjoyed by bureaucrats 
in the policy-making process has differed according to the nature of the regime, the 
characteristics of government, and sometimes distinctive socio-economic situations. From 
Korea’s formative period as a modern nation, the public administration in Korea has been 
central to both the direction that public policy has taken and the policy-making process itself, 
and a key actor within the policy-making process has been the bureaucracy. For example, 
under the authoritarian governments of Park and Chun, the policy-making process centred on 
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the president and bureaucrats, who in combination practically monopolised policy-making. In 
Korea, a core group of bureaucrats have exercised huge influence in deciding key public 
policies. As regards social policies, the MOHW and the Finance Ministry have played the key 
roles in the policy-making process within the state apparatus. As regards the policy areas 
specifically explored in this thesis, the MOHW was in charge of health insurance and pension 
policies and therefore had a direct interest in both policies. However, the MOHW social 
policy bureaucrats displayed significantly different attitudes towards and undertook different 
courses of action in regard to each of these policy areas.  
In regard to health insurance reform, as was seen in Chapter 6, MOHW bureaucrats were 
generally solid stakeholders in health insurance policy, many having vested interests as 
executives of health societies, although some MOHW bureaucrats did believe in NHI 
integration. They formed part of the anti-integration network along with The Federation of 
Korean Medical Insurance Societies (FKMIS) and the business community because the 
proposed integration would lead to the loss of their vested interests. Of particular note was 
their strategy of aligning with the members of the Presidential Secretariat under the 
authoritarian Roh regime to persuade the president to veto NHI integration. In sum, while 
MOHW bureaucrats lay at the heart of the strong anti-NHI-integration stakeholder network, 
the emergence and rise of a strong pro-integration solidarity network and the election of a 
new pro-integration president led to the erosion of their influence over the NHI integration 
policy-making process, and the stake-challenger alliance seized the initiative.  
 
In the case of pension reform, as was shown in Chapter 6, MOHW bureaucrats took a 
different approach in that they adopted the same position as civil organisations and the labour 
movement. From the economic crisis onward, one of the main driving forces for the 
expansion of pension coverage was the MOHW. While it might be argued that it is the role of 
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bureaucracies to execute and enforce the laws and policies of the legislature and the 
president’s will and philosophy, the MOHW bureaucrats’ attitude towards pension reform 
went beyond mere acceptance of the policy and its implementation. Instead, the MOHW was 
very active in and contributed directly to setting up the new government’s policy on pension 
reform. The contrasting stances of MOHW bureaucrats during the policy-making processes 
for pension and health insurance reform were fundamentally related to whether they had 
vested interests in the reform or not.  
Throughout the policy-making processes of welfare reform in Korea, economic bureaucrats 
would continuously be a crucial player in welfare politics. It is generally accepted that 
economic bureaucrats had greater decision-making power than social and other bureaucrats 
for a long time in Korea because economic growth was the focus of successive governments. 
The EPB was therefore the agenda-setter during Korea’s economic development. In practice, 
the EPB played a crucial role in setting up the NWP Law. Although its relation to health 
insurance policy was indirect in that it was an economic rather than a social ministry, the 
EPB nevertheless exerted considerable influence over health insurance policy because this 
ministry supported the operating expenses of health societies. In contrast to the MOHW, 
however, the economic policy bureaucrats of the EPB did not have vested interests in the 
separate heath societies that then existed and were primarily interested in budget efficiency 
because the operating costs of health societies were supported by their ministry and central 
government. Therefore, while they supported the integration of the separate health societies 
in principle, their focus on budgetary concerns and their position as neither stakeholders nor 
stake-challengers meant that, unlike civil organisations and labour unions, their 
encouragement of the government to embrace an integrationist policy on health insurance 
was founded not on the principle of social rights, but one of efficiency (Kim, Y. M, 2002).  
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However, it is also accepted that the EPB’s economic bureaucrats were generally opposed to 
the expansion of social welfare programmes. They tended to regard social policy as 
subordinate to and an instrument of economic policy or a necessary evil. Nevertheless, their 
views had a consistently strong influence on the development of social policy in Korea. 
However, during the economic crisis and the political power shift, they temporarily lost some 
of their power and their dominance over policy-making. Facing sustained criticism about 
their responsibility for the economic crisis and preoccupied with devising strategies to tackle 
it, they were unable to concentrate their forces and exert their influence over social welfare 
policy as a veto player. This situation made it possible for the MOHW to push ahead with the 
expansion of NPS coverage to the self-employed and to retain the mono-pillar structure of the 
pension system.  
 
Political parties’ inactivity and changes in the role of the National Assembly 
In the West, political parties have been central to the development of welfare states, and it is 
impossible to separate the welfare state and welfare development from the formation and 
growth of social democratic parties. In Korea’s case, however, there is no evidence that 
political parties played any significant role in social policy developments from the 1960s 
onwards. Before democratisation, political parties played no significant role in Korean 
politics, and after democratisation, this situation remained largely unchanged. In fact, almost 
all enactments of social welfare laws were the direct result of successive government 
leaderships, and political parties were unable to oppose, reject, or amend the laws submitted 
by governments before or after the economic crisis and political power shift. Furthermore, 
there is no indication that political parties were able to modify the key contents of social 
welfare laws. This situation also prevailed in the deliberation of the national budget. As was 
seen in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, political parties, whether ruling or in opposition, played no 
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significant part in the policy-making process of pension and health insurance reform prior to 
1998, and indeed they displayed little interest in these reforms. Above all, unlike in the West, 
political parties had no capacity for formulating policy alternatives (or the will to do so) 
because they were either firmly under the control of the authoritarian president, in the case of 
the ruling party, or dominated by their influential leader, in the case of opposition parties. For 
the most part, the members of the National Assembly were primarily interested in preserving 
their political careers, and they therefore had little inclination to challenge or develop policies 
unrelated to this end.  
Political parties did not play any role in the debates and conflicts on health insurance 
integration and pension reform under the Kim Young-sam government (1993–1998) or 
produce their own policies, and their role was effectively limited to rubber-stamping the 
government’s policies. Political parties failed to show an independent role in policy making 
or come up with any new proposals. Even in the more democratic situation existing after the 
economic crisis and the political power shift, the new ruling party unreservedly accepted Kim 
Dae-jung’s election pledges to introduce NHI integration and expand national pension 
coverage to the urban self-employed, as had been called for by civil organisations and 
progressive labour unions, which were influential supporters of the new president. Although 
the opposition party at this time, the Grand National Party (GNP), went against the 
president’s line and argued for the fiscal separation of NHI, this position merely mirrored that 
of one of their chief supporters, the KFTU (Kim, Y. M, 2005b), and political parties simply 
did not develop their own strategies on welfare reforms at that time. In sum, although 
political parties became more actively involved in debates about welfare reform after 1998, 
their positions tended to mirror those of their main supporters and they did not develop their 
own strategies or policies on welfare reforms. 
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The National Assembly also did not play a major role in the policy-making process of 
pension and health insurance reforms before 1998. In general, national assemblies draft, 
debate, and enact legislation, and Heywood (2002) points out their five principal functions: 
legislation, representation, scrutiny, political recruitment, and legitimacy. Korea, however, 
was under direct military rule from 1961 to 1988, and although Roh Tae-woo (president from 
1988-1992) narrowly won a popular presidential election in 1988 and initiated constitutional 
reforms that resulted in the Sixth Republic, he was part of the military establishment, and his 
rule guaranteed the continuity of military involvement in Korean politics that had persisted 
since Park’s coup in 1961. During this period, the National Assembly was unable to carry out 
its principal functions, and it was ignored and devalued. However, as democratisation 
progressed, the role played by the National Assembly in the policy-making process began to 
expand. As was seen in Chapter 6, after the economic crisis and the political power shift in 
particular, the National Assembly under the Kim Dae-jung administration began to become 
more involved in the conflict surrounding national health insurance integration and pension 
expansion. Civil organisations, labour unions, and interest groups lobbied individual 
members of the National Assembly and put pressure on political parties. The mass media too 
began to focus more attention on events and developments in the National Assembly. These 
developments were an entirely new phenomenon in the history of social policy developments 
in Korea, and extraordinarily, an agreement struck between the ruling party and the 
opposition party led to the postponement of the president’s NHI fiscal integration plan for a 
year and a half. After the economic crisis and the political power shift, the National 
Assembly emerged as a new strong player in welfare politics in Korea. Simultaneously, 
however, concerns arose that the National Assembly could be influenced more by external 
factors such as lobbying by interest groups and popular sentiment than the common good. 
 
238 
 
Interest groups as self-interested actors 
Interest groups can be defined as collective bodies that attempt to influence government 
policy in accordance with their special interests or vested rights. In this sense, some scholars 
emphasise that social policies are the products of conflicts between interest groups. As was 
seen earlier, however, the influence of interest groups in Korea was very limited during the 
long period of military rule, but as democratisation progressed, their activities and influence 
increased. In terms of social policy, their increasing influence is most clearly revealed during 
the policy-making process of health insurance and pension reforms. In the history of health 
policy in the West, and the UK in particular, doctors and their organisations have been the 
strongest interest group actors. While doctors had no special interest in pension reforms and 
therefore did not strongly voice their views on these reforms, The Korean Medical 
Association made its own views clear throughout the policy-making process for health 
insurance reform, but bureaucrats heeded their arguments only when their own interests were 
not affected. As regards the management of NHI, doctors expressed concerns about the late 
disbursement of medical bills under the system of independent health societies and thus 
supported NHI integration. Nevertheless, their position on this issue was largely based on the 
principle of social rights, and their own interests were unaffected. As a result, “there was no 
particularly meaningful and influential intervention from medical professionals throughout 
this process” (Hwang, 2006). However, their reaction to the proposed separation of medical 
and pharmaceutical practices was fundamentally different, and doctors were much more 
actively engaged in this issue. The Pharmaceutical Affairs Amendment Act of 1994 had set 
July 1999 as the date for the separation of medical and pharmaceutical practices, but “both 
the KMA and the KPA (Korean Pharmaceutical Association) found the proposal 
unsatisfactory and themselves still unprepared” for the change (Hwang, 2006). The conflicts 
that erupted between the two groups led the government to increase the overall burden of the 
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public. In the history of social policy, this result was rare example in the modern history of 
social policy. In the meantime, in the case of the KPA, they did not care too much about the 
integration of health insurance but generally supported it. As democratic advances in Korea 
became more durable, so interest groups became increasingly outspoken and their activities 
more assertive. They used the mass media and lobbied the members of the National 
Assembly. As was seen in Chapter 5, the most noteworthy development during the policy-
making process for NHI integration was the emergence of coalitions of interest groups.  
 
The international financial apparatus as a new external player 
At the end of 1996, Korea became a member of the OECD, but within one year, she 
experienced the most severe economic crisis in her history. As a result of the crisis, the IMF 
and the World Bank began to exert considerable influence in Korea’s economic and social 
policy-making. The IMF demanded both economic and social reform and on 13 April 1998 
called for the Kim Dae-jung government to expand the social safety net so as to ensure the 
success of economic reform. The World Bank also demanded welfare reform, most notably in 
the area of pension reform. As was seen in Chapter 6, the World Bank intervened in the 
pension reform process and set as a condition for the delivery of the $2 billion Structural 
Adjustment Loan (SAL) the revision of the PFMA (Public Fund Management Act) in order to 
end the government’s ability to forcibly appropriate pension funds. In addition, in early 1998, 
the Bank attempted to influence the plans for structural pension reform in Korea by 
recommending deferral of the expansion of pension coverage to the urban self-employed. In 
late 1998, the Bank again actively intervened in the pension reform process by sponsoring a 
Pension Reform Task Force (PRTK) research visit to countries that had implemented the 
pension reforms favoured by the Bank and by proposing alternatives to the reforms that were 
then being considered by the Korean authorities (Yang,J. J, 2000). The Bank’s aim was that 
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Korea would accept its favoured pension system, that is to say, a multi-pillar and more 
privatised system. As was shown in Chapter 6, however, the Kim Dae-jung government and 
the MOHW ultimately did not follow the Bank’s recommendations and employed a ‘non-
decision-making strategy’ in dealing with the sustained pressure from the World Bank. The 
most important thing to consider here, however, is the fact that international financial 
institutions intervened in Korean domestic policies, and depending on whether these 
interventions were in line with the government’s and bureaucrats’ aims, the external actors’ 
interventions were sometimes accepted and sometimes rejected. This points to the fact that, 
despite the economic crisis, the domestic political interests and power structure in 
determining the direction of social policy (Yang, J. J, 2000b) took precedence over the 
intervention by the international financial apparatus.  
 
Policy experts as policy entrepreneurs 
In the process of national health insurance integration and national pension reform, the roles 
played by policy experts, usually professors, researchers, and activists in related fields should 
not be overlooked. As was seen in Chapter 5, they sometimes played a central role in 
decision-making and the policy-making process. For example, Lee Kwang-chan, a researcher 
and policy expert on the Committee for Social Security (CSS), played a crucial role in 
constructing a convincing rationale for NHI integration and disseminating it both within and 
outside government circles. Through his dedicated efforts, many bureaucrats came to adopt a 
pro-NHI integration position. In this regard, Kim Yong-Ik, an executive commissioner of the 
PSC and a professor at Seoul National University, also played a key role in bringing about 
NHI integration. He developed the argument that NHI integration should take place on the 
basis of not only a commitment to the principle of social solidarity but also the expansion of 
benefit coverage and the practical benefit of working people.  
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The result of Kim Yong-Ik’s promotion of this argument was that the trade unions adopted 
NHI integration as a core policy. Kim Yeon-myung – in the case of pension reform – and 
Moon Jin-young and Kim Mi-gon – in the enactment of the NBLS – played practical roles in 
agenda setting and establishing the logic of welfare reforms. Besides these people, many 
policy experts made significant contributions to NHI integration and pension reform, and 
their ideas, arguments, and actions had significant influences on the policy-making process. 
These experts organised research teams and studied welfare reform alternatives. A good 
example of such activities is provided by the closed-door consultative body ‘Health and 
Welfare’ (H&W) that was established by Lee Seong-jae (a member of the National Assembly) 
and included Kim Yong-ik (a professor at Seoul National University), Kim Yeon-myung (a 
professor at Chung-Ang University and chairman of the social welfare special committee of 
the PSPD), Moon Jin-young (a professor at Sokang University), and Kim Mi-gon (who was a 
researcher at the Korea Institute of Health and Social Affairs).  
This body had a major influence on the position that civil organisations and the labour 
movement took on welfare reforms and even influenced the government’s policies. H&W 
continued to influence policy-making from the start of the Kim Dae-jung government (1998-
2003) to the early years of the Roh Moo-hyun government (2003–2008), and some of its 
members served in the Roh government.  
 
7.3.2 The rediscovery and the potential of Korean welfare politics in the process of 
health insurance and pension reform  
 
It is argued that policies produce politics (Pierson, 1985) and that politics produces policies. 
In this way, policies and politics interact. Since welfare politics is the politics of welfare 
development and reform, welfare politics denotes the strategic confrontations and power 
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conflicts that take place between actors on the issue of access to and control of social and 
economic resources. Whether these actors are pursuing the common good or private interests, 
they fiercely struggle for their own goals, and in the process of this struggle, they forge 
alliances and experience splits. In essence, welfare politics is a dynamic political process that 
takes place between stakeholders and stake challengers. The significance of welfare politics 
is this: welfare is the central issue for politics and the state in modern societies.  
 
The welfare politics of exclusion before the economic crisis 
As each country has a different history and culture, so each country has its own unique 
welfare politics, and Korea is no exception. In particular, Korean welfare politics is unique in 
that Korea experienced a long period of ‘welfare absence’. Likewise, welfare politics was 
absent in Korea, at least from the perspective that regards politics as the interaction of actors. 
For much of the time after Korea’s liberation from Japanese rule in 1945, Koreans did not 
benefit from any welfare state system. All government policy focused on national security 
and economic growth. Economic growth provides the foundation for welfare policy 
development, and even though Korea experienced enormous economic growth from the 
1960s onwards, welfare policy did not follow in its wake, and welfare in Korea was not 
conceived as a social right based on citizenship but as a sort of dispensation from the state 
and a means of achieving legitimacy for the authoritarian regimes that lasted from 1961 to 
1987. After democratisation, welfare development began to come to the fore as a political 
issue. Nevertheless, prior to the economic crisis, Korean welfare politics was characterised by 
the ‘politics of exclusion’, a term coined by Kim, Y. M (2005a), a professor of Social Policy 
at Chung-Ang University. He argues that social policy programmes in Korea were formed, 
administered, and revised purely by the state, and there was no input from social welfare 
organisations external to the state. Accordingly, this arrangement led the government and 
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bureaucrats to exclude social and political actors such as political parties, the working class, 
farmers, doctors, and other interest groups in the formation of social welfare. 
 
From the ‘welfare politics of exclusion’ to the ‘welfare politics of inclusion’ 
The characteristics of Korean welfare politics before the economic crisis forced welfare 
programmes and welfare policies to the margins of the political agenda. While there were 
pro-welfare voices inside and outside government during this period, and Korea’s autocratic 
presidents made pro-welfare statements, much of this pro-welfare discourse amounted to little 
more than rhetoric, and it was only when Korea faced impending economic doom in 1997 
that welfare programmes and welfare policies came to the forefront of the public’s attention 
and the political agenda (Shin, K. Y, 2003). The economic crisis brought mass 
unemployment and widespread poverty to Korea, and this unprecedented situation drew 
attention to the need to develop a Korean welfare state. The welfare health insurance and 
pension reforms implemented in the wake of the economic crisis triggered a new welfare 
politics in Korea, and it is no exaggeration to state that the emergence of Korea’s new welfare 
politics was the direct result of the economic crisis. Nevertheless, the first signs of the new 
welfare politics in Korea began to emerge after democratisation in 1987. With the advent of 
democratisation, the one-sided system of policy-making by government and bureaucrats 
changed. However, democratisation itself did not directly lead to the development of welfare 
programmes or welfare politics, but rather the explosion of participants in the new welfare 
politics triggered by the economic crisis led to the development of welfare programmes. 
Those people and organisations previously excluded by the bureaucracy and the authoritarian 
governments emerged as strong players in Korea’s new welfare politics. 
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The advent of the new welfare politics 1: the politics of civil organisations 
As was seen in Chapters 5, 6, and the section above, the most notable of these new players in 
welfare politics were civil activists and civil organisations, which led calls for welfare 
reforms and actively participated in the policy-making process. According to Lee, J. H, “the 
role of civil organizations in the politics of decision-making may be portrayed as one of 
‘policy entrepreneurs’. The entrepreneurial role of civil organizations in developing new 
policy initiatives is to mobilize new social movements and challenge powerful entrenched 
forces on behalf of those who would not otherwise act collectively” (2007, p240 ). These 
civil organisations represented the interests of the underprivileged, such as farmers, the urban 
poor, and irregular workers, and after the democratic struggle in 1987, they became 
increasingly active. In general, they pressurised the government by influencing public 
opinion through their use of the mass media, but their activities extended to include interest 
aggregation and coordination, and even designing social policies(Kim, Y. S, 2007). The 
governments of the time also needed the participation of civil organisations in the policy-
making arena as it lent political legitimacy to the government’s economic and social policies. 
By 1997, however, government policies (and economic policies in particular) had brought 
about mass unemployment and social problems, and with the political opposition set to gain 
power, the way was open for civil organisations to play a more central role in policy-making. 
As mentioned earlier, Korea’s experience of the role played by civil organisations in the 
development of a new welfare politics was so remarkable that it is hard to find a comparable 
experience in any other country. 
 
The advent of the new welfare politics 2: the politics of interest groups  
Another characteristic of welfare politics in Korea after the economic crisis was the 
widespread emergence of interest groups. Of course, before the economic crisis, interest 
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groups took action in defence of their interests, but most of their activities were limited to 
exerting pressure on the government.  
However, as has been shown, during the process of health insurance and pension reforms 
since the economic crisis, political conflicts and confrontations between actors fighting in 
defence of their own vested interests emerged. In addition, various interest groups became 
more involved and influential participants in the government’s decision-making on policies, 
including international financial organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank. Even 
though the government and bureaucrats almost certainly saw these participants as a means to 
legitimise and ‘rubber stamp’ the decisions reached, it is quite clear that these participants 
were in no way negligible factors in the decision-making process, and the social policy arena 
was characterised by political and social power conflicts among various actors (Shin, K. Y, 
2003).  
Interest groups politics within the social policy arena sometimes provided some positive 
function for the normal operation of democracy, but sometimes showed an exVtreme pluralist 
tendency in which excessive demands and intense conflicts among fragmented interest 
groups created a crisis of governability or a systematic overload. (Kim, Y.S, 2007) 
 
The advent of the new welfare politics 3: the coalition politics of stakeholders and stake 
challengers 
The third main characteristic of welfare politics in Korea after the economic crisis was the 
emergence of the coalition politics of stakeholders and stake challengers. As was seen in 
Chapters 5 and 6, disputes arose and battles were fought between two different coalitions 
during the health insurance and pension reform processes: the stakeholder coalition and the 
stake-challenger coalition. This characteristic of the post-economic crisis welfare politics in 
Korea has also been noted by Kwon, H. J of Seoul National University. He argues that the 
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politics of social policy in Korea after the 1997economic crisis is characterised by the 
emergence and growing influence of ‘advocacy coalitions’, a concept first conceived by 
Sabatier (1986) and defined as a group of actors from various public and private 
organisations who share a set of beliefs and who seek to realise their common goals over time. 
Kwon, H. J revealed this characteristic of welfare politics in Korea by exploring the dynamics 
of policy-making in the enactment of the National Livelihood Life Security (NBLS) system, 
arguing that the pro-welfare coalition was able to succeed in introducing the NBLS system by 
seizing control of strategic points of decision-making in Korea. Ahn, S. H and Kim, S. K 
(2003) also explain the development of the Korean welfare state by using the concept of 
‘welfare alliance’, which refers to the formation of political alliances on welfare politics. In 
conclusion, they argue that the effective mobilization of a challenging alliance was a main 
driving force behind the initial development of modern Korean welfare programmes.  
This characteristic of welfare politics in Korea since the economic crisis was clearly shown in 
the case studies in Chapters 5 and 6. For example, in the case of national health insurance 
integration, there was a long history of simmering conflict between the stakeholder coalition 
and the stake challenger coalition, which gave way to an all-out battle after the economic 
crisis. The stakeholder coalition opposed NHI integration and was composed of anti-
integrationist MOHSA bureaucrats, the Grand National Party (the opposition party after Kim 
Dae-jung’s presidential election victory), representatives of capitalists (the FKI and the KEP), 
the FKTU, and the conservative media. The stake challenger coalition supported NHI 
integration and comprised President Kim Dae-jung, pro-reform civil organisations, the ruling 
party, the KCTU, and progressive policy experts. These groups sometimes established formal 
coalition organisations and sometimes informally banded together. Fundamentally, the 
history of social policy development in Korea was the history of struggle between the anti-
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welfare stakeholder coalition and the pro-welfare stake challenger coalition, and this welfare 
politics phenomenon continued throughout the process of later social policy developments.  
 
The fundamental issue of welfare politics 4: no decisive role for class or party  
The final characteristic of Korean welfare politics that I contend is unlike that found in the 
West is the limited role played by the working class and political parties in the process of 
social policy development and welfare reforms. Since social policy issues such as 
unemployment, industrial incidents, pensions, health insurance, and childcare are closely 
related to the quality of working class life, the working class and trade unions have 
traditionally fought for welfare expansion and development. In the advanced welfare states of 
the West, welfare politics originated from initiatives by the trade union movement and 
political parties representing working class interests. However, the basic structure of welfare 
politics in Korea was fundamentally different from that found in the West, and social policy 
development occurred in Korea largely in the absence of traditional labour welfare politics. 
As was demonstrated in the previous two chapters, while the two main Korean trade union 
federations were involved in the process of NHI and NPS reforms, they were not the main 
actors. They were, on the whole, relatively passive players in the policy-making process, 
although on occasion they played more active roles. The reason for this is that, like other 
social classes in Korea at the time, the knowledge of the working class about welfare reform 
was rudimentary, and, in general, its attitude towards the need for reform was characterised 
by indifference. The reality in Korea is that many researches on welfare consciousness deny 
the explanatory power of socio-economic status in interpreting welfare consciousness. Trade 
unions members do not generally support the extension of public welfare more than non-
union members. And workers who have participated in strikes do not support the extension of 
public welfare more than workers who have not. In other words, there was little difference in 
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the welfare consciousness of different social classes either before or after the economic crisis, 
indicating that the roots of welfare discourse and welfare ideology in Korea was not (and is 
still not) to be found in socio-economic class. Fundamentally, this peculiarity of welfare 
politics in Korea has not changed even since the economic crisis. There are numerous reasons 
for this, the most important of which is the distinctive structure of trade unions in Korea, 
which are primarily constituted not at the industry level but at the individual company level. 
This union structure forced workers to have more interest in improving wages and working 
conditions at the individual company level than in social and collective issues such as welfare 
and social wages. In other words, while the trade union federations themselves were 
interested in national issues such as welfare provision, their membership and the ordinary 
working class were not. 
A similar story exists for the role played by political parties in the development of the welfare 
system in Korea. Throughout the history of welfare development in the West, political parties 
have been one of the main actors, and often both the ruling and opposition parties have had a 
shared concept of social security and some commitment to social welfare provision. However, 
according to Kwon, H. J (1997), in Korea, the core driving forces which influenced the 
evolution of Western welfare systems such as labour unions and social democratic parties did 
not have a significant influence on the making of social policy (Lee, J. H, 2007). Moreover, 
the first priority of political parties was maintaining their political power, and their policy 
priority was always economic growth, an attitude that persisted until the 1997 economic crisis. 
In summary, welfare politics in Korea was not primarily based on class cleavages and class-
based political parties, and as a result, it was civil organisations and interest groups that took 
the place of the labour movement and political parties on welfare issues. 
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7.4 Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter, I have analysed and discussed the characteristics of the new politics of 
welfare reform in Korea that emerged after the economic crisis and the election of President 
Kim Dae-jung. First, both the new policy-making process for health insurance and pension 
reforms during the Kim Dae-jung government and its meaning were summarised. Throughout 
the discussion, the key characteristics of the welfare politics operating in the course of these 
reforms were revealed based on my analytical framework. Changes in the strategies of actors 
were reviewed and analyzed, with a specific focus on their strategic actions and interactions 
in the policy-making processes of the two welfare reforms analysed in this thesis.  
From this analysis, civil organisations emerged as the most important pro-welfare actors 
within the new welfare politics in Korea as they were the most influential stake challenger 
during the welfare reforms process. The next most important pro-welfare actors were labour 
unions, again as stake challengers. However, their actions, while sometimes committed and 
effective, were not as strong as those of civil organisations, their influence in the policy-
making process was considerably less than civil organisations, and compared to their 
counterparts in the West, their role in the welfare reforms process was limited. The leading 
stakeholders in the welfare reform policy-making process immediately before and after the 
economic crisis were the business community, and they made a strong stand against the stake 
challengers. The main representatives of this circle were the KEF (Korea Employers 
Federation) and the FKI (Federation of Korean Industries), which played a vigorous role in 
articulating the interests of the business community as regards health insurance integration 
and pension reform. The role of political parties, however, was weak throughout the reform 
process, and it was only when stake challengers and stakeholders began to lobby 
parliamentarians that they began to play any role in welfare reform. Welfare politics in Korea, 
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therefore, was not grounded in class party politics. Although the traditionally strong actors in 
Korean policy-making – the president, as the absolute decision-maker, and the still-influential 
bureaucrats – remained as the strongest policy decision-makers, a new welfare politics 
emerged in Korea after the economic crisis, one in which the civil organisations movement, 
the politics of interest groups, and the coalition politics of stakeholders and stake challengers 
increasingly came to the fore. It was this new form of welfare politics that led to the post-
economic welfare reforms in Korea, a form unique to Korea and one not founded on the 
traditional class cleavages and class party politics of other advanced countries. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
Introduction 
This research has aimed to explain the peculiarities and dynamics of Korean welfare politics 
since the 1997 economic crisis, focusing especially on welfare reform during the Kim Dae-
jung government, the accession of which marked the peaceful turnover of political power 
from authoritarian regimes to a democratic administration. It has uncovered the driving forces 
and the interactions among political actors in the welfare reform policy-making process, 
especially as regards pension and health insurance reforms. To this end, I looked at four key 
questions:  
1) Where and how are welfare reforms initiated, brought to the attention of government, 
propelled forward to the point of decision or blocked and quietly buried? 2) With a 
particular focus on Korea’s pension and health insurance reforms, how and to what 
extent did political and social actors influence the decision-making process? 3) What 
have been the key peculiarities of welfare politics in Korea since the economic crisis, 
and 4) in what way do they differ from Korea’s welfare politics before the economic 
crisis?  
I also asked several additional questions:   
What were the underlying dynamics of the changes in Korea’s welfare politics and welfare 
reforms? What were the most influential and important driving forces behind these reforms? 
How do we explain the political dynamics of welfare reform in regards to the decision-
making process for social policies in Korea? How has welfare politics manifested itself in the 
decision-making process of the pension and health insurance welfare reforms? How and to 
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what extent did the social policy welfare reforms affect the emergence and development of 
the welfare state in Korea? 
Over thechapters that make up this thesis, I have attempted to unearth the answers to these 
questions. Chapters 3 and 4 focused on theoretical issues. Chapter 3 reviewed the literature 
on the competing theories of welfare politics in the Western and Korean contexts. In Chapter 
4, I presented a theoretical framework for analysing the political dynamics within the policy-
making process of pension reform and health insurance integration. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, 
respectively, dealt with the welfare politics of health insurance and pension reform as 
meaningful case studies. In Chapter 7, I analysed the new pattern of Korean welfare politics 
that has emerged and put it into perspective. Although I have not found perfectly satisfactory 
answers to all these questions, I believe that my investigation has revealed that a new and 
unique pattern of Korean welfare politics has emerged since the 1997 economic crisis. While 
many studies on Korean welfare policy have been published, most of them have concentrated 
on broad case studies detailing the National Basic Living Security Act, the separation of 
medicine dispensary from medical services, pension reform and so on. The innovation in this 
study is its explicit and in-depth focus on two fundamental areas of welfare policy: pension 
and medical insurance reform. Through this effort, which is the first of its kind, this thesis has 
shed light on the changes, the unique characteristics, and the universality of welfare politics 
in Korea.In summary, I have revealed the peculiarities and universality of Korean welfare 
politics by exploring the health insurance and pension reform process and its underlying 
welfare politics. In this concluding chapter, therefore, I will firstly summarise my research 
findings, and secondly, I will show the implications and limitations of the new welfare 
politics in Korea since the economic crisis in 1997.Thirdly, I will offer some final reflections on 
the theoretical framework I have used. Might there be some missing dimensions? In particular, might 
I have understated the importance of ideas in the developments of social policy?  For example, social 
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democratic ideas were deemed to be of importance in relation to welfare state developments in 
Western Europe from 1945 to the mid-1970s.  Subsequently, neo-liberal ideas came to the fore. Such 
ideas also mighthave influencedthe social policy changes in Korea more than I recognised. I will also 
consider, with the benefit of hindsight, whether I might have approached the topic in a slightly 
different way. Finally, I will consider how further research on this topic might be undertaken 
in the future and make some concluding remarks.Finally, suggestions for further study will be 
presented and concluding remarks made. 
 
8.1. Summary of research findings 
Several meaningful findings were uncovered as a result of exploring the welfare 
reformsconducted under the Kim Dae-jung government after the 1997 economic crisis. As 
mentioned above, these findings were revealed by focusing on actors’ actions, strategies, and 
interactions during the process of health insurance and pension reform and viewing them 
through the lens of the welfare politics framework adopted for this research. In this section, I 
will summarise the findings described in detail in chapters 5 through 7. I will then go on to 
point out the meaning of these welfare reforms, the structure of Korea’s new welfare politics 
and the implications and limitations of this new form of welfare politics.  
 
Health insurance politics in Korea 
In Chapter 5 and Chapter 7, I examined and discussed why and how the health insurance 
reform was achieved by the Kim Dae-jung government in the wake of the 1997 economic 
crisis. This discussion revealed how the combination of problem, policy, and political 
orientation during the Kim Dae-jung government provided a window of opportunity for 
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health insurance integration and how stake challengers overcame stakeholders’ efforts to 
block reform and ultimately achieved their objectives. These specific conditions enabled 
health insurance integration to take place and led social and political actors in Korea to 
develop a new policy-making process and create a new political arena. For a long time, 
policy-making power had been concentrated in the hands of high-ranking bureaucrats within 
the Korean state, and decision making took place very much within a closed structure. 
However, as democratisation progressed and the economic crisis surfaced, new actors such as 
civil activists and policy experts gradually became involved in the policy-making process for 
national health insurance integration. They were a key driving force for health insurance 
reform.  
 
Pension politics in Korea 
In Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, I explored why and how pension reform was achieved under the 
Kim Dae-jung government. Again, the combination of problem, policy, and the political 
direction taken by the Kim Dae-jung government provided a window of opportunity for 
pension expansion. Stake challengers once again overcame stakeholders’ blocking attempts 
and achieved their reform objectives. Pension expansion led social bureaucrats, civil 
organisation activists, and trade unions to develop a new policy-making process and establish 
a new political arena. As with the case of health insurance, policy-making power over 
pension reform had traditionally been wielded by high-ranking members of the presidential 
office and by economic bureaucrats, and the decision-making process was very much closed 
to external influences. Again, with the political shift towards democratisation and as the 
severity of the economic crisis became apparent, new actors such as social bureaucrats, civil 
activists and policy experts became increasingly involved in the pension expansion policy-
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making process. These new actors, as with the case of health insurance reform, were key 
players in Korea’s pension reform process.  
 
New politics of welfare reform in Korea 
As can be seen, Korean welfare politics were dominated by dynamic political battles between 
stakeholders and the stake-challenger coalition throughout the policy-making processes of 
both the pension and health insurance reforms. For this study, therefore, I have developed a 
theoretical framework for the new politics of welfare reform in Korea, namely ‘the politics of 
conflict between stakeholders and the stake-challenger coalition’. By using this frameworkto 
explore Korea’s health insurance and pension reforms, new findings in terms of the welfare 
politics of welfare reform have been brought to light.  
The most obvious characteristic of Korea’s new welfare politics since the economic crisis in 
1997 and the subsequent political power shift was the key role played by civil organisations, 
which emerged as an influential stake challenger against stakeholders. The coalition formed 
by these civil organisations consisted of a large network of different organisations, including 
NGOs, interest groups, policy experts and labour unions. The voice of interest groups and 
policy experts grew as democratisation progressed, and their influence on and their role in the 
decision-making processes for the reforms should not be overlooked or underestimated. 
Despite the undoubted contributions of these other civil organisation actors, the role played 
by the Korean labour union movement as a pro-welfare reform actor is of particular note. 
Generally speaking, while welfare development and reform have been closely associated with 
national labour movements, the actual influence that labour organisations have had on the 
development of welfare states has varied in different countries. In the Korean context, the 
1997 economic crisis in fact marked a turning point for the Korean labour movement and its 
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influence on the direction of social policy. Before the economic crisis, Korean trade unions 
had largely been policy outsiders, but after the economic crisis, the labour movement became 
an important actor and partner of the government in the welfare reform decision-making 
process.  
Nevertheless, the traditional actors in the Korean policy and politics context continued to play 
prominent roles in the post-economic crisis social reforms. The business community 
remained a leading stakeholder and played a significant role in opposing health insurance 
integration and pension coverage expansion. Despite the economic crisis and the political 
shift from an authoritarian presidential system of government, the president remained the 
supreme decision maker in terms of both economic and social policy. Public administrators 
and bureaucrats also continued to be influential actors. Although the monopolistic control of 
economic bureaucrats over all aspects of policy was weakened, the policy preferences of 
economic bureaucrats continued to retain a degree of precedence over those of non-economic 
bureaucrats. It should be borne in mind that the role that political parties in Korea have 
played in social policy reform has been very different from that played by political parties in 
the West. While political parties were prominent players in the development of the Western 
welfare states, their influence was marginal in Korea. Before the 1997 economic crisis, 
Korean political parties did not engage in the debates and conflicts on health insurance 
integration and pension reform. Even after the economic crisis and the political shift towards 
democratisation, the individual political parties failed to produce their own strategies or 
policies on welfare reforms, although the National Assembly gradually emerged as a new 
strong player in welfare politics in Korea.  
Last but not least, the international financial apparatus emerged as an external and significant 
player in Korean welfare politics. Even though Korea’s domestic political interests and power 
structure ultimately took precedence over the interests of the international financial apparatus 
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in determining the direction of social policy, the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on 
the eventual course of action taken by the Korean authorities can in no way be considered 
negligible.  
 
8.2 New changes: Implications and limitations of Korean welfare politics  
 
In the seventeen years since the 1997 economic crisis, welfare politics in Korea has 
undergone fundamental change and is now a dynamic process. The issue of social welfare in 
Korea has become a subject integral to everyday discussion on Korean society. However, this 
is a result of a relatively recent trend. As noted earlier in this thesis, Korea experienced a long 
period in which there was an almost complete absence of welfare. In other words, Korea’s 
circumstancesand the characteristics of the Korean welfare system before the economic crisis 
forced welfare reform programmes and welfare politics to the margins of the political agenda. 
In this thesis, I have termed the situation that resulted in the absence of welfare as ‘the 
welfare politics of exclusion’. With the arrival of the economic crisis and the political 
transition to democratisation, the window to the new Korean welfare politics was opened. 
Since then, welfare politics in Korea, like that in the West, has been a dynamic process that 
has taken place between stakeholders and stake challengers. As was shown in chapters 5, 6 
and 7, the characteristics and structure of Korean welfare politics since the economic crisis in 
1997 has changed from the welfare politics of exclusion to the welfare politics of inclusion. 
What, then, is the crucial difference between the former and the latter, and what is the key 
driving force behind this change?  
I have argued in this thesis that the health insurance and pension reforms implemented in the 
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wake of the economic crisis triggered a new welfare politics in Korea. It is not an 
exaggeration to state that the emergence of Korea’s new welfare politics was a direct result of 
the economic crisis. Here, I need to address one important point. As described in Chapter 8, 
democratisation itself did not directly lead to the development of welfare programmes or the 
advent of a new form of welfare politics. Rather, it was the explosion of participants in 
welfare politics triggered by the economic crisis that led to the development of welfare 
programmes.  
In this thesis, I have argued that the new form of Korean welfare politics that emerged during 
the administration of the Kim Dae-jung government had four main features. The first of these 
was the emergence of civil organisations as a political force. According to Lee Joo-ha (2007), 
the main role of civil organisation groups in developing new policy initiatives is to mobilise 
new social movements on behalf of the socially unprivilegedand to challenge those groups 
that have a strong vested interest in the preservation of the status quo. The chief characteristic 
of the politics of Korean civil organisations in the immediate aftermath of the 1997 economic 
crisis was broadly populist way in that it aimed both to reflect and to guide public opinion of 
the time. While this characteristic continues to underpin the politics of many civil 
organisations in Korea to this day, and while these organisations have continued to play an 
important role in Korean welfare politics, their voice is certainly less prominent than it was 
during the period of Kim Dae-jung’s government. The second feature of the new Korean 
welfare politics that emerged after the economic crisis was the rise of interest groups as 
political players, with various interest groups becoming more involved in the welfare reform 
decision-making process. Although their participation in decision-making or advisory bodies 
sometimes served only as a ‘rubber stamp’ to legitimate decisions that had already been 
reached by bureaucrats, over time their voice and lobbying practices gradually became more 
sophisticated, and they increasingly came to influence and participate in policy decisions 
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directly. The third key feature of welfare politics in Korea after the economic crisis was the 
emergence and intensification of the coalition politics of stakeholders and stake challengers. 
There emerged a kind of ‘advocacy coalition’ (Kwon, H. J, 2003) or ‘welfare alliance’ (Ahn, 
S. H, 2003). Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 showed how this characteristic of Korean welfare 
politics was clearly in evidence in the health insurance and pension reform processes. The last 
key feature of the new form of Korean welfare politics that emerged during Kim Dae-jung’s 
government was the fact that party politics did not make a major contribution to the process 
of welfare reform. For example, political party members did not exhibit greater support for 
the extension of public welfare than non-party members. Unlike in the West, political parties 
also did not play a key role in the welfare reforms undertaken during the Kim Dae-jung 
government, a fact that is relevant given that the Kim Dae-jung government was the first truly 
democratic government in Korean history. It appears that the first priority of the various party 
leaderships was simply to maintain their political power. 
In the years after the Kim Dae-jung government, these features of Korean welfare politics 
continued to influence the course of welfare expansion in Korea. However, this new form of 
Korean welfare politics had a fundamentallimitation in that the welfare politics formed during 
the Kim Dae-jung administration were neither the result of party politics nor had a genuine 
socio-economic foundation, but rather were the result of the instrumental role played by civil 
society. As a result, there were no openly progressive pro-welfare political parties or 
persistently influential pro-welfare social forces within Korea’s new welfare politics. 
Ultimately, this limitation has had a negative effect on the development of the Korean welfare 
state. The lack of a consistent driving force for further welfare reform and expansion of 
welfare provision has meant that the neoliberal-driven economic reforms that were enacted in 
the wake of the 1997 economic crisis have given birth to the problem of social polarisation in 
Korea. While on the one hand these neoliberal reforms brought much needed reforms to 
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Korea’s financial institutional structure, at the same time, labour flexibility increased 
significantly, thus increasing the number of non-regular workers and giving birth to 
polarisation. Since then, the polarisation between workers in small and large businesses, 
domestic companies and export companies, and in other industries has grown significantly. 
The majority view states that although there was an expansion of social insurance and social 
welfare in general in this period, the combination of Korea’sbirth rate drop and rapid ageing 
population made it impossible to overcome the social polarisation. The Roh Moo-hyun 
administration, which succeeded the Kim Dae-jung government, tried to confront these issues 
by making the tackling of the issue of polarisation a priority, but the government was 
ultimately unable to achieve its vision. However, recent developments are beginning to lead 
towards a change in this dynamics. Firstly, the issue of the provision of free school meals 
became one of the main political issues in Korea’s most recent local elections. Secondly, 
welfare-friendly expert associations have raised the profile of discussion on the welfare state. 
For example, the Society for the Welfare State, which has modelled itself on the Fabian 
Society of the United Kingdom, has been instrumental in the discussion on social welfare 
issues and the drive to create a movement for a fully functioning welfare state in Korea. The 
author himself has actively participated in think-tank group composed of social policy 
scholars who have conducted research in the field of welfare and who have consistently 
promoted the welfare agenda. The efforts of such groups, which can be regarded as civil 
society organisations, have caused both political circles and civil societyto pay greater 
attention to the welfare state and the issue of welfare itself. As a result of such efforts, both 
the progressive Democratic Party and the Conservative Saenuri Party have shown increased 
interest in the welfare agenda, leading the parties to make competing welfare pledges to the 
public during both the general election and the presidential election in 2012. The most 
distinctive characteristic of welfare politics since 2008, however, has been how the campaign 
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for welfare reform has shifted from being one driven by the civil society movement’s and 
interest groups’ appeals to the public to one driven by political elections and the press (Shin, 
K. Y, 2012). 
 
8. 3 Overall reflections on the theoretical framework 
 
In this section, I will reflect on the implications and limitations of the theoretical framework I 
have used in this thesis. As I noted in Chapter4, the theorisation of welfare politics proved to 
be a considerable challenge for me as it is for other social scientists. I set up my framework 
entitled the ‘new politics of welfare reform in Korea’ or, more specifically, the‘politics of 
stakeholders and stake challengers’. It was found that this framework was both applicable and 
very useful for understanding the political mechanisms of welfare reforms in Korea. 
By focusing on various actors’ strategic activities and interactions, this thesis revealed actors’ 
identities, characteristics and political procedures in terms of Korean welfare politics. This 
framework was also persuasive in capturing the changes in Korean social policy caused by 
the dynamic and confrontational struggles between the stakeholder coalition and the stake 
challenger coalition In Korea. This framework might also have wider applicability.  A future 
study could explore whether this framework could be applied to the social policy changes of 
advanced countries (Taylor-Gooby, 2005; Van Kersbergen and Kis, 2014). 
I am confident that my theoretical framework and my research findings on the Korean case in 
terms of welfare politics will contribute to a better understanding of the characteristics of 
welfare politics and policychanges including, possibly, welfare reforms in other countries. In 
particular, the model of stake holders and stake challengers would be a useful one to explore 
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the dramatic policy changes and welfare reforms particularly in countries where there are 
ongoing debates between different groups about the direction of welfare reform. 
My framework does, however, have some limitations. As has been noted, the framework can 
reveal the role of policy actors, the interests they serve or represent and the strategic 
interactions.  From this perspective, welfare politics is viewed as a struggle between 
coalitions and alliances of policy actors for or against a direction of welfare reform. Although 
this framework has considerable strength, it tends to understate the role of ideas and 
discourses in welfare reform. For example, Haggard (1990a) suggests “that the plausibility of 
ideological arguments for policy choice increases with the degree of autonomy of political 
elites from societal or international constraints” (p.47).  Hwang (2002) also argues that “by 
focusing on the role of ideas, we may better understand how policy changes occur and how 
decision-makers come to recognize interest under conditions of uncertainty”(p.4). In my 
thesis, Itouch on this point in relation to the development of NHI integration (see p.246) but I 
could have considered this in greater depth.  However, the role of ideas was alluded to rather 
than analysed in relation to the proponents of reform.  Certainly, it would be worthwhile to 
explore the part that ideas and discourses might have played in the reforms of health 
insurance and pension in more detail and then incorporate this into a revised theoretical 
framework. Finally, I revealed the role of various actors and their characteristics but in a 
rather individual way. Their dynamic and collective dimensions could have been considered. 
The issue of welfare has generated animated discussion in Korea in recent years. Various 
discourses on welfare have emerged, and the arena of debate has moved beyond the academic 
world, with debates and disputes taking place in both political circles and in civil society. It is 
notable that this trend is considerably stronger during local, general, and presidential 
elections, and this strongly suggests that public pressure for welfare reform has become a 
significant political issue. For example, in the 2010 local elections, which were held in the 
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aftermath of the second major economic crisis in modern Korean history (that is, the global 
financial crisis of 2008), the most controversial issue was the provision of free school meals. 
However, the debates and disputes were not confined to single welfare issues. The debates 
moved on from individual welfare issues such as provision of free school meals to discourses 
on ways to build upon and improve Korea’s welfare state system. The very fact that related 
discussion of welfare policy was central to the politics of these elections and that these 
debates and disputes were addressed by a large number of politicians was an unprecedented 
phenomenon in the history of modern Korean politics. It was felt that if politicians failed to 
address the welfare and social policy concerns of the electorate, it was likely to prove 
difficult for them to obtain popular support (Shin, K.Y, 2012). With these developments, 
Therealm of decision makers such as bureaucrats, activists within Korean welfare politics 
could not be exclusive andinstead, interest groups and experts and has become an integral 
part of everyday politics and ordinary life. 
It is widely accepted within the academic world that the economic crises of 1997 and 2008 
were closely related to the changes in approach to welfare policy by both political actors and 
civil society and that they were instrumental in triggering discourse on welfare reform and 
welfare state reform. Even though the circumstances and the political and economic 
fundamentals of the two economic criseswere significantly different, the common outcome 
was the emergence of a ‘new welfare politics’. This is a crucial point to make as the changes 
in Korean welfare politics post-2008 ultimately stem from and build upon the situation that 
existed in the wake of the 1997 economic crisis and are intimately related to the changes that 
have occurred since that time. Since the 1997 economic crisis, people’s attitude towards 
welfare and welfare politics in Korea has shifted fundamentally, and welfare issues and 
welfare politics have gradually advanced towards the centre of the debate on the future of 
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Korea.2 Perhaps the most important aspect of these developments in Korean welfare politics 
was that the calls for welfare reform and welfare state development were led by a 
combination of civic groups and progressive policy experts and that the demands, strategies 
and participation of these political and social actors greatly influenced the decision-making 
process. Thus, it was the combination of economic crisis and political democratisation that 
acted as the driving force for social policy reform and the emergence of a new form of 
welfare politics in Korea.  
As this dissertation has not dealt with all the changes in Korean welfare politics during the 
period under discussion, it is necessary to mention the areas that still need to be addressed in 
future studies. Firstly, as a result of the conservative Grand National Party’s (since 2012, the 
Saenuri Party) victory in the 2007 presidential election, the Lee Myung-bak administration 
took office the following year. In early stages of Lee’s administration, welfare politics 
weakened in Korea (Shin, K.Y, 2012). The conservative administration tried to emphasise the 
difference between itself and the previous progressive government by promoting an ideology 
of ‘active welfare’ and by enacting wide-ranging neoliberal economic policies. Temporarily, 
welfare politics once again came to be seen as the preserve of elite bureaucrats (as it had been 
during the 1997 financial crisis and the democratisation of 1987) because civil organisations, 
which are the main actors in welfare politics, were ignored by the administration. During the 
2009 educational superintendent election, the 2010 local elections and the 2012 presidential 
election, the role of civil organisations as a participant in the decision-making process 
disappeared almost entirely, even though there were clearly civil society bodies that sought to 
stimulate alternative discourse on welfare policy and reform. Above all, the most notable 
feature of these elections was the emergence of political parties as the main actor in the 
                                                          
2While some scholars argue that the democratisation of 1987 and the period after it is the turning point in terms of welfare politics, I maintain that the economic crisis is in actuality the turning and tipping point for changes in terms of both welfare reform and welfare politics. 
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debate on welfare. As welfare became the political focal point of these elections, the role of 
welfare politics increased in the political parties’ election strategies, and the influence of 
parliament over welfare policy direction thus grew. In this way, welfare politics in Korea 
became increasingly institutionalised, with active debate on alternative visions of the welfare 
state and alternative welfare policies taking place among welfare politics actors and policy 
insiders. This phenomenon was amplified when the then presidential candidate Park Geun-
hye (now the president) highlighted welfare in her manifesto. While the single issue of free 
school meals was the initial catalyst for the advent of this new form of welfare politics, the 
current welfare debate has expanded to discussion of diverse welfare reforms, including 
pension reform, free medical care and other issues. In light of the emergence of welfare 
reform both as an political issue and an election strategy, and with the rise of new debate on 
welfare policy within both political circles and wider society, there is a need to conduct an in-
depth investigation into how Korean welfare politics is changing under the influence of these 
new variables.  
Finally, I believe that detailed mention should be made of the strengths of the theory of 
welfare politics that has been employed in this thesis. The theory of welfare politics is based 
on the thesis that every welfare policy and each decision-making process is 
political(Kim,Y.S,2007). In the case of Korea, however, there was a period before the 
financial crisis, and especially before democratisation, in which the concept of welfare 
politics did not exist. After the 1997 financial crisis and the swearing in of Kim Dae-jung’s 
democratic government, welfare politics gained greater attention. These changes boosted 
Korean academics’ interest in welfare politics, and while there has not been extensive 
research conducted on Korean welfare politics thus far, a number of pioneering scholars have 
led efforts to conceptualise and study welfare politics in the Korean context. To date, research 
has drawn upon the Western theory of welfare politics and has centred on class, beneficiaries, 
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rules and sources of power.Kim,Y. S (2007) maintains that these studies can broadly be 
distinguished by the two differing approaches that they take to the research area: one focuses 
on structure and context, and the other on the interaction among the main actors. For this 
dissertation, I drew upon an approach from the second category, that is, power-centred action 
theory, which was then modified and developed into a particular framework through which I 
could explore the changes within Korean welfare policy via case studies of pension reform 
and the integration of medical insurance. As noted in Chapter 4, the most significant point of 
power-centred action theory is its emphasis on strategic coalition or alliance through which 
competing policies frame the interactions between an anti-reform coalition and a pro-reform 
coalition.  
Thus, the success or failure of reform is ultimately determined by the power relationship 
between stake challengers and the stakeholders (Kim, Y.S, 2007). This theoretical perspective 
led me to consider the range of actors (including the working class) emphasised by power 
resource theory. It also showed how the interests of civil organisations transform into political 
actions via political institutions and through the linkages that form between societal actors 
and political actors around interests and policy coalitions or alliances.  
In conclusion, welfare reforms under the Kim Dae-jung government were products of the 
interactions between stakeholder and stake challenger coalitions and the result of the stake 
challenger coalition’s strategic victory. In this thesis, I have defined this framework as the 
new politics of welfare reform, and it has demonstrated its utility by revealing the struggles 
between the stakeholder coalition and the stake challenger coalition and their dynamic 
interactions. The framework has served to illustrate how civil organisations overcame the 
stakeholder coalition’s objections and finally won the battle for health care and public 
pension reform. 
267 
 
Given that the history of social policy itself could perhaps be interpreted as a product of the 
struggles between stakeholders and stake challengers, the strength of the theoretical 
framework adopted in this thesis might have applicability beyond the Korean case.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1.The Process of Health Insurance Expansion in South Korea 
 
Year Expansion of Health Insurance Percentage of Insured Citizens 
1977 Implementation of the National Health Insurance (NHI) (firms with 500 or more workers) and the National Health Assistant Program 
8.8 
1979 Expansion of the NHI coverage to civil servants, private school teachers, and firms with 300 or more workers  
21.2 
1981 Expansion of the NHI coverage to firms with 100 or more workers 28.7 
1988 Implementation of NHI coverage to farmers and fisherman and firms with 5 or more workers 
69.5 
1989 Expansion of the NHI coverage to the urban self-employed 94.2 
1999 Integration of the NHI scheme with the revised NHI Act in 1999 
2003 Complete integration of the Health Insurance Fund 
 
Appendix 2.The Process of National Pension Expansion in South Korea 
 
Year Expansion of National Pension 
1973 Enactment of National Welfare Pension (NWP) Act  
1974 Suspension of Implementing NWP Act 
1988 Implementation of National Pension (NP) Act 
1992 Expansion of NP application to firms with 5 or more workers 
1995 Expansion of NP application to farmers and fisherman 
1999 Expansion of NP application to the urban self-employed 
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